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ABSTRACT
As the United States looked forward to its future as an independent nation at the
end of the eighteenth century, many saw commerce as a way to secure the nation’s future.
American commerce, however, was plagued by a number of commercial problems.
Solving these commercial problems facilitated an interest in science and the practical arts
as engineers, inventors, mechanics, public officials, and everyday tinkerers innovated
new apparatuses to preserve, promote, and protect American commerce. Many of
America’s commercial problems in the early nineteenth century, however, resulted from
the young nation’s varied geography and environments. Combating the environment’s
unrelenting forces often exceeded the resources of private citizens and necessitated the
involvement of the state. This can be seen in the advent of government agencies such as
the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Survey, and the Light-House Establishment.
Notwithstanding, the government’s involvement in practical science and innovation
proceeded cautiously and unevenly. This caution and uneven involvement on the part of
the government derived from societally held values of Jeffersonian republicanism.
Republican values of civic duty, prudence, honesty, and self-reliance, thus shaped the
government’s role in advancing practical science and the arts in the early nineteenth
century United States.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Currently in the United States there is a debate over the value of science and
technology. Scott Pruitt, the newly confirmed head of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), for instance, denies the existence of global warming despite the wealth of
scientific evidence that the planet is undergoing severe changes in climate. The
Administration has expressed its desire to eliminate the EPA. According to the
Administration, eliminating the EPA benefits business by reducing the costly burden of
complying with environmental protection policies. In addition to the Administration’s
plans for the EPA, the Administration’s proposed budget drastically cuts funding for
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has voiced similar concerns over the
devaluing of science. Scientists have organized a protest march at the Nation’s capital in
April to push back against the Administration’s stance on science and to demonstrate the
importance of science to the public good.
The current debate over science and the government’s involvement in scientific
practice is nothing new. Between the late eighteenth century and the middle of the
nineteenth century, a similar debate raged over the government’s involvement in practical
science and the mechanical arts. The eighteenth and nineteenth century debate, however,
did not question the validity of science and it did not see science as a hindrance to
business and commerce. Rather, in the early 1800s, science was seen as a boon for
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commerce. The debate from two centuries ago sought justification for the government’s
involvement in science and whether or not the military was better suited for scientific
production than the artisan craftsmen, merchants, and everyday tinkerers. Similar to the
present Administration’s focus on business, commerce and the economy were major
concerns for the government that ultimately shaped their decision to become involved.
The environment also played role. Dissimilar from the current Administration’s
views that environmental regulations are an obstacle to business, early nineteenth-century
Americans saw the environment itself as challenging commerce and economic growth. In
many instances, however, the unrelenting forces of nature proved too much for private
enterprise. The natural world forced the government into pursuing practical science and
innovation in order to protect the nation’s commerce.
The project that follows is a study of the interaction between science, technology,
commerce and the state in the early United States. As commerce in the first half of the
nineteenth century relied heavily on maritime shipping this project examines the Army
Corps of Engineers’ work in constructing port infrastructure, the Coast Survey’s charting
of the coastal boundaries and hazards, the Light-House Establishment’s attempts to
protect maritime commerce from navigational hazards, and the private network of marine
telegraphs efforts to improve port efficiencies. The following chapters examine the
interaction of these institutions in defining the role of public and private involvement in
commerce and science. The wreck of the Union on Baker’s Island in Massachusetts
provides an excellent illustration of the interaction between science, technology,
commerce and the state.
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In the wee hours of the early morning on February 27, 1827, the Union began its
final approach toward the harbor at Salem, Massachusetts. Captained by a 31-year old
shipmaster named William Osgood, the Union and its crew were returning home after a
nine-month voyage to Pulo Penang in the Far East.1 The Union carried a cargo of pepper
and block tin valued at $80,000 ($1.47 million in 2015 dollars).2 Unfortunately, as the
Union was nearing the end of its journey, the ship encountered a surprise snowstorm. The
sea became rough as a result. Combined with the darkness of the new moon, the
snowstorm made it impossible for the crew to ascertain their location. The Union’s only
hope for determining their exact position was the lighthouse on Baker’s Island. Yet, when
Osgood and the crew spotted the beacon, they mistook it for the Boston Harbor Light. In
what proved to be a fatal mistake, Osgood ordered the crew to turn south causing the
Union to run aground on Baker’s Island. As the grounded Union lay helpless, the storm
surge almost immediately began ripping the ship apart. Within hours, the cargo was
strewn along the island’s shore and the Union was a complete loss. Osgood however was
not entirely at fault for causing the disaster by ordering the crew to turn southward. Eight
months earlier, the government announced plans to make extensive repairs the Baker’s
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Pulo Penang is located in the Strait of Malacca off the coast of Malaysia. Historically,
Pulo Penang has been known as the Prince of Wales Island, Areca Island, and many other
names. Today, Pulo Penang is known simply as Penang Island.
2
George Granville Putnam, Salem Vessels and Their Voyages: A History of the Pepper
Trade with the Island of Sumatra (Salem, MA: The Essex Institute, 1922), 43. “Baker’s
Island Lights,” Salem Gazette (Massachusetts) May 29, 1818. Dollar values for 1817
were converted to current values using Samuel H. Williamson, “Seven Ways to Compute
the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to present,” Measuring Worth, 2015,
http://www.measuringworth.com (accessed December 18, 2016). Use of Williamson’s
currency converter is for illustrative purposes only to aid in comprehension of the ship’s
value.
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Island Lighthouse.3 The repairs included altering the height of the tower and
extinguishing the light’s second lamp, which had been a fixture on Baker’s Island since
the government established the lighthouse there in 1798. Osgood expected the lighthouse
at Baker’s Island to confirm his position within the approaches of the harbor, but it did
not. The lighthouse failed to meet Osgood’s expectations because the alterations made
the Baker’s Island Light indistinguishable from the Boston Harbor Light. Osgood and the
crew of the Union were unaware of the alterations. The Union had already set sail for the
Far East when the notice of the proposed changes was published. Fortunately, Osgood
and all of the crew survived the wreck despite the loss of the ship and cargo.4 Stephen
Phillips and George Pierce, the owners of the Union, carried insurance on the ship and its
cargo, but the loss exceeded the insurance coverage by $35,000.5 After three years of
ongoing complaints by mariners that the Baker’s Island Lighthouse was inadequate for its
intended purpose, the government was forced to relight the second lamp. It did nothing in
regards to restoring the light to is original height.6
As previously stated, the wreck of the Union illustrates the relationship between
science, technology, commerce, and the state in the United States in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Several factors influenced innovation and the development of
practical science in America. Commerce, for instance, was a driving force behind the
state establishing its authority over the navigation in 1789 with the just the ninth act of
3

H.A.S. Dearborn, “Notice to Mariners,” Nantucket Gazette (Nantucket, MA), July 1,
1816.
4
Putnam, 43-5.
5
Putnam, 44. James Risk, “Ship to Shore: Infrastructure and the Growth of American
Seaports, 1790 – 1850, (MA thesis, UMBC, 2011), 25-6.
6
Risk, 26. Edward Rowe Snow, The Lighthouses of New England, (1945; repr., Beverly,
MA: Commonwealth Editions, 2002), 154.
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the new constitutional Congress. This act stipulated that the federal government would
assume all responsibilities for the administration, maintenance, and support of the buoys,
lights, and public piers to ensure safe navigation “within any bay, inlet, harbor, or port of
the United States.”7 Previous to the act, these assets were administered by the individual
states under the Articles of Confederation. In passing the act, Congress showed its intent
to facilitate commerce and the economic growth of the young nation. Congress saw the
protection of the nation’s commercial interests as means of securing and protecting the
nation itself. Nearly 90 percent of the nation’s revenue came from customs duties in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.8 Shipwrecks impacted the state’s revenues
through lost customs duties. They also impacted the local economy through lost wages
and profits on sellable goods. A single shipwreck could mean financial ruin for a
merchant or ship owner.
In 1802, Congress established the Army Corps of Engineers at West Point. In the
beginning, the Army Corps of Engineers primarily focused on building defenses for the
nation’s major ports. Harbor defenses were not only necessary for the security of the
nation; they were also important for the safety of American commerce. This was
especially true for a young developing nation like the United States, making American
ports more susceptible to attack. One of the surest ways to cripple an enemy combatant is
to cripple their economy and attacking American ports was sure to cripple its ability to
fight. As previously mentioned, the majority of economic activity around the world
remained tied to the maritime sector and the ocean’s access to global markets in the first
7

United States Congress, An act to provide for the establishment and support of
Lighthouses, Beacons, Buoys, and Public Piers, 1st Cong., 1st sess., ch. 9, sec. I, 1789.
8
Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 339.
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decades of the nineteenth century.
Five years later, Congress, at the request of President Thomas Jefferson, created
the Coast Survey to chart harbors, shipping lanes, shoals, and other aspects of the coast
related to navigation. Here again, the government’s primary concern was for the
preservation of commerce. As Samuel Whittlesey Dana, a Federalist Congressman from
Connecticut, argued, the coast survey would be in the “interest of our merchants” and
benefit the nation’s revenue. Dana also believed a survey of the coast would protect
mariners engaged in commercial shipping from being impressed by the British into the
Royal Navy. An accurate survey might force the British to respect America’s sovereignty
within twenty leagues of the land where most of the impressments occurred.9
Early American ports were vulnerable because of the young nation’s fledging
military. Although the American colonies had defeated the most powerful nation on earth
to establish their independence, the threat of war continued to loom large for the United
States in the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth
century. Americans divided their political loyalties between two of Europe’s most bitter
enemies – Britain and France – who were either at war themselves or on the verge of war
until the fall of Napoleon in 1815. This division left the United States without a firm ally.
Britain had not forgotten the American rebellion and eyed any opportunity to reassert its
power and reclaim its former colonies. France, who aided the American colonies in their
bid for independence, turned against the United States in a quasi-war because of
America’s refusal to reciprocate the aide during France’s war with Britain. For these

9

Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2nd sess., 1807, 152.
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reasons, the United States Army Corps of Engineers focused their efforts on protecting
the young nation’s port cities by building fortresses and improving harbor defenses.
The federal government’s concern for commerce and the government’s actions in
response to that concern therefore made it the state’s responsibility to ensure the Baker’s
Island Lighthouse provided protection against the possibility of shipwreck. Yet, Osgood
and others blamed the inadequacy of the Baker’s Island Lighthouse for doing the exact
opposite – causing shipwrecks. The alterations of the Baker’s Island Lighthouse and the
wreck of the Union that followed is a classic example of James C. Scott’s argument in
Seeing Like a State. Scott argues the state’s good intentions did not always square with
the reality of the situation and sometimes good intentions by the state led to bad
outcomes.10
The government’s involvement in innovation and practical science, however, was
also quite uneven. This was due in part to the how the state appropriated money to
science and the arts as well as how the state managed its involvement in those fields. In
terms of appropriations, the state was limited in its financial resources at the end of the
eighteenth century and for a significant portion of the early nineteenth century. Congress
had to prioritize those resources and divide them as they saw fit. This often left the
agencies involved in practical science short of the money they needed to adequately
perform their duties and engage in science. On the management side, Congress did not
legislate science and the arts, but instead left decisions of agency oversight to the
superintendents of the various organizations. These superintendents took it upon
10

James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition have Failed, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 247, 258, 287,
408.
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themselves to craft scientific agendas and pursue science within their departments. Thus,
the state built its knowledge base through scientific-minded institutions such as the Army
Corps of Engineers, the Coast Survey and the Light-House Service. As these institutions
gained a respect for their scientific endeavors, their skills became more valuable to the
general good of the nation and the demand for their expertise grew exponentially.
STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION
Chapter 2 examines the role of commerce in innovation, practical science and the
arts in the early United States. This opening chapter introduces commerce as an important
factor shaping American innovation and identifies some of the problems facing the
nation’s commerce. The chapter also looks at what science and the practical arts meant to
inventors, merchants, and even consumers. Individuals were undoubtedly concerned with
profits, but they were also interested in solving everyday problems. Maritime disasters
and port efficiency were major concerns for the individuals. Many of the inventors
discussed in the following chapters were actually merchants who tinkered on the side.
Others were retired shipmasters whose maritime experience provided them with an
intimate insight into the commercial needs of their local communities, states, and the
nation as a whole. A few of the innovators were even government agents. Most of these
inventors, however, engaged in tinkering because they saw an opportunity to solve
commercial problems and possibly make a small profit form their efforts. Few expected
to get rich or to make innovation their livelihood.
Chapter 3 introduces the environmental need for practical science and the
involvement of the state. The chapter identifies ways in which the natural world shaped
innovation and science in the early nineteenth century United States. The environment
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posed many challenges for Americans with regard to commerce. From the dangerous
shoals and maritime hazards to the obstructed views of approaching ships, the natural
world created both a need for science and the arts as well as a space in which science and
innovation could thrive. The environment provided resources for innovation and science.
Contractors used the environment’s natural resources to build lighthouses and marine
telegraph stations, often drawing on the immediate area surrounding the structure for the
necessary building materials. Elevated spaces gave these structures the height needed to
observe or warn approaching ships. In other cases, the environment presented challenges
that individuals and the state sought to overcome. At Carysfort Reef off the Florida Keys,
the hollow shoal forced engineers to redesign the foundation of an offshore lighthouse in
order to properly anchor it to the sea floor. For the marine telegraph, the environment
influenced the use of particular colors on signal flags due to those colors’ higher visibility
in various weather conditions.
Chapter 4 provides a scientific and technological solution to the commercial and
environmental challenges laid out in the first two chapters. That solution was the LightHouse Establishment. Chapter 4 examines the science and innovation that occurred in the
Light-House Establishment prior to the 1850s. Similar to Hugh Richard Slotten, Thomas
G. Manning, and Todd Shallat’s narratives of the Coast Survey and Army Corps of
Engineers, Chapter 4 argues the Light-House Establishment was one of the state’s first
scientific enterprises. This argument goes against many of the mainstream histories of the
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Light-House Establishment, which portray the agency as anti-science.11 At issue with the
previous narratives is what constitutes science in the early United States to make the
assumption that the Establishment was anti-science. Chapter 4 looks at a variety of
innovations and experiments conducted under the aegis of the Light-House Establishment
to demonstrate the extent that the establishment engaged in scientific practice. Many of
the innovations and experiments discussed in this chapter not only meet the criteria of
science in the early nineteenth century, but would also qualify as science in a more
modern twentieth century understanding of the term.
The state’s involvement in innovation and science was also influenced by the
political climate of the time. Republican values, such as civic duty, prudence, honesty,
and self-reliance, played an important role in shaping the state’s involvement with
science. Chapter 5 looks specifically at these republican values and argues for their role
in shaping the state’s involvement in innovation, practical science and the arts.
Americans articulated these republican values during the revolutionary period. After the
American Revolution, republicanism continued to dominate political thought well into
the nineteenth century. The irony of American republicanism is that the ideology often
appeared opposed to science even though its leader, Thomas Jefferson, was intimately
engaged in natural philosophy, practical science, and the arts. This, however, was clearly
not the case and Chapter 5 makes an argument for how Jeffersonian republicanism
shaped scientific progress in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century.
11

Francis Ross Holland, Jr., America’s Lighthouses: An Illustrated History, (1972; repr.,
New York: Dover Publications, 1988). Theresa Levitt, A Short Bright Flash: Augustin
Fresnel and the Birth of the Modern Lighthouse, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
2013). Eric Jay Dolin, Brilliant Beacons: A History of the American Lighthouse, (New
York: Liveright Publishing, 2016).
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Most scholars of Jeffersonian republicanism, including Drew R. McCoy and Lance
Banning, fail to discuss republican values in relation to science in the early United
States.12 John Lauritz Lawson and Daniel Walker Howe may be two exceptions. Lawson
and Walker discuss republicanism in broad terms as they discuss internal improvements,
but their narratives imply the relationship between science and republicanism more than
implicitly stating the connection.13
The final chapter examines the state’s uneven involvement in scientific practice
by exploring the three aforementioned state agencies, how they interacted with each
other, and how they used innovation, practical science, and the arts to meet the nation’s
needs and advance the scientific enterprise in the United States. This chapter shows how
science and innovation were part of a broader system of commercial governance.
Previous histories of the Army Corps of Engineers, Coast Survey, and Light-House
Establishment have examined the institutions in isolation and have looked internally at

12

Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America,
(1980; repr., Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1996). Lance Banning, The Jefferson Persuasion:
Evolution of a Party Ideology, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980).
13
John Lauritz Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of
Popular Government in the Early United States, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2001). Daniel
Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought? The Transformation of America, 1815-1848,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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the individual agencies.14 The final chapter seeks to remedy those errors.
CHRONOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE
I set the perimeters of the project between the establishment of the constitutional
government in the United States and the American Civil War. I set these perimeters,
because of how I define the state’s involvement in innovation and practical science.
Generally, in referring to the state, I am referring to the federal government and all of its
entities. Prior to the ratification of the constitution, the individual states held more power
under the Articles of Confederation. This limited the federal government’s relationship to
science, technology, and commerce. At the other end of the spectrum, the American Civil
War marked a drastic turning point in the history of the United States. By the outbreak of
hostilities in 1860, the state was fully engaged in commerce, science and technology.
Additionally, by the mid 1850s, most of the historical actors in this study were dead.

14

Hugh Richard Slotten, Patronage, Practice, and the Culture of American Science:
Alexander Dallas Bache and the U.S. Coast Survey, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1994). Todd Shallat, Structures in the Stream: Water, Science, and the Rise of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994). Thomas G.
Manning, U.S. Coast Survey vs. Naval Hydrographic Office: A 19th Century Rivalry in
Science and Politics, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1988). Henry E.
Barber and Allen R. Gann, A History of the Savannah District U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, (Savannah, GA: Savannah District USACE, 1989). Frank N. Schubert, ed.,
The Nation Builders: A Sesquicentennial History of the Corps of Topographical
Engineers, 1838-1863, (Fort Belvoir, VA: USACE, 1988). Aubrey Parkman, Army
Engineers in New England: The Military and Civil Work of the Corps of Engineers in
New England, 1775-1975, (Waltham, MA: USACE New England Division, 1978).
Harold Kanarek, The Mid-Atlantic Engineers: A History of the Baltimore District U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 1774-1974, (Washington: Superintendent of Documents GPO,
1975). George Rockwell Putnam, Lighthouses and Lightships of the United States, (New
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1917). Francis Ross Holland, Jr., America’s Lighthouses:
Their Illustrated History Since 1716, (Brattleboro, VT: Stephen Greene Press, 1972).
Dennis L. Noble, Lighthouses and Keepers: The United States Lighthouse Service and Its
Legacy, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999).
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Geographically, this study is mostly limited to the Atlantic coast, Great Lakes,
and Gulf coast where the majority of the Army Corps of Engineers, Coast Survey, LightHouse Establishment, and private marine telegraph’s work took place between 1789 and
1860. This is not meant to discount the scientific work of these institutions occurring on
the Pacific coast, which for the most part, did not occur until the very latter part of this
study. Including work on the Pacific coast may be an area of consideration should this
dissertation ever become a published manuscript.
CAST OF IMPORTANT CHARACTERS
The individuals highlighted in this study were a diverse lot. They came from
every walk of life – rich, poor, and middle-class –, included various ethnicities and races,
and comprised both men and women of every age. Children were not excepted. A few
individuals make repeated appearances throughout the narrative. It is therefore necessary
to introduce this important cast of characters here.
James Elford was a retired sea captain and prominent figure in Charleston, South
Carolina until his death in 1826. Elford migrated to Charleston from Bristol, England. In
the late 1810s, Elford established a navigational school on East Bay Street directly across
from the Merchant’s Exchange. Understanding the commercial needs of Charleston’s
merchants and shipmasters, Elford designed a semophoric system for communicating
between ships and the shore, which he patented in 1823. While most others involved in
marine telegraphs applied the science locally, Elford envisioned a universal system that
could be used by any ship, in any port, at any time and still be understood by all who
were familiar with the system.

13

Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler was a Swiss mathematician who immigrated to the
United States after conducting several government-sanctioned surveys in Europe.
Hassler’s presence in the United States was instrumental in the establishment of the Coast
Survey. Thomas Jefferson and the American Philosophical Society both supported the
creation of the Coast Survey as a means for providing Hassler with employment for his
scientific expertise. Congress approved Hassler’s appointment as the first Superintendent
of the Coast Survey in 1807. Hassler was removed as Superintendent of the Coast Survey
in 1816 when an act of Congress prohibited civilians from participating in the survey, but
was reappointed as superintendent of the survey in 1832 because of the lack of progress
made by the military. Hassler remained the Superintendent of the Coast Survey until his
death in 1843.
Benjamin Henry Latrobe was the United States’ “first” architect and engineer. He
studied in England under Samuel Pepys Cockerell and John Smeaton, respectively before
coming to the United States. Latrobe was appointed the Chief Surveyor of Public
Buildings, oversaw the construction of the Bank of Philadelphia and the dome on the
United States Capitol Building. In the first decade of the 1800s, Latrobe designed an
elaborate lighthouse structure for the mouth of the Mississippi River. His designs were
held up by the inaction of Congress and the War of 1812. The Treasury Department,
which oversaw the Light-House Establishment, ultimately approved a design by
Latrobe’s son, however because Latrobe’s son succumbed to yellow fever, the elder
Latrobe later supervised construction of the lighthouse. Latrobe succumbed to yellow
fever in 1820.
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Lieutenant Isaiah William Penn (I. W. P.) Lewis was an engineer in the Army
Corps of Engineers’ Topographical Bureau and the nephew of the Light-House
Establishment’s main contractor, Winslow Lewis. In the mid-1830s, Lieutenant Lewis
was commissioned to conduct a survey on the condition of the Light-House
Establishment. His report was extremely critical of Stephen Pleasonton’s administration
of the Establishment and of his uncle’s contract work for the agency. Lieutenant Lewis
invented an oil lamp for use in the Light-House Establishment and was a staunch
supporter of importing the French-made Fresnel lens to improve coastal lighting.
Lieutenant Lewis also designed the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse in the late 1840s.
Winslow Lewis was a retired sea captain from Wellfleet, Massachusetts who
tinkered with inventing and improving lighting apparatuses for ships and coastal
navigations. In 1810, Lewis patented a knock-off of Ami Argand’s oil lamp and sold the
patent to the United States government. Lewis’ contract with the government called for
him to maintain the lamps and provide oil to all of the nation’s lighthouses. He later
began contracting to build lighthouses for the Light-House Establishment. Lewis
maintained his contract for supplying the Establishment with his patented lamp and
reflector system until the early 1850s. In the mid to late 1810s, Lewis became embroiled
in a patent lawsuit with his business partner, David Melville.
Lieutenant George Gordon Meade was an engineer in the Army Corps
Topographical Bureau. He later became known as the Union general who opposed
General Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Gettysburg. Lieutenant Meade was assigned to
build the Brandywine Shoal Lighthouse in the Delaware Bay in 1848, where he first
learned of and used the screwpile foundation pioneered by Alexander Mitchell, a blind
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Irish engineer. In the early 1850s, Lieutenant Meade was assigned to build lighthouses in
Florida. One of Lieutenant Meade’s assignments was the completion of the Carysfort
Reef Lighthouse. Captain Howard Stansbury started construction on the Carysfort
Lighthouse, but was reassigned to survey the Great Salt Lake in Utah. During the
construction of the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse, engineers had to modify the proposed
screwpile foundation design and created what is now known as the diskpile foundation.
Due to the change in leadership at Carysfort, some historians credit Lieutenant Meade
with the invention of the diskpile foundation. It is more plausible to believe the diskpile
foundation was already installed by the time Meade arrived. Meade invented a hydraulic
oil lamp that he installed at the Sand Key Lighthouse, which was later adopted by the
Light-House Board for general use.
David Melville was a Newport, Rhode Island stationer and hardware merchant. In
the first and second decades of the nineteenth century, Melville became interested in
natural gas lighting. He formed a business partnership with Winslow Lewis to promote
natural gas lighting for homes and businesses. In Melville’s spare time, he tinkered with
improvements to the Argand style oil lamp.
Lemuel Moody was a retired sea captain from Portland, Massachusetts (Maine
after the Missouri Compromise of 1820) who established a marine telegraph station in
1807 based on Captain David Porter, Sr.’s signals in Baltimore. Moody also created maps
and charts of Portland’s harbor in 1825. Moody ran the telegraph until his death in 1846.
John Rowe Parker was a Boston merchant who invested in the marine telegraph,
particularly the system designed by James Elford of Charleston, South Carolina. Parker’s
main business was the Franklin Music Warehouse, which sold musical instruments and
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sheet music. As an agent of Elford’s system, Parker sought to universalize the marine
telegraph from the 1823 until his death in 1844. His telegraph operators, Charles Beck,
Frederick W.A.L. Brown, and Jonathon Bruce all conducted scientific experiments on
cloths and dyes.
Stephen Pleasonton served as the Fifth Auditor of the Treasury from 1820 until
the early 1850s. During his tenure as Fifth Auditor, Pleasonton was charged with
overseeing the Light-House Establishment. His administration came under heavy
criticism in the mid to late 1830s because of his failure to import the superior Fresnel
lighthouse lens and the poor overall condition of the nation’s lighthouses.
Captain David Porter, Sr. established the first marine telegraph in the United
States on Federal Hill overlooking the Patapsco River in Baltimore in 1797. He was the
grandfather of Admiral David Porter and the great-grandfather of Commodore David
Dixon Porter. Admiral Porter served in the Barbary Wars and the War of 1812.
Commodore David Porter served in the American Civil War.
Captain Howard Stansbury was an engineer with the Army Corps of Engineers
Topographical Bureau. Stansbury was assigned to build the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse,
which utilized a design by Irish engineer Alexander Mitchell known as the screwpile
foundation. Sources appear to support Stansbury as the originator of the diskpile
innovation that derived from the screwpile, but as stated earlier, some historians claim the
invention was the work of Lieutenant George Gordon Meade.
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RELEVANT HISTORIOGRAPHY
As Ann Johnson noted in her essay “STEM in the EAR,” science and technology
are mostly invisible in the historiography of the early United States.15 Johnson argues this
invisibility is due to the “ubiquity, as much as its poor resemblance to post-WWII
science.”16 A small handful of works from the late 1980s to the present confirm
Johnson’s assessment. These works include Judith McGaw’s Most Wonderful Machine
(1989), Carroll Pursell’s edited volume Technology in America (1990), Eda Kranakis’
Constructing a Bridge (1996), John F. Kasson’s Civilizing the Machine (1999), David E.
Nye’s American Technological Sublime, and Andrew J. Lewis’ A Democracy of Facts
(2011).17 Aside from Lewis, most of the works discussing science and technology in the
early United States do not limit themselves to that period and go well into the latter part
of the nineteenth century. McGaw’s narrative, for instance, chronicles papermaking in
Berkshire, Massachusetts through the mid 1880s and Nye’s study includes a discussion
on the sublimity of electricity in the late nineteenth century. Science and technology in
the history of the early United States is thus scattered and sporadic in the literature and
historians must attempt a scavenger hunt of sorts to locate relevant information.
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Johnson’s own work examines the role of engineers in “shaping the nation – both
physically and culturally – in the early republic.”18 Johnson asks scholars to consider
“what counted as science?” and “why did a particular activity or body of knowledge
count as science?”19 If scholars follow Johnson’s advice and consider the stakes for
“making a claim of being scientific” in the period, it becomes easier to identify science
and technology in the history of the early United States and thus easier to write about it.20
Science was not just practiced by great men such as Thomas Jefferson, Joseph Henry, and
Alexander Dallas Bache. It was also practiced by the James Elfords, Winslow Lewises,
David Melvilles, and Lemuel Moodys of the world. This study thus adds to the history of
science and technology in the early United States with its attempt to answer Johnson’s
question of “what counted as science” and considering the work of everyday people in
those terms.
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CHAPTER 2
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN COMMERCE
Commerce was the driving force behind many Americans’ involvement in
practical science and the mechanical arts. Commerce, however, was intricately tied to
shipping and navigation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Shipping
and navigation came with its own set of challenges. Navigating the open sea required
mariners to understand the principles of astronomy because they used the stars to
pinpoint their location. Navigating the shipping lanes and coastal waters were fraught
with numerous hazards. Protecting commerce meant having to solve these commercial
challenges and many Americans found solutions to these challenges by engaging in
scientific practice. In fact, solving commercial problems drove many Americans to
science and the arts who otherwise might not have ventured into those fields. What
follows are examples that illustrate the types of commercial problems Americans faced
and the solutions they created for those problems using practical science and the
mechanical arts.
In 1798, a Wellfleet, Massachusetts shipmaster named Winslow Lewis wrote to
the Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, that he, Lewis, “was passing a Barber shop
in Boston and observed an Uncommon Light being thrown into the street from the
window.” Lewis’ curiosity with the light led him into the barber’s shop where he
discovered the shop owner “had got a Lenses [sic] about two inches in Diameter Placed
into the Window behind which he had a Candle.” Lewis realized the lens caused the light
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to be thrown “a great distance altho the Night was Unusuly [sic] Dark.” He surmised that
a similar apparatus “would have a good effect in a Light house.” Lewis set about creating
a lens and reflector unit that could be used in coastal beacons. To Lewis’ dismay,
however, he “found that the Lenses Could Not be made in this Country of the size
Suitable for Light houses.”1
Lewis returned to the sea following his “discovery.” For the next several years
Lewis was “constantly Employed in Foreign Voyages.”2 The Embargo Act of 1807,
signed into law by Thomas Jefferson, abruptly ended Lewis’ time at sea and Lewis
resumed his work in the mechanical arts hoping to support his growing family. Lewis’
tinkering in the mechanical arts resulted in the invention of his “Patent sky Light for
ship[’]s decks.” A year later in 1808, Lewis created his “Patent Reflecting bin[n]acle
illuminator.”3
Lewis’ inventions met with such great reception that word of his work came to the
attention of Commodore John Rodgers. Rodgers was interested in finding a way to
provide better lighting for the ammunition magazines on the navy’s ships of war. The
naval officer asked Lewis if he could construct an apparatus to that effect. Lewis said he
could and for the next several months Lewis tinkered with various materials to construct
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something that would satisfy the commodore’s request. After four months, Lewis
presented his reflecting magazine lantern to Commodore Rodgers.4
After patenting his reflecting magazine lantern, Lewis spent a year perfecting his
lamp and reflector system (Figure 2.1) for lighthouses that he envisioned in 1798. In May
1810, Lewis received permission from Albert Gallatin to test his lamp and reflector in the
Cape Ann Lighthouse north of Boston. The experiment proved successful and Lewis
patented his lamp and reflector system that summer.5
There are no records indicating how much Lewis made off his binnacle
illuminator and reflecting magazine lantern patents. It does not appear that he entered into
manufacturing them long term. His patent for the lighthouse lamp and reflector system
did not pay dividends until 1812 when the government purchased the rights to the patent.
Thus, it appears Lewis did not profit much from his tinkering in the mechanical arts. In
November 1810, Lewis returned to the sea and his livelihood as a shipmaster engaged in
foreign and transatlantic voyages.6
Lewis’ November voyage took him to Holyhead, England. While there, Lewis
found the lighthouse at Holyhead fitted with reflectors. This discovery must have alarmed
Lewis, for upon his return to the United States, Lewis defended his lens and reflector as
being solely his idea.
I am confident that there was never a reflector made
before my invention in any Optical principal[.] Now I
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Figure 2.1 Winslow Lewis Lamp and Reflector Patent #1305, June 8, 1810. Courtesy of
the Smithsonian Institution NMAH / Maritime.
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have no idea that the principle of reflecting and
magnifying by reflectors [&] lenses was ever before
attempted. The principle of my reflector is allowed by all
scientific men to be a thing not before known. that the
Whole Combination of the apparatus is not an invention
of mine never has been doubted. I can aDD no stronger
proof than my oath on the specification [sic] – Mr. Loy
[&] Mr. Quincy, Mr. Turner [&] Mr. Green - all have
long known me [&] are well acquainted with my
character [&] the progress of my inventions from the
commencement of them.4
Although Lewis installed his lamp and reflector in the Cape Ann lighthouse before his
visit to Holyhead, the impulsiveness of his defense seems suspicious; almost selfincriminating. According to the British lighthouse engineer Alan Stevenson, Britain had
been using a parabolic reflector in their lamps since at least 1794, or almost 20 years
before Lewis patented his system in the United States.5 Captain R. R. Crocker testified in
a letter to revenue collector John P. Norton that “Captain Winslow Lewis, of Boston,
took the plan of the house and reflectors at Holyhead.”6 Several historians, including
Amy K. Marshall, Terry Pepper and Wayne Wheeler, have also claimed Lewis “stole”
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the design for his lamp from that of François Pierre Aimé Argand.7 Marshall cites Lewis’
nephew, Army Corps of Engineers Lieutenant I.W.P. Lewis, who charged his uncle with
plagiarizing the lighting of the South Stack Lighthouse at Holyhead.8
François Pierre Aimé Argand was a Swiss physicist who patented an oil-burning
lamp in 1781. Argand died in 1803, but his lamp had been installed in English
lighthouses as early as 1792 and was widely adopted in non-maritime applications
throughout Europe.9 (It was also introduced in the United States among early republic
elites including Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George Washington.)10 As
Winslow Lewis had been a shipmaster prior to his inventions in the first decade of the
nineteenth century, it is conceivable that he witnessed Argand’s lamp on a previous trip
to Europe before he installed his lamp and reflector at Cape Ann. Argand’s patent in
England, however, was invalidated due to similar lamps being in use prior to issuing the
patent. Correspondence of Johann Sabastian Clais in the Conservatoire des Arts et
Metiers in Paris indicate Argand witnessed a demonstration of Benjamin Franklin’s oil
lamp in England and returned to Paris to construct a lamp of Argand’s own design.11
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After Argand’s patent was invalidated in Britain, the French Minister forced Argand to
end his patent dispute with Ambriose L’Ange and file joint ownership of the invention.12
Regardless of the origin of Lewis’ lighthouse lamp, its successful
use in beacon at Cape Ann prompted him to solicit the federal government
for adoption in all of the nation’s lighthouses.
The Patent having always had in mind the view the
Service he might render the public and in particular
navigation more than pecuniary emoluments will convey
his Patent right to the United States for twenty thousand
dollars, this to include the Patent rights for the Lights
already fitted as he has never received any compensation
whatever for his time employed in fitting the three lights
now in operation.13
The success of Lewis’ lamp was the reduction in oil consumption. According to a Mr. W.
Carrington, Lewis’ workman who attended to the lamps at Cape Ann, the twelve lamps in
Lewis’ new system consumed 30 gallons of oil from May 15, to June 23, 1811.
Previously, the lighthouse consumed 28 gallons per week.14
Lewis further agreed to eliminate the government’s risk in purchasing his patent
rights by giving “satisfactory Bonds such as shall be deemed good security to reimburse
the money paid for the Patent as well as every Expense government may have been att
[sic] in Fitting up the Light houses in the New system if they should be found not to
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answer the purpose now calculated & that the saving of oyl [sic] is not equal to one half
the quantity consumed in the present system.” Lewis also warranted his system for seven
years after it had been installed in a lighthouse. At the time, the Treasury Department
could not authorize wider adoption of Lewis’ lamp as “extending the improvement to all
the light houses…would however exceed the ordinary appropriations.”15
Albert Gallatin deemed Lewis’ scientific enterprise as a “great success” for the
United States “both as to the brilliancy of the light and the saving of the oil.” As
Secretary of the Treasury and the man responsible for overseeing the nation’s
lighthouses, Gallatin begged leave of Congress to “lay the subject before the committee
of commerce and manufactures,” for a decision on the expense.16 The Committee on
Commerce and Manufactures responded favorably to Gallatin’s request finding it “proper
to authorize the expense” and “introduce an item to that effect in the general
appropriation law.”17 Lewis’ contract with the federal government, commenced March
26, 1812.
The contract called for Lewis to be paid “the sum of Twenty Four Thousand
Dollars” plus “a rate of five hundred dollars a year, for keeping all apparatus as aforesaid
in repair during seven years.”18 By 1817, Lewis had fitted up every lighthouse in America
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with his lamp and reflector system. The government renewed Lewis’ contract that same
year for fitting up any new lighthouses that were to be built.19
As Lewis’ lighthouse lamp and reflector example demonstrates, science and
commerce were intricately related in the early United States; a fact that could be the
subject of an entire book. This chapter seeks to explore two aspects of the science –
commerce relationship in the first half of the nineteenth century in America. First,
Americans used practical science and the mechanical arts to solve commercial problems.
Although the United States was expanding westward, the nation’s commerce remained
heavily dependent on shipping and global trade. Commercial problems were often
shipping problems. Sometimes solving commercial problems meant protecting commerce
from the natural world. Lewis almost immediately recognized the utility of placing a lens
in front of a lighthouse lamp to protect shipping. The lens provided for a stronger
illumination by projecting the light further into the darkness, which in turn allowed better
visibility in adverse weather and better discernibility of underwater hazards. At other
times, solving commercial problems might mean improving port operations. The marine
telegraph, for instance, solved the problem of ships arriving unannounced. The arrival or
unannounced ships delayed the collection of customs duties, unlading of cargoes, and
selling of imported goods. These delays directly impacted the efficiency of shipping by
indirectly causing ships to lay idle in port for longer periods of time.20 As most merchants

19

Winslow Lewis, Description of the light houses on the coast of the United States,
(Boston: Thomas G. Bangs, 1817), 16, PRHC, no. 427, HAG.
20
According to Jennifer Karns Alexander, “efficiency” did not obtain its quantitative
definition until the late nineteenth century. I use the term here for ease of understanding
despite its ahistorical nature for the period under consideration. Jennifer Karns
Alexander, The Mantra of Efficiency: From Waterwheel to Social Control, (Baltimore:
JHU Press, 2008), 2.
28

and shipmasters knew, a ship only makes money while it is sailing. Ships lying idle in
port for extended periods of time was, and still is, a drag on the commercial economy.
Second, science and the practical arts provided commercial opportunities for
those engaged in scientific practice. Science allowed individuals, such as Lewis, to profit
from their ideas and skills. Whether or not Lewis was entitled to a patent on his lamp and
reflector system is a separate issue. The fact that Lewis profited handsomely from his
patents illustrates the types of opportunities created by science and the mechanical arts.
Science and the mechanical arts did not limit who could participate in the scientific
enterprise. Early republic entrepreneurs with little to no scientific training or background
in the practical arts seized upon these opportunities. In the United States, science and
mechanical arts were not limited to the educated elite natural philosophers, but instead
were performed by anyone who had the financial means or the intellectual ability to work
in those fields. Andrew J. Lewis’s study of natural philosophy in the early American
republic indicated this was the democratization of natural philosophy.21
HISTORIOGRAPHY
Literature on intersection of science and commerce in the early United States is
spread sporadically throughout historical narratives on the history of science. Christopher
Beauchamp’s Invented by Law (2015), for instance, dedicates the first chapter of his
narrative on Alexander Graham Bell and the invention of the telephone to the exploring
the role of United States patent law in promoting commerce in the early American
republic. Beauchamp argues, “patenting activity grew less from specific developments in
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technology than from broad-based economic factors.”22 Similarly, the final chapter in
James Delbourgo’s A Most Amazing Scene of Wonders (2006) explores the world of
physicians selling electrotherapies to the public for improved health. Delbourgo claims
charlatan doctors sold electric tractors to unsuspecting consumers for as much as $25
dollars a set. The tractor was a set of two small metallic rods measuring approximately
three inches in length. The rods were constructed of iron and brass which the quack
physician claimed used electricity to cure certain ailments when the rods were passed
over the body.23 And Andrew J. Lewis’s A Democracy of Facts (2011) uses a single
chapter to explore the market economy of plants and rocks in the expansion of
knowledge. Lewis puts forth the idea that naturalists bought plant and rock specimens
from “ordinary Americans” as a means for increasing the naturalists’ knowledge.24
Full length narratives on the intersection of science and commerce often focus on
manufacturing and distribution. Judith McGaw’s Most Wonderful Machine (1987), for
instance, explores the social and cultural impact of mechanization in the early American
paper making industry. Part of that social change was the advent of steamboat
transportation and the opening of the Erie Canal. McGaw argues these forces, along with
improvements in factory mechanization, opened new markets for the Berkshire paper
manufacturers and increased Berkshire’s share of business in New York City. Daniel
Walker Howe’s What Hath God Wrought (2007) examines how improvements in
transportation and communication expanded the American economy between the War of
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1812 and the Mexican-American War. Howe argues these developments helped diversify
the American economy, placing industry on the same foothold as agriculture. Perhaps
the best narratives exploring the intersection of science and commerce is Paul Lucier’s
Scientists and Swindlers (2008). Lucier argues American men of science were
entrepreneurs engaged in self-promotion. Lucier sees this scientific entrepreneurship as
the foundation for the rise of the consulting industry and subsequently the rise of
scientific corruption.25
While the importance of McGaw’s and Howe’s studies are unquestioned, they
diminish the fact that America remained tied to the ocean for much of its commerce and
economy. This chapter focuses on the shipping side of commerce and seeks to
demonstrate the role of science and the practical arts in promoting commerce within a
maritime context. Additionally, this chapter most closely fits with Lucier’s Scientists and
Swindlers in arguing that those engaged in science and the practical arts were merchants
and businessmen more than they were scientists and artisans. Similar to Lucier’s
narrative, this chapter also looks at the commercial corruption the merchants’
innovations.
SOLVING COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS
Commerce in the early American nineteenth century was fraught with many
problems. First, physical geography and the environment posed obstacles that endangered
cargos and the lives of mariners. Mariners, merchants, shipmasters, public officials, and
anyone with an interest in commerce sought to reduce these dangers, or at least the losses
associated with these hazards. Additionally, the Light-House Establishment and Coast
25
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Survey were established with these ends in mind, while the Army Corps of Engineers
eventually assumed the role of building the public infrastructure for ensuring the safety of
commerce. Second, British impressment of American sailors robbed the young nation’s
commerce of much needed labor. Political leaders, such as Connecticut Congressman
Samuel W. Dana, believed accurate charts and maps could reduce these infractions on
American commerce. Finally, inefficient shipping processes caused merchants and ship
owners to lose money when their vessels lay idle in port for extended periods. Although
efficiency is rarely mentioned specifically in the historical documents, (it is often masked
in the language of expediency), the concern over inefficient processes is easily found in
the actions of those concerned with commerce. Several historians, including John K.
Moulton, Marc Levinson, Kenneth Pomeranz, and the trio of Alex Roland, W. Jeffrey
Bolster, and Alexander Keyssar all acknowledge the importance of efficiency in shipping
in the first half of the nineteenth century, even though, as previously noted, the term itself
did not obtain its quantitative definition until later in the nineteenth century.26 Solving
these commercial problems, and others, became a priority for many Americans and
pushed them to pursue scientific endeavors to preserve America’s commercial enterprise.
THE PROBLEM OF SHIPWRECKS
One of the biggest commercial problems of the early Untied States was providing
for safe passage of cargoes, passengers, and crew. As commerce and shipping increased
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with the growth of the United States in the early nineteenth century, the rate of maritime
disasters increased. According to historian Donald Shomette, the Chesapeake Bay, upon
which Baltimore was the leading port, witnessed nearly 140 shipwrecks between the
1790 and 1850.27 The approaches to Boston fared worse. Minot’s Ledge near Cohasset
Harbor south of Boston became a graveyard for more than 40 ships between 1832 and
1841; an average of more than four groundings annually. Cape Cod proved even more
hazardous claiming an average of 50 wrecks annually in the 16 years between 1843 and
1859 and a high of more than 82 marooned ships in 1844 alone.28
Shipwrecks disrupted the local economy. In the early nineteenth century United
States, a ship’s cargo averaged between $300,000 and $400,000 with the ship owner
realizing at least a 30% profit.29 With so much money riding on a single voyage, the loss
of even one ship could easily bankrupt a local merchant. This was the case with the
wreck of the Union in 1817, which was highlighted in the previous chapter. Although the
ship’s owners, Stephen Phillips and George Pierce, carried insurance on the Union and its
cargo, the loss exceeded the insurance by $35,000 ($599,000 in 2013 dollars).30 This loss
reverberated through the local economy in the loss of income, employment, and tax
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revenues.
The loss of a ship disrupted the national economy as well through the loss of
customs duties. As United States Congressman James Jackson of Savannah
acknowledged, “commerce would be embarrassed and our revenue will be lessened and
destroyed” by the failure to provide safe passage for shipping.31 Jackson noted, “the
revenue of the United States is to be derived from navigation and commerce.”32 In 1823,
for instance, annual customs duties accounted for slightly more than 88 percent of the
total federal income.33
In addition to disrupting the local and national economies, historian Jamin John
Wells notes shipwrecks also impacted the social, material, and cultural world.34 The loss
of life, or even the possibility of loss, brought communities closer together in mourning
and the concern over the fate of loved ones. The hardships of loss were often comforted
and relieved through churches or charitable organizations such as the Portland Marine
Society. Material goods lost in shipwrecks could be replaced, at an expense, with another
shipment, but until then, the loss of material goods left a void in the lives many. Rich
socialites would have to survive a little while longer without the manufactured goods that
gave them their societal status while the less privileged would have to do without
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altogether. Culturally, shipwrecks impacted the exchange of knowledge. As goods and
lives were lost, so was the knowledge gained from travels to foreign countries.
Ship wrecks nudged Americans toward science as solving this commercial
problem immediately became a priority. For the previously stated reasons, Americans
sought to protect commerce from shipwrecks and other maritime hazards and they used
practical science and the mechanical arts to achieve those ends. The scientific work of
private citizens is seen most prominently in the Light-House Establishment, where
regional superintendents relied heavily on merchants and inventors for improvements to
lighthouse apparatuses. In November 1816, for instance, David Melville, a Newport,
Rhode Island businessman, met with Winslow Lewis, William Simons, and Captain
George Shearman, the keeper of the Newport Lighthouse. As all four men were either
intimately involved with maintaining the lighthouses or were interested in their efficient
operation, their conversation turned to the difficulty of keeping the lights lit in subfreezing temperatures of winter.35 Captain Shearman acknowledged he had experienced
difficulties in the winter because the spermaceti oil used by the United States LightHouse establishment congealed in temperatures below 30 degrees Fahrenheit, causing the
light to extinguish itself.36 Lewis’ solution had been to recommend placing a small stove
in the lantern room of the lighthouse to keep the air warm and thus the oil in a liquid
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state.37 While Lewis’ suggestion worked in theory, it was hardly a very practical solution.
Most lighthouse lanterns barely have enough room for the keeper and the light let alone
the addition of a wood- or coal- burning stove. Additionally, carrying a stove up the
narrow, often spiral, staircases to the top of the lighthouse was a cumbersome task. The
safety of the ships, however, left the keepers with little choice. The preservation of life
and commerce mandated they carry out the task regardless of the difficulty.
During the conversation, Melville asked Lewis if there was a way to keep the oil
heated without a stove in the lantern of the lighthouse. Lewis responded, “no, my dear
Sir, that is impossible.” Melville then proceeded to explain to Lewis how one might go
about heating the oil using the same flame that burned the oil. Melville then, at Lewis’
request sketched out his plan.38
While Melville fully intended to profit from his idea, his improvement to the
lighthouse lamp was also driven by the need to protect commerce and the lives of
mariners. If the spermaceti oil congealed from the cold winter temperatures, the flame in
the lighthouse lamp would extinguish itself. An extinguished beacon created a hazard to
mariners and their cargos. Mariners used the lights not only to navigate coastal and
underwater hazards, but also to pinpoint their location. An unlit lighthouse could easily
result in a shipwreck similar to the previously mentioned wreck of the Union. Melville
recognized this fact and the importance of his invention, but he only stood to profit from
the invention if the congealing of the oil were a real problem for commerce. As will be
discussed later, Lewis adopted Melville’s plan for adding an oil heating tube to the lamp.
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Other industrious individuals also sought to protect commerce through science
and the mechanical arts. In 1844, Alonzo Farrar of Boston, for instance, devised a method
of protecting a lighthouse’s parabolic reflectors from losing their reflective power. Farrar
pointed out the reflectors then in use were made of copper and coated with silver. As
smoke and dust accumulated on the apparatus, the reflectors required frequent cleanings.
Farrar noted that the silver coating often tarnished or wore off as a result of these
repeated cleanings. His improvement to protect the reflective finish was to apply a
“surface of flint glass, or in fact, what may be termed a parabolic lens (when the reflector
is parabolic), and when it is of any other shape, a lens made perfectly symmetrical with
the reflecting surface of the mirror” which was then “cemented or hermetically sealed to
the mirror or reflector around its perimeter or edge.”39 Farrar’s patent attempted to
provide for the safety of commerce and mariners lives by ensuring a lighthouse’s
reflector remained consistently brilliant and therefore allowing for the most powerful
light.
Protecting commerce was not limited to lighthouse innovations. Throughout the
early 1800s, many local entrepreneurs, such as Lewis Brantz of Baltimore and Lemuel
Moody of Portland, Maine, took it upon themselves to survey their ports and the
surrounding waters for the safety of commerce. In the 1810s, Brantz surveyed
Baltimore’s harbor and the Patapsco River leading into the port. Brantz’s survey
employed the latest scientific methods including using lead weights to take depth
soundings of the river’s bottom. By documenting the depth soundings on his map, which
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Brantz published in 1819, the cartographer gave mariners an accurate picture of the deepwater shipping lanes approaching the harbor to help guide ships safely to the docks.40
Lemuel Moody produced a similar map of Portland in 1825.41 Moody’s map
indicated the position the underwater shoals off Stanford Point, Spring Point, and near
Little Hog Island (present day Little Diamond Island). Moody charted the shallow
shipping lane between Banges Island (present day Cushing Island) and Peake’s Island
and the narrow passage between Peake’s Island and Little Hog Island showing the depth
of the water in each instance.42 Prior to the Coast Survey’s first chart in 1835, it is logical
to assume every port had a local entrepreneur who charted the waters for the safety of
commercial shipping.
Another problems hindering commerce was the buildup of silt and debris in the
harbor. Pile-driven wharves restricted the flow of water adding to the buildup of silt and
debris that accompanied normal runoff. Silt and debris reduced the depth of shipping
lanes and wharfage making it difficult to conduct business on the water. In 1827, civil
engineer Edward Clark proposed building a floating dock
by forming a float of timbers, which is intended to
constitute the bottom of the structure, and which, by its
buoyancy, is to support a vessel within the dock, with its
keel above the surface of the water…this float is to be
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made in the form of a large hollow box, formed of
strong logs firmly joined together and calked so as to
render it water tight. The capacity of the hollow part
must be such that when exhausted of water, by means of
pumps, it shall be sufficiently buoyant to sustain itself
with its load.43
Clark believed his floating dock would provide for the safety of commerce by
preventing this build up. The civil engineer submitted his proposal to his peers at
the Franklin Institute for their opinion on the expediency, feasibility, and
practicality of his proposal, to “which the committee award to the inventor much
credit for the ingenuity which the plan displays.” The committee, however, were
unable to support the idea of a floating dock, noting that ships “undergo in nearly
every instance a change in form after they are launched” causing the floating dock
to “be much more liable” because the lift was “calculated to resist the effects of
the purpose to which they are to be subjugated.”44
From the federal government’s point of view, the task of providing safe
passage was left to the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Survey, and the
Light-House Establishment. Their efforts were sometimes aided by the private
marine telegraph. The Army Corps of Engineers removed underwater obstacles,
consulted on the dredging of harbors (or physically performed the act of dredging
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themselves), and constructed protective breakwaters all for the safety of
commerce.45 In 1815, for instance, a hurricane completely destroyed all the docks,
several ships, and many warehouses in Newport, Rhode Island because the port
lacked the necessary breakwater piers to protect the harbor from storm surges.46
In Cape May, New Jersey, businessmen, residents, and public officials feared a
similar situation. In 1838, several Cape May individuals, many of them pilots
responsible for bringing ships safely into port, petitioned the government for a
breakwater to “decrease, if they cannot entirely remove, the evil” of “the repeated
and extensive loss of lives and property.”47 They argued that although a
breakwater existed at Cape Henlopen and Lewistown, the “number and extent of
the shoals” in the Delaware Bay made the Bay “far more dangerous…in windy
weather, than the main ocean.” Cape May residents saw existing breakwaters “as
useless as if [they] were at Cape Henry [Virginia],” because the existing
breakwaters, constructed under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers in the
early 1800s to the benefit of Philadelphia’s merchants and shipping, were situated
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on the opposite side of the channel leading into the Bay.48 The petitioners
believed a “stone pier from half to three-quarters mile in length” constructed by a
skilled engineer could obviate many of the serious difficulties associated with
their shipping in the Delaware Bay.49
The New Jersey petitioners also argued that the breakwater was not only in their
best interests, but that the Western states were also interested in protecting shipping on
the Delaware Bay “as a large quantity of tobacco, pork, lard, hams, bacon, flour, grain,
and other articles of western produce poured into Philadelphia through those channels,
which find a market in Eastern States by the Delaware coasters, which bring back fish, of
which an immense quantity is shipped west through these channels.”50
Building lighthouses, breakwater piers, and wharves required more than just basic
engineering knowledge and knowing the strength of various building materials.
Engineers also needed to have an understanding of the natural world. Breakwaters had to
withstand the impact of ice floes, which were essentially miniature icebergs. They had to
be able to withstand the powerful crashing waves of storm surges. For these, and many
other reasons, engineers needed to have knowledge of tidal currents, winds, and the mass
of potential ice floes. They had to understand the differences in the sea floor to
understand how to anchor structures for safety and stability. Captain Henry Stansbury
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understood this when he developed the diskpile anchoring system for offshore beacons.51
Stansbury added iron flanges to the screwpile foundation invented by British engineer
Alexander Mitchell. Stansbury’s flanges, or disks, provided additional security for the
screwpile foundation by diffusing the weight of the structure on the disks when the
structure was anchored in hollow shoals. Because engineers had to understand tidal
currents, winds, the mass of ice floes, and the differences in the sea floor, the Treasury
Department and the Army Corps of Engineers created a set of rigid standards for the
construction of lighthouses and expected engineers to adhere to the standards. The
specifications provided general standards regarding the type of lighthouse being
constructed (brick tower, screwpile, etc.) and specific standards related to the geographic
location of the light, such as those at Atchafalaya Bay, Louisiana and Cape Canaveral,
Florida.52
The state also sought to provide safe passage for commerce through the placement
of buoys, daymarks, and other aids to navigation. These aids provided a visual signal of
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nearby hazards when visibility was clear and helped mariners confirm their position
similar to how Global positioning systems are used to pinpoint a ship’s location today.
When adverse weather affected the visibility of these navigational aids, bells and cannons
were used as audio warnings. This became the responsibility of the Light-House
Establishment in 1789 when Congress passed An act for the Establishment and support of
lighthouse, beacons, buoys, and public piers for the purpose of rending navigation
“within any bay, inlet, harbor, or port of the United States…easy and safe.”53 Although
these aids could not prevent all shipwrecks, they drastically reduced the number of
disasters along the early American coasts. Beginning in 1834, the Corps of Engineers
built beacons for the Light-House Establishment, reported on the condition of existing
lighthouses, and surveyed sites to determine the practicality of constructing navigational
aids.54
Lastly, the state established the Coast Survey to address commercial issues and to
be “subservient to the commercial interests” of the nation. The Coast Survey’s
responsibilities included charting the “islands and shoals, with the roads or places of
anchorage, within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States; and also
the respective courses and distances between the principal capes or head lands, together
with other such matters” as deemed necessary for the complete and accurate charting of
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the coast.55 Surveying and navigation were the premier sciences in the early nineteenth
century Untied States. The Coast Survey’s mapping of the physical environment provided
for the safety of commerce through very precise mathematical calculation known as
triangulation. In the early 1850s, the surveying of sites for lighthouses had been added to
the list of Coast Survey responsibilities. 56
These surveys resulted in more accurate charts than had been previously
available. Prior to the U.S. Coast Survey’s charts, commercial shipping relied on the
charts of foreign nations, sailing directions published in The American Coast Pilot, or as
previously mentioned, charts and maps of local entrepreneurs. Foreign-made charts and
maps were heavily relied on in the early nineteenth century because the foreign nations
had more experience in the field of cartography. When Benjamin Henry Latrobe designed
the lighthouse at the mouth of the Mississippi River in 1805, Albert Gallatin, the
Secretary of the Treasury, ordered “A copy of a Spanish chart of the coast published at
Madrid,” for Latrobe’s assistant Lewis Dumain to use in surveying the site of the
lighthouse.57 Foreign maps, however, were often regional or local in nature and were
frequently outdated due to the constantly changing environment. Many were drawn years
earlier during America’s colonial period by the British, French, or Spanish Empires.
The marine telegraph also provided some measures for the safety of commerce.
According to the New York Spectator and Eastern Argus newspapers, “Vessels entering
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[the port] in distress, which require immediate assistance from the city, often for the
preservation of lives as well as property” can “communicate their wants and distress to
the shore” through the marine telegraph.58 Several years earlier, The Columbian reported
that marine signals “may prove the salvation of both vessel and crew, as the necessary aid
can in that case be always promptly afforded.”59 In fact, that is precisely what happened
at Cohasset rocks to the south of Boston in January 1827. According to the Eastern
Argus, the marine telegraph communicated “a vessel ashore on Cohasset rocks,” causing
the port of Boston to respond by sending a cable and anchor via the schooner Ardent. The
grounded vessel was towed off the ledge and brought safely into port.60 The rescue of the
grounded ship saved the ship owner, merchants, and insurance company from the loss
that would have been sustained at the hands of the pounding sea by a prolonged
grounding on the ledge. In another incident, the ship Undine of Doxbury arrived at New
York from Cadiz in “great distress” after 57 days at sea. The captain of the Undine
requested the aid of six men to help bring her into port because the ship’s crew was
“unable to work.” The port of New York responded by sending the men and other
necessary requisites within two hours, avoiding the possibility of the ship encountering
further disaster.61
Whereas lighthouses, beacons, and buoys sought to eliminate shipwrecks, marine
telegraphs were used to communicate wrecks when they did occur so that assistance
could be sent to the marooned vessel. In advocating for the establishment of the marine
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telegraph in New York, Taomas Mercein, the Comptroller of the Port, noted, “it
frequently happens that vessels are becalmed off the Hook for many days unknown to
their owners.” Mercein believed telegraphic communication from Sandy Hook could
relay information about the stranded vessels and alleviate some of the uncertainty.62
The establishment of the marine telegraph was believed to reduce the indirect
costs of doing business. In both of the previously mentioned incidents, ship owners,
merchants, and insurers were saved the high cost of an insurance claim. According to
economic historian Christopher Kingston, some early nineteenth-century insurers, such as
the Insurance Company of North America, refunded a portion of the premium to the ship
owner upon the ship’s safe return.63 In New York, Comptroller Mercein claimed that
communication of stranded vessels could relieve ship owners, “who supposing them out
of time are induced to effect additional insurance at advanced premiums,” from having to
take costly extra precautions.64
The use of science and the mechanical arts to protect commerce extended beyond
maritime shipping. According to James B. Calvert, railroads began considering
telegraphic signals as early as 1845. In that year, civil engineer Ashbel Welch inquired of
Joseph Henry, one of premier scientists in the United States at the time, about the
practicality of using telegraphic signals on the Pennsylvania Railroad.65 Calvert notes the
first fixed semaphore signals were “the well-known ball signals derived from nautical
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tide signals.”66 Additionally, Farrar’s patent method for protecting the polished surfaces
of reflectors was also used on railroads.67 By the mid-1840s, the time of Farrar’s patent
and Welch’s inquiry of Joseph Henry, railroads were emerging as a commercial force.
They had already proved more viable than canals for transporting goods to the interior of
the continent and were on their way to becoming the dominant form of distributing goods
over land.
THE PROBLEM OF BRITISH IMPRESSMENT
British impressment of American sailors also threatened the safety of commerce
and pressured the United States to engage in the practical science of coastal surveying.
Impressment was the forced recruitment and service of mariners for naval service in the
British Royal Navy. Forced recruitment and service often came without notice. It robbed
commerce of the much-needed maritime labor that looked after the ships employed in the
nation’s commerce and the cargoes that fueled the economy. Despite the crown’s defeat
in the American Revolution, Britain did not recognize naturalized American citizenship.
The crown and parliament considered Americans to be British citizens, which made them
subject to naval impressment. Jay’s Treaty in 1795 sought to address grievances between
the two nations in the decade and a half following the American Revolution, but it failed
on the point of impressment. In the early 1810s, the issue of impressment remained a
contentious subject between the two nations, resulting in the United States declaring war
on Britain in 1812.
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Some thought British impressment of American sailors might cease with the
establishment of the Coast Survey. In particular, Connecticut Representative Samuel
Dana argued the Coast Survey would be useful for the establishment of maritime
precincts within the United States “within which, of course, the navigation ought to be
free from the belligerent searches and seizures” of foreign nations.”68 In other words,
Dana believed by establishing accurate boundaries of the United States coast, American
ships, particular those involved in the coastal trade, could be free of British impressments
simply by remaining in U.S. waters and therefore under U.S. law and jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, Dana did not seem to realize the scope of the task at hand and the
improbability that the Coast Survey would ever impact the impressment of American
sailors. Due to the continual shifting of responsibilities for the Coast Survey in its early
years, and the monumental task set before it, the Survey would not produce its first chart
of the American coast until 1835 and even then, it was only a chart of Bridgeport
Harbor.69 Britain ceased impressing American sailors in 1814, some twenty-one years
earlier. Still, the perception was that science could solve this important commercial
problem, even if in reality the problem ceased to exist before the survey had the
opportunity to resolve it.
THE PROBLEM OF PORT EFFICIENCY
Similarly, the problem of port efficiency pushed many Americans toward
practical science as a way to solve this costly commercial problem. Although this issue is
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not specifically mentioned in any of the primary source documents, time in port had to
weigh heavily on merchants and ship owners’ minds. Ships only make money when they
are at sea, trading goods in a network of economic exchanges. Unless ships returned
immediately to the sea upon unloading their cargo, they lost money sitting idle in port
through wharfage fees, lost profits and wages, and the ship’s slow depreciation and decay
at the hands of the marine environment. Time was money and in early American seaports,
time cost ship owners a great deal of money. In April 1828, the owner of the schooner
Two Sisters paid 20 cents per day for the privilege of docking at the John Gladding’s
wharf in Providence, Rhode Island.70 While 20 cents per day may not seem like a lot of
money, comparably is it equal to about $151.00 in 2015.71
Idle time in port resulted from one of three things – waiting to unload
merchandise, making necessary repairs to the ship, and securing an export cargo. One of
the advantages science and the mechanical arts had with commerce was the ability to
reduce port idle time. As historians Alex Roland, W. Jeffrey Bolster, and Alexander
Keyssar note, even modest improvements in port operations, “translated into increases in
overall economic productivity, even without improvements in production.”72
Technologies, such as the construction of warehouses, the advent of the American packet
ship, the the establishment of a marine telegraph station greatly impacted a ship’s time in
port.
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Kenneth Pomeranz surmises the simple establishment of a storage facility cut
shipping idle time to “50 days.”73 Roland, Bolster, and Keyssar found, “time in port was
reduced, sometimes by half,” with the advent of storage facilities.74 Warehouses
eliminated the ship as a holding facility by allowing merchants a place to store unsold
merchandise. Having a place to store cargoes also allowed stevedores to unload cargoes
sooner, thus reducing a ship’s time in port by freeing the ship for acceptance of the
outbound shipment. Additionally, warehouses allowed for merchants to store their goods
prior to export, further reducing a ship’s idle time in port because the outbound shipment
was already near the docks and ready for loading.
Packet service provided an additional reduction in port time. As Andrew Gibson
and Arthur Donovan note, strict adherence to schedules took priority over a full cargo
hold. Packet ships left precisely on schedule regardless of whether or not they were full.75
The packets’ routine schedule of arrivals and departures improved port operations by
standardizing processes associated with time schedules such as loading and unloading
and freeing wharves for other ships.
Prior to the establishment of regular packet service in the 1830s, the marine
telegraph provided a similar modest improvement in port operations. The marine
telegraph was a communication system that used flags, pendants, burgees, and balls to
send messages between ships at sea and the shore. It required a visual line of sight,
usually with the aid of a telescope, and a vantage point that allowed the signaler an
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unobstructed view of the ocean. The marine telegraph was primarily used in American
port cities to announce the arrival of a ship into port while it was still a great distance
away, but it could also be used to bring other news from passing ships to the port. Two of
the factors responsible for extended port idle times (unloading and securing an export
cargo) could be reduced with the assistance of an early communication system. By
announcing the arrival of a ship earlier, the marine telegraph gave ship owners and
merchants the additional time they needed to hire stevedores for unloading, sell their
goods, secure storage for unsold merchandise, and arrange for an outbound shipment.76
Today, these improvements in port operations would be known as efficiencies.
However, just as the box container of Malcom McLean and Leslie Harlander did not exist
in the nineteenth century, neither did the concept of efficiency. According to Jennifer
Karns Alexander, efficiency is a twentieth-century notion that developed out of “an
obscure philosophical concept” concerned “with the causes of change and the ways of
God, and only during the Industrial Revolution was it linked with human powers and
abilities.” Thus, efficiency, as we conceive it today, first concerned itself with the
mechanics of nineteenth-century industrialization as “engineers and physicists [sought] to
measure the performance of machines, and, in particular, to relate a machine’s output to
the inputs it had used.”77 This concept was instrumental in the early twentieth century as
men such as Henry Ford and Fredrick Winslow Taylor applied science to the
management of production.78
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Alexander sees two distinct types of efficiency – one static and one dynamic. First
is Alexander’s notion of efficiency as control. According to Alexander control is static
and is based on Samuel P. Hays’ thesis regarding conservation.79 The second is efficiency
as progress, or dynamic transformation. This type of efficiency is focused on changing
processes. As Alexander notes, the historical actors did not use terms like efficiency, but
rather spoke in a language of terms that lacked clear definitions such as “mechanical
power,” “natural effective power,” and “used effect.”80 She continues stating that the
term “efficiency” did not receive a clear quantitative definition until the late nineteenth
century.81 The historical actors in this study were not necessarily men of science and it
would be hard to classify some of them as mechanical or practical artists. They were
mariners and entrepreneurs who used technology to solved their commercial issues. They
spoke in even more ambiguous terms of “advantages,” and “expedients.” Use of the term
efficiency here will simultaneously mean both control of and transformation of processes.
The marine telegraph controlled port operations by directing merchants and shipowners
to action once their approaching vessel was reported. The marine telegraph transformed
the port operations by changing when men were moved into action. Rather than acting
when the ship arrived at the dock, interested parties began acting at the first sign of
arrival.
Two case studies of idle time in port indicate the science and technology of the
marine telegraph may have played a significant role in improving port operations, thus
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intersecting with commerce by reducing ship idle times. Looking at ship arrivals and
departures in the year immediately preceding and following the establishment of a marine
telegraph to calculate idle time in port isolates ships’ time in port to the improvement in
ship to shore communication. Analysis of port time in Baltimore indicates a noticeable
increase in port efficiency through the decline in port idle time, while a similar analysis in
Portland (Maine) demonstrates the possibility of a downward trend for a ship’s idle time
in port. Statistically, however, the data for Portland is not enough to make the claim for
improved efficiency. The small data set and smaller variance in port idle times for each
ship in the data set renders such a claim statistically insignificant.
Baltimore and Portland were chosen for several reasons. Both ports held status as
year-round ports, eliminating concerns over weather closures affecting port idle time. The
availability of ship arrival and departure records for Baltimore and Portland, as well as a
discernable date for the establishment of the marine telegraph, were important
considerations for calculating the port idle time before and after the establishment of the
observatories.82 At this time, it has been impossible to establish the exact date for the
establishment of the marine telegraph at Charleston, Newport, and Philadelphia, while the
ship departures at New York were not available for the periods immediately preceding
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and following the establishment of the telegraph in 1812.83 The observatories at
Baltimore and Portland were also established in different economic times. David Porter’s
telegraph in Baltimore was established in a time of economic prosperity, whereas the
“brown tower” in Portland was completed just two months before the start of Jefferson’s
embargo.84 Additionally, Baltimore was one of the four primary seaports in the early
American republic, while Portland ranked as a secondary port. The diversity of economic
times and port size add to the validity of the data by showing studies of both primary and
secondary ports in different economic times obtained similar results. Lastly, the telegraph
at Baltimore and Portland served a single port unlike that at Boston. Boston’s signal
station served the entire area including the smaller ports of Beverly, Salem, and
Marblehead. Therefore, it was impossible at this time to conduct case studies of those
ports for comparison.
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Both case studies found similar results in the average time in port, indicating at
the very least there is some validity to the argument marine telegraphs improved
commercial operations in early American seaports through the advanced notification of
ship arrivals. In both cases studies, only ships which could be positively identified as the
same ship (ship type, ship owner, shipmaster, port of call, destination, etc.) arriving and
departing the port were used. While this methodology reduced the usable samples, it
assured the accuracy of the data sets.
Captain David Porter commenced signaling at his marine telegraph on Federal
Hill in Baltimore, on April 9, 1797.85 In the year prior to Porter erecting his flagstaff,
Baltimore’s vessels remained in port an average of 28 days. While this is significantly
lower than Pomeranz’s “50 Days,” it was still a substantial amount of time for a ship to
lay idle in port and a considerable loss for merchants and ship owners. Immediately
following the founding of Porter’s signal station, ships lingered in port an average of only
16 days, a reduction in idleness of almost two full weeks.86 This is similar to Roland,
Bolster, and Keyssar’s claim that warehouses reduced ship idle time by half. It is
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impossible to put a dollar amount on this improvement in port time, however, the
reduction in the average idle time undoubtedly contributed to the rise in the economy.
Less time in port meant more voyages, which in turn translated into an expansion of the
economy.
A similar reduction in port time was found in Portland after the establishment of
its observatory. Prior to the construction of Captain Lemuel Moody’s lookout station,
Portland’s vessels lay idle an average of 50 days, consistent with Pomeranz’s estimate.
Moody began signaling arrivals in August 1807, just months before Jefferson convinced
Congress to pass the Embargo Act of 1807. The Embargo had a profound effect on
shipping, especially in New England, where ports such as Portland relied almost solely
on its maritime industries. Despite the Embargo, many ships continued to sail into and
out of Portland, as witnessed by the continued reporting of ship departures in the local
newspapers. After Moody began signaling ship arrivals, Portland’s average idle time fell
by approximately 10 days, as vessels remained in port an average of 40 days.87 Some of
this decline can be attributed to Portland’s conversion to the coastal trade, however, the
rate of decline being similar to that in Baltimore suggests the possibility of a trend related
the the establishment of the marine observatory. Portlanders continued to engage in the
global market through illicit smuggling, but the arrival and departure records for these
illegal shipments would not have been published in the city’s two most prominent
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newspapers, the Eastern Argus and the Portland Gazette.88 Therefore, it is only possible
to speculate the possibility of a reducing trend in port idle time following the
establishment of the marine observatory.
With similar results between two ports of different commodities, geographies,
size, and economic times, it seems plausible that other ports might have experienced a
reduction in port idle time with the establishment of their local marine telegraph stations.
Unfortunately, the methodology cannot be carried forward to other ports at this time for
the reasons previously stated. As additional research resolves those issues, additional case
studies can be added to validate the findings in Baltimore and Portland.
As the previous examples demonstrate, solving commercial problems was a
driving force for early Americans engaging in practical science, innovation, and the
mechanical arts. That is not to say those same individuals rejected the idea of making a
profit. Some, if not most were interested, in profiting from their tinkering. Rather, the
intent is to recognize the importance of commerce in the production of science and the
arts in the early United States. Commercial problems needed solutions that could only be
provided by practical science and the mechanical arts. Commercial problems, thus
justified many Americans’ venture into innovating new mechanical apparatuses and
performing science.
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CREATING COMMERICAL OPPORTUNITIES
If solving commercial opportunities pushed many Americans toward scientific
practice, their engagement in science and the mechanical arts created many commercial
opportunities in the early nineteenth-century United States. Merchants and entrepreneurs
with little or no scientific background tinkered in science and the practical arts with the
hopes of someday profiting from their ideas. David Melville, for instance, is best known
for his natural gas patents in the early 1800s. Yet, Melville’s primary business was selling
hardware and stationary.89 Melville hoped to profit handsomely from his gas lighting and
the wide spread introduction of gas lighting. Melville was particularly interested in a
government contract with the Light-House Establishment for his gas lights.90
It does not appear, however, that Melville ever profited much from his venture in
gas lighting. According to gas light historian David Mattausch, sales of gas lamps and
lighting equipment were slow for Melville. Melville charged $13.00 per light, which
many found too costly.91 Melville’s equipment was also crudely manufactured and often
defective. In some lights it was impossible to get the gas to flow “from the condenser to
the cistern,” whereas others leaked gas from poorly crafted pipes.92 In 1813, an explosion
resulting from Melville’s gas lighting at the Arkwright mill in Providence, Rhode Island,
caused the death of Abraham Churchill and the complete destruction of an out building.93
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This incident lead many to question the safety of natural gas lighting and Melville’s gas
enterprise never fully recovered from the accident.
Additionally, Melville’s experiment at the Newport lighthouse in 1817 lost money
for the inventor. The government contract for the experiment did not allow for
reimbursement of any of Melville’s expenses. Melville paid for the entire year-long
experiment out of his own pocket, including the installation of the gas piping and the
building of the gas house. Winslow Lewis, who in addition to supplying the Light-House
Establishment with his patented lamp and reflector system also held a very lucrative
contract ($35,000 per annum) for delivering spermaceti oil to the lighthouses, suggested
that Melville could make a larger profit if his experiment failed. Lewis recommended
Melville “make the best bargain he can with the Nantucket people” believing Melville
could “no doubt…obtain ten thousand dollars from them.”94 Melville refused.
Others, however were more successful in their tinkering. Winslow Lewis, for
instance, sold the rights to his patent lighthouse lamp and reflector system to the United
States government for $24,000. Lewis agreed to fit up all of the lighthouses with his
system and maintain the system in each lighthouse for a period of seven years. The
government extended Lewis a contract for $600 per annum for maintaining the lights. As
new lighthouses were built, Lewis’s contract for fitting up the lighthouses and
maintaining the lights became a long-term renewable contract that provided Lewis with a
source of income for more than three decades. As Lewis was now responsible for
maintaining the lights and therefore had to make routine visits to each lighthouse, the
government awarded Lewis another contract for delivering the spermaceti oil to each
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beacon. As previously noted, Lewis’ oil contract was worth $35,000 annually.95 Lewis
later turned his commercial opportunity into a contract for building coastal beacons.
Similarly, James Elford of Charleston, South Carolina used science and the
practical arts to create a commercial opportunity for himself. In 1823, Elford patented a
universal code of signals for his marine telegraph in the copula of the Charleston
Merchant’s Exchange Building. Unlike existing signaling systems of the time which were
often unique to a specific port, Elford’s system was universal. It could be used in any
port, foreign or domestic, that adopted his system.
Elford profited from his efforts by licensing his system to an agent in Boston
Massachusetts. John Rowe Parker, the proprietor of the Central Wharf marine telegraph
in Boston, paid “one hundred dollars” per annum payable in two installments of fifty
dollars every six months for the right to sell Elford’s system throughout New England.
Elford also offered to let Parker “have the State of New York at $100,” and allowed
Parker to “Supply Vessels with Flags & books belonging to New Hampshire State”
without further compensation, as “it may add a little to [the] profits.” 96 In turn, Elford
supplied Parker with signal flags and signal books, which Parker resold to shipmasters
and merchants subscribing to the telegraph service. Elford sold these items to Parker at a
25 per cent discount, believing “a handsome profit [could] be made” if the telegraph were
“properly managed.”97
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Indeed, proprietors of marine observatories could make a “handsome profit.”
Parker, for instance, grossed at least $4,400 in 1834 in annual subscriptions to the marine
telegraph alone, not counting the profits made from the sale of flags and signal books.98
Samuel Topliff, the city’s primary news broker from 1814 to 1842, paid Parker $200
annually for shipping information.99 The Merchant’s Exchange paid $150 per year, while
insurance companies were charged $50 per annum. Individual merchants paid Parker $10
annually for their subscriptions to the service.100 In other ports, such as Baltimore and
Portland, proprietors of the marine telegraph charged subscribers between $2.50 and
$3.00 annually.101
Once the subscription was paid, the proprietor of the marine observatory outfitted
each vessel with a set of signal flags and a codebook. Subscriber’s purchased a set of six
flags in ports utilizing Elford’s system. If the subscriber owned more than one ship, they
purchased a set of flags for each vessel. According to the Salem Gazette, “The cost of a
suit of signal flags with the dictionary is $15.” Since Elford sold the signal flags and
codebook to Parker at a 25 per cent discount, Parker netted $3.75 for every set he sold.102
Captain Porter’s telegraph in Baltimore required five signal flags and an unnamed
number of basketwork balls.103 Moody’s system in Portland utilized five flags and three
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balls when it first began operation in 1807.104 Porter’s telegraph in Baltimore required
four flags.105
Elford’s dictionary of codes included a list of subscribed ships and their
corresponding signals. The South Carolinian updated the codebooks as more ports
adopted the system and as more ships subscribed to its universality. At times, the system
expanded so rapidly Elford was forced to update the signal book several times a year.
These updates, in turn, forced shipmasters to purchase the latest edition of the codebook
in order to identify and communicate with other ships. This process of was not so
different from purchasing software updates in today’s digital electronic age. The constant
updates provided a regular demand for the codebook, thus keeping the proprietor of the
marine telegraph with a steady flow of income.
The marine telegraph provided an additional commercial opportunity for
manufacturing and selling flags. Each subscribing vessel needed a set of signal flags. The
task of manufacturing flags varied from one port to another. In Baltimore, for instance,
David Porter caused “suitable signal flags [to be] prepared,” indicating he contracted with
a local flag maker for their manufacture.106 In Portland, the proprietor of the telegraph,
Lemuel Moody, appears to have manufactured the flags himself, but “sent [the cloth] to
be coloured” by someone else.107 Moody contradicted Elford’s claim that one could make
a handsome profit selling signal flags when the former complained, “I get but little for
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my trouble, the flags cost me but little short of the amount I receive” and that “it was with
great difficulty, I could obtain in the small sum of 50 dollars per year…finding my own
flags.”108 In Boston, John Rowe Parker original purchased his flags from Elford, but
when Elford was unable to supply the signal flags, Parker delegated the task of making
the flags to his signaling agents on Little Brewster Island and Long Island.109 Parker’s
agents were responsible for all aspects of manufacturing the flag including dyeing the
cloth.110 Regardless of who manufactured the flags, the marine telegraph offered an
opportunity for commercial gain.
Additionally, vessels usually carried a private signal flag, also referred to as a
house flag, that identified the merchant, his port, and sometimes a specific ship. These
flags were unique in design within the maritime community of the merchant’s home port
(although a study of more than a thousand house flags from nineteen different nineteenthcentury United States ports indicates many designs were duplicated in other ports).111 The
flags represented a shipping family in much the same way a coat of arms represented a
clan of nobility and often had been passed down through many generations of the family.
Each local marine telegraph allowed merchants to deposit their flag with the observatory
so that the vessel could be identified and signaled more easily with a single flag than with
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a series. By having a copy of their flag deposited at the marine telegraph station, at least
two private signal flags were needed for every merchant or shipmaster.
Elford’s system appears to be the only one adopted for use in multiple ports, but
not all ports utilized the universal system. As each port originally had its own unique
system of signals, merchants and shipmasters outfitted their vessels with the various
signals used in each port of call. According to an 1838 inventory of the Charles W.
Morgan, the whaling ship carried as many as 500 signal flags on board.112 If the Chares
W. Morgan’s flag inventory is typical of ships for this period, the telegraph created a vast
commercial opportunity for the textiles and dyes needed to make the flags, the flag
makers, and those merchants selling the flags.
Similar to the marine telegraph, science and the practical arts provided
opportunities for enterprising merchants and skilled cartographers to profit from making
charts and maps of America’s harbors, shipping lanes, and surrounding coastline.
Although the Coast Survey was authorized in 1807, it did not publish its first map until
the 1830s.113 Prior to the establishment of the Coast Survey and in the years leading up to
the Survey’s first map after its establishment, individuals with a knowledge of science
created maps of their local ports and sold them to shipmasters, merchants, and public
officials. Moody saw “the great necessity of a correct Chart of Portland Harbour and the
dangerous Rocks near Cape Elizabeth, also of Winter Harbour and the numerous islands
in Casco Bay” and took it upon himself to create a new map of Portland’s coastal region
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in 1825.114 Moody sold his map by subscription. Subscribers bought more than 100
copies of Moody’s Chart of Portland Harbor at $3.00 each, generating at least $300
income for the mapmaker.115 Moody used his mapmaking as a supplement to his main
source of income as proprietor of the marine telegraph at Portland and instructor of
navigation.
James Elford, Lemuel Moody, David Porter, and Winslow Lewis were all retired
mariners. When mariners retired from the sea, they could turn to science and the arts to
carve out new lives for themselves. Most mariners were exposed to science and the
practical arts through navigation and onboard ship repairs.116 Their engagement in
science and the practical arts for a new sense of livelihood complicates the narratives of
maritime and labor historians W. Jeffrey Bolster, Paul Gijle, Marcus Rediker, and Daniel
Vickers. Each of these historians have argued sailors had few employment opportunities
off the ship and that many were forced to return to the sea for their livelihood as a

114

Lemuel Moody, “Commissioning of Chart of Portland Harbor, 1825,” Box 1, Folder
10, Ms. Coll. 1931 Lemuel Moody Collection, MeHS.
115
Ibid.
116
Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen,
Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700 – 1750, (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 85.
65

result.117 These arguments overlook the fact that mariners received training in science and
the practical arts through their everyday sailing experiences. In nearly every seaport,
mariners translated their skills of repairing ships to building construction. As Portland
historian Moulton points out, many of the homes in that seaport were built by mariners
waiting for their next voyage. Although the individuals discussed here, (Elford, Moody,
Porter, and Lewis) were all shipmasters, they were not exceptional. They engaged in the
same sciences of navigation and the practical arts as other mariners. The biggest
difference between Elford, Moody, Porter, Lewis and other mariners was not their higher
status as ship captains, which undoubtedly taught them skills of management, but their
self-motivation to accede to a higher position in life. Elford, Moody, Porter, and Lewis’
self-motivation allowed them to use science and the arts to create lasting careers as
landlubbers.118
Not all commercial opportunities were positive. As Winslow Lewis noted in his
dinner conversation with David Melville, Captain George Shearman, and William
Simons, “patents [are] useless under the present patent law, as they [are] so easily
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evaded.”119 As previously noted, Lewis’ patented lamp and reflector system was hardly
his own invention. Many of Lewis’ contemporaries considered Lewis somewhat of a
charlatan when it came to his inventions and patents. Several, including Lewis’ nephew
Lieutenant I.W.P. Lewis, claimed the elder Lewis had stolen the concept of the lamp and
reflector system from the lighthouse at Holyhead in Great Britain, thus invalidating his
patent.120 All evidence indicates, Britain’s Trinity House and Northern Lighthouse Board
had implemented lenses with their reflectors for several years ahead of Lewis’ invention.
Lewis’ patented lamp and reflector system is not the only instance of Lewis
committing commercial fraud. In 1819, Lewis became embroiled in a patent lawsuit with
his friend David Melville. Three years earlier in 1816 in the same conversation that
Lewis stated the uselessness of patents, Melville described a principle improvement to
the argand oil lamp that would prevent the spermaceti oil from congealing and thus
causing the light to extinguish itself. Melville made a rough sketch of the plan and gave it
to Lewis. Melville later registered the idea and sketch with a local notary, but did not
have the means to pursue a costly patent of the apparatus at the time. Lewis took out a
patent in January 1817 for an oil heater based on Melville’s description and sketch. In
fact, Melville claimed, “on examining the drawing and specification of yours [Lewis’], I
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find it exactly similar to mine.”121 Melville sued Lewis for the infringement and
eventually forced Lewis to vacate the patent.
Others also engaged in commercial fraud using science and the practical arts. In
1824, an unscrupulous Mr. Lawrence sought to profit from the marine telegraph in
Boston without just cause. According to Jonathan Bruce, the telegraph agent stationed at
Boston Lighthouse on Little Brewster Island, Mr. Lawrence “made a seemingly generous
offer” for Bruce to concede his proposition as the telegraph agent. Mr. Lawrence’s offer
was to collect “2 thirds of the money,” while Bruce continued to do “two thirds of the
work.”122 Mr. Lawrence, however, was not entitled to collect any profits from the
telegraph. John Rowe Parker was the legal proprietor of the telegraph in Boston and held
the exclusive rights to profit from Elford’s universal signal code in that harbor.
Additionally, Charles Beck, the signal agent on Long Island in Boston Harbor, noted an
S. Winson made signals “Which only Answer to Destroye [sic] the Conector [sic] of your
Telegraph & mak [sic] Sport for Spectators.”123 Beck and Bruce both claimed men like
Lawrence and Winson were “no friends to the Telegraph establishment” and that such
men were “Woolves [sic] in Sheep Clothings [sic]” who did not “wish for the Telegraph
to succeed” with the “perpos [sic] to Destroye [sic] the credit of the telegraph.”124
Building contractors often tried to profit fraudulently from their engagement in
engineering and the mechanical arts for the purposes of advancing commerce. In 1825,
for instance, the Grand River Harbour Company in Ohio and its contractors saw a
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commercial opportunity for profit and attempted to bilk the state out of thousands of
dollars for the completion of a public pier. Congress appropriated “one thousand dollars
for completing it.” The pier was owned by the Grand River Harbour Company, which
contracted with Abraham Skinner for the repairs. The intent was that once the pier was
complete, the Treasury Department would pay the money to the Grand River Harbour
Company. Skinner, however, sought payment directly from the federal government. He
also attempted to collect the payment in advance of completing the work. The Grand
River Harbor Company in turn expected to sell the pier to the United States government,
thus fraudulently getting the state to pay twice for the same pier. Fortunately for the
United States, Stephen Pleasonton, the Fifth Auditor of the Treasury, recognized the
unscrupulous scheme and refused to pay for anything other than the original
construction.125
CONCLUSION
Although the nation had already begun expanding westward by the time the
Constitution was ratified, eastern seaports remained the nation’s economic centers. As
commercial interests increased, so did the problems facing commerce. With seaports
anchoring the nation’s economic activity, commercial problems were shipping problems.
British impressment of American sailors, safe passage for cargos and crew, and the loss
of income from idled ships were just a few of the commercial problems facing early
Americans. Merchants, public officials, ship owners, and others concerned with the
economic livelihood and commercial advancement of their city and nation turned to
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science and the practical arts to solve these commercial problems as “a matter of serious
importance.”126
Protecting the lives of mariners, valuable cargos and even the ship itself were the
most important issues for American commercial interests. The loss of life was a personal
tragedy, but it also impacted the economy by reducing the labor pool needed work the
commercial ships. The loss of cargo had a more direct impact on the economy in that the
lost goods would not generate the profits, taxes, or wages necessary for churning the
economy. A lost ship often had the larger impact of losing both lives and cargo and the
potential of financial ruin for local merchants and ship owners. For these reasons, many
believed “commerce should receive all the protection possible” and “for this purpose, a
safe harbor…is all-important.”127
Science and the arts were necessary components to providing safe harbors and
protecting commerce. In the early years, individuals who had an interest in protecting and
advancing commerce took up this task. Men, such as Winslow Lewis and David Melville,
invented new apparatuses or made improvements to existing technologies with the intent
of advancing commerce. Government entities, such as the Treasury Department, utilized
the practical expertise of such individuals. By mid-century, however, science and the
practical arts in the United States had begun to mature. The Light-House Establishment
began relying more heavily on the science of the Coast Survey for selecting lighthouse
sites rather than petitions from locals as they had in the past. They began relying on the
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technical expertise of the Corps of Engineers for constructing breakwaters, lighthouses,
piers, and wharves rather than the practical expertise of men such as Lewis.
To build this infrastructure, the Corps of Engineers needed to understand the
various elements of the natural world, including tides, currents, winds, and the makeup of
the ocean floor in order to properly protect commercial interests. The Coast Survey
provided much of this information with its scientific studies of the harbors and inlets
along the coast and its mathematical calculations charting the precise location of the
coastline. Some of the information came from the Corps of Engineers’ own work as they
built the infrastructure of the ports and learned from their practical experience.
In the private sector, entrepreneurs participated in science and the arts to advance
their commercial interests through the improvement of port efficiencies. Through the
advanced reporting of ship arrivals, the marine telegraph made it possible for merchants
and ship owners to pre-arrange unlading of cargoes, the sale of imported goods and
merchandise, and identify outbound freights. This allowed for a faster turnaround in
shipping and reduced the amount of time ships sat idle in port by as much as two weeks.
The reduction in port idle time meant more voyages and more profit as ships and crews
spent more time working in the economy than sitting idle in port.
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CHAPTER 3
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
“They are insensible to the wonders of inanimate nature and they may be said not
to perceive the mighty forests that surround them till they fall beneath the hatchet,” wrote
Alexis de Tocqueville of the American public in his 1835 study of American society, On
Democracy in America.1 “Their eyes are fixed upon another sight: the American people
views its own march across the wilds, draining swamps, turning the course of rivers,
peopling solitudes, and subduing nature,” the Frenchman continued.2 De Tocqueville was
right. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, most Americans were hostile
towards the environment.3 They showed little concern for the natural world.
Several historians of science and technology, including Leo Marx, David E. Nye, John F.
Kasson, and Judith McGraw, confirm de Tocqueville’s sentiments.4 Leo Marx’s The
Machine in the Garden (1964, 2000), for instance, argues evidence of de Tocqueville’s
concerns could be found much earlier in Tench Coxe’s ambitions for American
manufacturing. Coxe overlooked the wonders of nature when he promoted harnessing the
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environment for manufacturing. “By wind and water machines we can make pig and bar
iron, nail rods, tire, sheet-iron, sheet-copper, sheet-brass, anchors, meal of all kinds,
gunpowder…”5 Coxe believed factories were necessary else the “great natural powers of
the country will remain inactive and useless.”6 It is true manufacturing could highlight
the wonders of nature, but Coxe saw the environment in terms of economic development,
not with the awe and wonder of someone sensitive to the natural world.
Similarly, Marx’s protégé, David E. Nye argues eighteenth and early nineteenth
century Americans sought to “subdue the land.” Nye contends that the majority of
Americans held the environment as an obstacle “to be overcome” by the industrious.7
According to Nye, hostility toward the environment was the dominant view held by
Americans throughout the early republic and well in to the Jacksonian era of the 1830s.8
Nye’s interpretation, however, cuts short the timeline along which Americans held a
hostile viewpoint towards the environment. Although romantic era literarists, such as
Henry David Thoreau, began sympathizing with the environment by mid-century, the
establishment of the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse in the early 1850s, discussed in the final
chapter, indicates the idea of mastering nature continued to be a factor in Americans’
relationship with the natural world for at least another twenty years beyond Nye’s
estimation.9
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Lastly, John F. Kasson and Judith A. McGaw argue early American industrialists,
such as Francis Cabot Lowell, Nathan Appleton, and Zenas Crane, sought to “exercise
exclusive control over the environment,” as they advanced their industry.10 The
environment played a central role in America’s industrial revolution as industrialists built
mills near waterfalls or river rapids and dams to harness the water’s power.11
Political historian Drew R. McCoy substantiates these claims. McCoy’s study of
the political economy in the early American republic argues the Jeffersonian republican
idea of a peaceful agrarian republic was never a real possibility. America had already
achieved a “relatively advanced commercial society” by the outbreak of the American
Revolution.12 Many of the nation’s founding fathers, including John Adams and
Benjamin Franklin were well aware of this fact.13 McCoy argues the republican vision
was not one of Sparta, but rather one that was closely integrated with larger global
commercial society.14 A greater discussion of republican values and practical science in
the early United States follows in Chapter 5.
If solving commercial problems served as the foundation for Americans venturing
into practical science and the mechanical arts, the environment played a similarly
important role. The environment created many of the commercial problems for which
Americans sought solutions and thus created a need for science and the arts. This chapter
examines the environment’s impact on the development of American science, illustrating
10
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how the environment mandated the involvement of the state, shaped innovation and
created a need for science and the arts.
To solve the commercial problems created by the environment, many Individuals
tapped into the natural properties of the landscape’s resources and exploited those
properties and resources to give themselves an advantage over their surroundings.
Additionally, Americans adapted, innovated, and used their knowledge of natural
philosophy and the arts to solve problems in nature. These innovations targeted specific
elements of the environment that allowed man to co-exist with the natural world. Lastly,
many individuals went so far as to alter the environment to best suit their own needs.
Altering the environment, however, also presented the greatest opportunity for the
environment to fight back against man’s encroachment. This constant struggle between
man and the environment necessitated the involvement of the state.
EXPLOITING THE LANDSCAPE’S RESOURCES
As individuals sought to solve the various commercial problems outlined in
Chapter 2, natural forces presented their own set of problems. Forces of nature, such as
winds, storm surges, and erosion, created a need for a scientific understanding of the
world. Americans had to keep this in mind as they worked to solve commercial issues.
Sometimes this required using the landscape’s natural resources to tame nature’s forces,
keep the forces of nature in check, or at the very least, prevent those forces from
becoming bigger issues. Captain Lemuel Moody and the Portland Observatory are a case
in point. In the spring and summer of 1807, Moody took charge of building a marine
telegraph station. The station, then known as the Portland Monument Ground, provided
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the seaport with advanced notice of ship arrivals.15 Building the tower proved quite a
challenge for Moody. Moody was not an engineer. He was a retired shipmaster.
Presumably, Moody learned the art of construction during his twenty-plus years plying
the oceans, rising from a lowly waterboy in the American Revolution to a sea captain
before the turn of the century. As a mariner, Moody undoubtedly had to make repairs to
his ship at some point in that career. Although few records exist documenting Moody’s
career at sea, it is unrealistic to think his ships escaped the ravages of storms and the sea.
If Moody’s did not encounter such concerns in a career spanning more than twenty years,
Moody would have had one of the most remarkable seafaring careers of any mariner in
the history of sailing.
Storms and the ravages of the sea caused a great deal of damage to ships on the
water. Often times repairing damages at sea could not wait until the ship reached the next
port, but rather the repairs had to be completed while the ship was en route. This
necessitated that mariners learned the art of construction. Through this learning, sailors
gained knowledge of construction techniques, strength of materials, and practical
engineering experience. They also learned to take their environment into consideration
and they applied their knowledge to combating the effects of the environment. This
practical experience is evident in Moody’s construction of the Portland Observatory and
the tower’s longevity. The observatory has lasted 210 years and still remains standing in
its original location today.
Moody not only considered the tower’s purpose, he also thought intently about
the coastal environment and the forces of nature affecting the observatory. Although
15
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Portland’s harbor is protected by Cape Elizabeth to the south and the barrier islands of
the Casco Bay to the east, the city of Portland sits on an inclined peninsula that leaves it
exposed to the harsh coastal elements. For this reason, Moody decided to build his marine
lookout “in the form of a lighthouse.”16 Tapered lighthouse towers, such as those at
Portland Head and Cape Henry, had proven effective against coastal elements regardless
of the locale. Moody understood the task at hand and proceeded with the knowledge that
“the form of a lighthouse,” provided the best option for the tower’s long term survival.
The fields of architecture and engineering were just beginning to emerge in the
United States when Moody built his marine observatory.17 Moody was not formally
trained in either field and his only knowledge of architecture and engineering was what
he knew about ship design and repair from his days of sailing. Moody also lacked the
knowledge of the strength of materials. Ann Johnson notes that strength of materials
testing was also emerging in the United States alongside the field of engineering.18
Similar to his knowledge of architecture and engineering, Moody’s knowledge of
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strength of materials was limited to what he may have gained from working on seafaring
vessels and making any necessary repairs while the ship remained at sea.19
What Moody did possess was an intimate knowledge of Portland’s physical
geography. Moody understood his lookout tower needed to withstand the violent
hurricanes and ravaging nor’easters that constantly plagued Portland’s coastal
community. He understood the benefits the local environment provided as well as the
challenges it posed to the success of his operation. This double-edged sword pushed
Moody to consider every aspect of the environment in building his signaling station.
Portland’s physical environment was both friend and foe.
Portland’s physical environment provided two major benefits for Moody’s tower.
First, the natural resources in and around the seaport provided Moody with an abundance
of strong building materials that proved ideal for standing up against the harsh conditions
of the coast. For instance, Moody ballasted the foundation of the signal tower with 122
tons of granite rubblestone quarried from the coast and the fields surrounding the port.20
Moody knew from his seafaring days that a strong, heavy ballast helped stabilize a ship
and kept it upright against rolling waves and violent storms. Because Moody had no
formal training in architecture or engineering, he drew on his experience and practical
knowledge of shipping in building his marine telegraph. He surmised that a heavy ballast
of granite rubblestone would keep the observatory tower upright against the constant
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punishment of the coastal winds similar to the way a ship’s ballast keeps the vessel from
rolling.21
Moody chose the granite rubblestone not only for its prevalence around Portland,
but also its weight. Aside from basalt, granite is the heaviest stone common to Portland.
Given a sample of equal dimensions, granite is five times heavier than pinewood,
Portland’s other abundant natural resource.22 Once completed, the observatory eclipsed
seven stories and stands more than 85 feet tall.23 It needed a heavy ballast to provide a
sufficient counterweight to the prevailing winds. Moody’s decision proved an admirable
choice.
Contractors harvested the wood for the tower, including the “eight sticks of prime
timber of sixty-five feet in length, fourteen inches square at the butt and ten inches at the
top” used for the corner support posts, from the forests near Sebago Lake and Windham,
both just to the northwest of Portland.24 Here again, the abundance of white pine in and
around the port made it the obvious choice, but Moody was also aware of pine’s strength
from his sailing days. White pine was the same material used for ships’ masts. Moody
knew that pine was strong enough to endure the hurricanes and harsh nor’easters that
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were common to Portland, but also light enough to allow for relative ease in raising the
tower’s eight 65-foot tall corner support posts.
Second, the physical geography of the port provided Moody with an ideal
location. As previously mentioned, the city of Portland sits on a hill sloping towards a
sheltered harbor while the Casco Bay is full of islands. The coastline extending from
Portland to the Portland Head Lighthouse at Cape Elizabeth is lined with rocky cliffs. In
thinking about the intended purpose of the marine observatory, Moody knew the tower
needed to be elevated in order to have an unobstructed view of the harbor, bay, and cape.
He chose the highest elevation in the city, an “elivated [sic] part of Mountjoy’s Neck.”
Mountjoy Hill was a windswept barren wasteland used primarily for grazing cattle.25
Moody chose the hill not only because of its excellent 360-degree views, but also because
it had a clear line of sight with the city’s wharves.26 Merchants and dock workers easily
saw the observatory and its signals and knew what was going on with shipping beyond
their limited view of the bay.
Moody also considered the environment in his design of the tower. Moody
designed the observatory on a compass rose with each of the eight sides aligning directly
with a point on a compass – N-S-E-W and NE-SE-SW-NW. He then tapered the
observatory near the top to provide the least wind resistance. Designing the lookout was
an important task. Moody knew that designing the observatory “in the form of a
lighthouse” gave it the best chance of surviving the coastal elements.27
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Others were not so sure. For many, the observatory was the tallest building they
had ever seen. Moody’s tower bested the Portland Head light by a full story.28 Calvin
Day and Nathaniel Willis, editors of Portland’s Eastern Argus newspaper, were two such
skeptics. In the month after the observatory was completed, Day and Willis questioned
the stability of Moody’s tower claiming, “at some period hence forward the tower will
blow over like a summer cloud.”29 Moody proved the editors wrong. As previously noted,
Moody’s observatory continues to tower over the city today, some 210 years after its
construction, despite Portland’s harsh coastal environment. The Portland Observatory is
the only remaining nineteenth-century marine telegraph station in the United States. Two
reasons the observatory remains are because of its excellent design and Moody’s choice
of materials.30
The Portland Monument Ground invoked a sublimity among residents and visitors
alike. The awe and wonder experienced by the tower’s visitors were not so much because
of the technology itself, but rather because of what the structure represented. The
observatory illustrated both man’s conquest of nature and man’s place within it. Moody
conquered the environment by utilizing the environment’s own natural resources against
its climatic elements. He invited spectators to climb to the top of his tower where they
were taken abreath by the vast panoramic views of the expansive oceanic scene. Nowhere
else on earth could one take in the vastness of the ocean except at sea.
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SOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES THROUGH ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION
If men like Captain Moody used the environment against itself, they also invented
technologies to solve specific problems created by the landscape. In this, some might see
the environment as advancing science and the arts in the early United States, while others
might argue the natural world dictated the science performed and the technologies used
by America’s scientific minds. The power of the natural world dictating outcomes is
well-argued by environmental historians. Mark Fiege’s Irrigated Eden, for instance,
argues the environment of Idaho’s Snake River Valley compromised any chance of
engineers controlling the natural world and their plans for an ordered agricultural
landscape. These engineers sought to bring water to the valley’s desert and turn it into an
agricultural mecca. As engineers altered the natural world, the environment pushed back
with its own change.31 William Cronon asserts Chicago’s rapid growth was directly
influenced by its position within nature. Cronon begins his argument showing how
Chicago’s location was a desolate wasteland unworthy of such a great city, yet the natural
world provided the city with access to farmland, forests, and water that fueled the city’s
economy. The location of these natural resources naturally dictated the location of
Chicago’s granaries, meat packing plants, stockyards, and other amenities that turned
Chicago into the gateway to the west more than the Mississippi River cities of St. Louis
and New Orleans.32 Ari Kelman’s A River and Its City and Matthew Klingle’s Emerald
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City make similar arguments about the environment’s ability to influence development in
New Orleans and Seattle respectively.33
Arthur McEvoy’s The Fisherman’s Problem illustrates how the environment
dictated government policy in California. By arguing the environment was as much of a
factor in the degradation of natural resources as human interaction, McEvoy demonstrates
how natural world phenomenon, such as El Nino, contributed to policymakers’
misunderstanding of the environment and therefore negatively influenced legislation
aimed at reversing landscape degradation.34 Richard White extends this argument by
illustrating how the Columbia river dictated the development of electrical, nuclear, and
steam power technologies.35
The development of the mud machine, the marine telegraph, the diskpile
foundation and oil heaters and lens defrosters for America’s New England lighthouses are
good examples of the environment’s interaction with science and the arts. The mud
machine, for instance, was developed to dredge harbors and deepen shipping lanes so that
shipping could move in and out of port unimpeded by the natural world. The marine
telegraph provided advance notification of ship arrivals in ports where the view from the
wharf was obstructed by barrier islands, rocky cliffs, and other geographical features. The
diskpile foundation allowed engineers to secure offshore structures to hollow reefs on the
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ocean floor. Cold northern winters necessitated the development of oil heaters and lens
defrosters in coastal beacons.
Mud Machines
One technology influenced by the environment was the development of the steam
powered dredger, often referred to as the “mud machine.” John and Andrew Ellicott, first
introduced the horse powered mud machine when they opened their wharf in Baltimore’s
harbor to export flour in 1783.36 Before they could build their wharf, the Ellicott brothers
needed to dredge the harbor at the construction site so they could accommodate larger
vessels. To achieve this, John and Andrew constructed a horse-drawn bucket scoop and
placed it on a barge. The bucket scoop consisted a horse-powered treadwheel attached to
a chain-driven winch. As the treadwheel turned, the winch coiled the chain and raised the
bucket scoop of dredge from the depths of the harbor. The operator then dumped the spoil
on a large scow positioned next to the barge. When the scow was full, it sailed down the
Patapsco River where it would dump the dredge back into the water.37
The Ellicotts’ venture with the mud machine was a private one. They used it
specifically to clear the harbor for the construction of their wharf. Other merchants,
however, quickly realized the utility of the machine and pushed the city of Baltimore to
invest in its own mud machine. The city’s board of Port Wardens levied a one cent tax on
every ton of cargo moving through the harbor. Five years later, the Port Wardens doubled
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the tax. By the turn of the decade, the Port Wardens had raised enough money to order
the construction of the Ellicotts’ mud machine for general use in the harbor.38
The horse-drawn mud machine was a slow process. According to Seth Rockman,
a labor historian of early Baltimore, workers standing in shallow water guided the mud
machine’s bucket scoop and “emptied the foul-smelling muck into waiting scows.” This
operation required as many as 60 laborers a day.39 Emptying the scow was equally
difficult. The entire process was inefficient.40 Adding to that was the continual need for
keeping the harbor and shipping lanes clear of dredge buildup. Baltimore’s harbor is fed
by the Jones Falls. As the Falls flowed through the city, it brought dirt and debris with it,
which were deposited on the floor of the harbor at the end of the Falls’ run. The velocity
of the Jones Falls meant the harbor filled up very quickly. Floods, such as the one in
1796, caused the harbor to fill up faster than the mud machine could remove the debris.
Overdevelopment of Jones Falls in the early nineteenth century exacerbated the problem
by reducing the paths for runoff and drainage, thus channeling it into the Falls and
increasing the velocity of the river.41 Something better was needed.
In 1824, the city of Baltimore contracted with Watchman and Bratt to build a
steam engine, which was placed on the dredging machine.42 The steam-powered dredging
machine proved more efficient than its horse drawn predecessor. It was not only faster,
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but also more powerful. Unfortunately, the steam engine required a great deal of
maintenance to keep it running. The Port Wardens originally paid Watchman and Bratt
$2,500 for the steam engine, but within a few years the Wardens had to replace the steam
power dredging machine with a new one. The estimated repairs nearly exceeded the cost
of a new machine.43
The conflict between nature and technology is a contentious one and the mud
machine was no different. As the mud machine removed debris and opened the shipping
lanes, it also cleared the path available for the silt and debris to run off. By reducing the
the barriers to runoff and erosion, the mud machine made it easier for silt and debris to
build back up. The mud machine demonstrates that nature necessitates the development
of newer, more advanced technologies, but those technologies in turn also interfere with
nature. The cycle of conflict between nature and technology is infinite. Man will never
win the ultimate battle against the environment and the forces of nature.
Telegraphic Science
Although telegraphic science had been around for several centuries in the old
world, it was still in its infancy in the United States at the turn of the nineteenth century.
David Porter established the first telegraph station in the United States in 1797 on
Baltimore’s Federal Hill.44 Other seaports soon followed. Around the turn of the
nineteenth century, a semaphoric telegraph existed between The Vineyard and mainland
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Massachusetts, although the name of the proprietor is unclear.45 Lemuel Moody built the
Portland observatory in 1807.46 Most east coast telegraph stations in the United States,
however, were established between the 1810s and 1830s.47
The environment played a significant role in furthering telegraphic science in the
United States. In most cases, proprietors like David Porter and Lemuel Moody
established telegraph stations to compensate for the lack of a visual line of sight.48 Many
American ports were established because the physical geography of the landscape
provided a shelter from violent ocean storms and sea surges that resulted from those
storms. Yet, the protective nature of the landscape also created challenges for merchants
and port officials. In many ports, the sheltering nature made it impossible for the port to
see approaching ships and vice versa. The port environment provided the opportunity to
develop and expand telegraphic science. The natural world dictated a need for marine
observatories to spot incoming ships and telegraph their arrival to the merchants,
stevedores, and other interested parties. In Baltimore for instance, the approach to the
inner harbor runs the length of the Patapsco River, however the towering height of
Federal Hill blocks the view of the Patapsco from the docks. Merchants, public officials,
and dock workers were unable to see ships approaching the harbor until those ships had
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almost reached the docks. This late notice impacted every aspect of the ships’ unlading
from the hiring of stevedores to the selling and storage of the imported merchandise.49
If the natural landscape dictated the need for marine telegraphs, the physical
environment also determined how the telegraph stations were built and where they were
located. David Porter, for instance, built his his marine telegraph on top of Federal Hill.
By placing the signal station on such a high vantage point, Porter was able to see both the
inner and outer harbors of Baltimore and several miles of the Patapsco River leading into
the port. Federal Hill’s height above the surrounding area, however, allowed Porter to
build a modest tower of approximately two stories. In contrast, Moody’s observatory in
Portland eclipsed six stories despite being situated on the highest elevation in the city.
The high rocky cliffs and Casco Bay islands mandated the height of Moody’s tower. In
Boston, the lay of the land and the various islands of the harbor mandated a network of
signal stations.50
Additionally, the natural world limited the colors, shapes, and designs that could
be used on signal flags due to the principles of atmospheric refraction.51 The concept of
atmospheric refraction can be traced back to Claudius Ptolemy of the ancient GrecoEgyptian civilization. In its simplest terms, atmospheric refraction is the aberration of
light and other electromagnetic waves passing through the earth’s atmosphere. The
effects of atmospheric refraction, however, are much more complicated. For instance, as
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astronomer Andrew T. Young notes, refraction “lets us see a little further, if the ray is
concave toward the earth,” but that air quality, the curvature of the earth, and
temperatures can all affect atmospheric refraction.52 This says nothing of adverse weather
conditions, which in themselves could cause problems with the identification of colors,
shapes, and designs. Young also notes, refraction is “particularly variable over water,
because of the high heat capacity of water” and that “temperature contrasts are
particularly marked near the shore.”53 Observations from the maritime signal towers
would have been directly impacted by weather conditions and the laws of atmospheric
refraction.
Red, white, and royal or navy blue were the most common colors used on
maritime signal flags throughout the nineteenth century. A survey of over 1,000 signal
flags and private merchant house flags from 19 different American ports show more than
90% of the flags used by the marine telegraphs limited their colors to some combination
of red, white, and blue.54 Although dyes of the early nineteenth century may not have
contrasted as much as they do today, the limited use of colors resulted from the distance
at which the colors could be seen and discerned from one another rather than from the
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inability to manufacture dyes of other colors.55 Black and yellow appeared less frequently
on American signal flags than on European signals. Green was found on fewer than five
flags from the previously mentioned survey of 19 American port cities.56
Although yellow was found on a few flags, the hue was one of those colors that
observers found hard to distinguish. In 1824, Charles Beck, the signaling agent stationed
at Long Island in Boston Harbor, informed John Rowe Parker, the proprietor of Boston’s
marine telegraph, that he was replacing the yellow flags with “Some thing Bather [sic].”57
Jonathan Bruce, another Boston signaling agent stationed at the Boston lighthouse, wrote
to Parker asking for cloth of red, white, and blue, stating that he could make the flags “so
plain that you will not mistake them in whether [sic].”58 Barnard Lindsay Watson’s
signals from Holyhead to Liverpool between 1827 and 1839 and Frederick Marryat’s
signals for British merchants first published in 1817 were similarly colored. One-third of
Marryat’s signals also incorporated yellow.
Atmospheric refraction and the inability to distinguish colors at great distances
also impacted the designs that were used on signals. In 1780, Captain Walter Young of
the HMS Sandwich noted, “Chequed flags should be abolished. Quartered, halved, threestriped, striped corner ways, half up and down, and pierced are the only ones that are
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properly distinguished at a distance.”59 This sentiment was shared by Rear Admiral
Richard Kempenfelt. Kempenfelt believed tri-colored flags of vertical stripes were the
easiest to distinguish and noted that red-yellow combinations on flags resulted in poor
identifications.60 According to Andries Burgers, “Simple signal flag design is an
imperative at sea and it is the practical seamanlike requirement to be able to identify
signal flags at the longest possible distance.”61
Similarly, the natural world limited the shapes that could be used on signal flags.
Kempenfelt, for instance, wrote that pendants should not have swallowtails. In 1814,
Vice-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood wrote Sir Home Popham, “The Broad Pendants give
great relief to the observer, the flag wafting out with every change of view, the colours
are more perfectly distinguished. There certainly is not that advantage in triangular flags;
they are in general difficult to discern.”62
While these examples pertain to European signal codes, they can be easily applied
to the American systems. When Porter and Moody established their signaling stations in
Baltimore and Portland, they drew on their knowledge of the European systems they
encountered in the Caribbean.63 John Rowe Parker claimed, Samuel C. Reid’s New York
telegraph was “nearly similar” to Watson’s signals at Holyhead.64 Through their
knowledge of the European signal systems, proprietors of the marine telegraph already
understood that certain colors, designs, and shapes were indistinguishable in the marine
environment.
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In order to give the observer the best advantage at discerning colors, shapes, and
designs, the observatories used the most advanced telescopes of the day. Porter and
Moody both utilized telescopes made by Peter and John Dollond of London65 Minutes of
the organizational meeting for the Portland Monument Ground indicate Moody spent
$500 on the Dollond and Son telescope used at the observatory on Munjoy Hill.66 The
environment thus not only dictated the colors, shapes, and designs used on flags, but also
the equipment needed to identify those characteristics.
One might wonder why Moody and Porter sent away to London to procure their
telescopes rather than purchase them domestically. The answer is simple. Although glass
manufacturing was one of America’s first industries, the United States simply did not
have the capability of producing high quality optical glass. The state of science and the
arts in the United States limited American access to knowledge and American glass
manufacturers lagged behind their European counterparts. In fact, few Americans knew
the art of glassmaking. According to Pamela O. Long, “Glassmaking involved much tacit
knowledge especially as it related to firing in the furnaces.”67 This limited American
production and quality. Most gaffers, skilled master artisans who oversaw a teams of
glassmaking laborers, had to be brought over from Europe. Enticing Europeans to
immigrate to the United States and paying for their passage made glass production in the
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United States more expensive.68 The Dollond’s of London, on the other hand, were
producing top quality optical glass. Their telescopes were considered among the best in
the world at the time.
Although certain colors, shapes and designs were indistinguishable at sea or
between the land and the sea, there were fewer issues with discerning colors, shapes, and
designs between the observatory and the port. In Baltimore, for instance, the observatory
agent flew a triangular pendant to signal the arrival of an unknown brig.69 In Portland, a
yellow triangular pendant signified an approaching sloop.70 One reason for there being
fewer issues was the distance. At sea and between the land and the sea, the distance
between the signal and the observer was greater than it was between the observatory and
the port. Greater distances allowed for atmospheric refraction to distort images, colors,
and shapes.
Issues surrounding the colors, shapes, and visibility of signal flags illustrates how
the environment impacted even the littlest things. To the uninformed observer, the color
or shape of a flag might seem inconsequential. Individuals participating in the mechanical
arts and practical science, however, understood that they had to consider the environment
in nearly every aspect of the scientific and mechanical work.
Stansbury’s Diskpile Foundation
If the environment played a significant role in the marine telegraph, it played a
similar role in the construction of the lighthouse at Carysfort Reef in Florida. On the
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recommendation of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Lighthouse Service intended to
build a screwpile style structure at Carysfort. A screwpile foundation is a tubular cast or
wrought iron skeletal frame. It is an adaption of the standard straightpile construction.
The screwpile foundation was first used by Alexander Mitchell, a blind Irish architect and
engineer, in 1838. Mitchell added threads to the end of the wrought iron tubes allowing
them to be screwed into the ground for greater rigidity and stronger structural support.
Although the straightpile construction had been used in both onshore and offshore
structures, the screwpile proved especially ideal for muddy, sandy, or swampy softbottomed floors. The design was also highly touted in exposed and wave-swept areas
because it allowed the wind and waves to sweep through the foundation almost
unobstructed.
The lighthouse at Carysfort Reef proved more challenging than the screwpile light
built by Major Hartman Bache and Lt. George Gordon Meade at Brandywine Shoal in the
Delaware Bay. While it was intended that the Army Corps of Engineers would build a
screwpile structure for the Light-House Service at Carysfort, the environment made that
task impossible. Engineers originally believed Carysfort Reef was solid and would
provide a suitable base for the screwpile foundation. Upon closer inspection, however,
Captain Howard Stansbury found the reef hollow. The engineers had nothing to which
they could anchor the screwpiles.
Stansbury went to the drawing board. He determined that by driving the piles
through steel disks he could anchor the piles in the hollow reef. By adding disks to the
piles, Stansbury extended the reach of the screwpile threads and ensured the piles bored
into the solid portions of the reef when they were screwed into the sea floor.
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Additionally, the disk helped distribute the weight of the structure giving it stability and
making it more secure in the face of hurricanes and other environmental elements.
Stansbury’s diskpile innovation shows the impossibility of a one-size-fits-all technology
suitable for every environment. The screwpile foundation proved successful in many
other applications, but the innovation did not work for the Carysfort Reef because the
shoal was hollow at its core. The same can be said for other innovations. Technology
must be adapted to each unique landscape. Engineers, inventors, and others responsible
for designing mechanical apparatuses cannot account for every geographic feature or
variance between two different physical environments. It is an unreasonable expectation
to believe that man can, or will someday, accomplish this impossible task.
Oil Heaters and Lens Defrosters
Stansbury’s diskpile construction is not the only instance when the environment
dictated the development of new technologies. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4, several
individuals tinkered with inventing an oil heater for lighthouse lamps in the mid to late
1810s. Chapter 2 looks at the oil heater as a commercial opportunity for the inventors,
whereas Chapter 4 looks at the innovation in terms of mechanical arts in the Light-House
Establishment. Here, the oil heater is discussed as a product deriving out of
environmental factors.
Tinkering in the mechanical arts was directly influenced by the environment.
Unlike other countries, specifically France, that used colza oil to fuel their lighthouse
lamps, the United States primarily used spermaceti oil. Spermaceti oil is a waxy
substance derived from the head of sperm whales that is much denser, and in the early
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nineteenth century much cheaper, than colza.71 Colza, also known as rapeseed, is
extracted from cabbage, mustard, turnips, and other vegetables of the Brassicaceae
family. During the cold winter months northern United States lighthouse keepers
struggled to keep the oil from congealing. Once the spermaceti oil congealed, the
lighthouse lamp’s flame is greatly reduced and often extinguished altogether. Mechanics,
such as Alexander Black, Winslow Lewis, and David Melville, attempted to solve this
problem of congealing oil, which was created by their local environment. Melville, for
instance, devised a small tube to direct the heat of the lamp’s flame to the oil. The heat
from the flame was just enough to keep the oil warm and prevent its congealing. Lewis
and Black attempted to copy Melville’s invention, but ultimately, Melville innovation
was installed on all of the northern lighthouses.
The environment also influenced Melville in developing a method for defrosting
and dehumidifying the lighthouse lens. Moisture from the humid summer and cold winter
airs caused condensation and frost to accumulate on the lighthouse lantern, which
reduced the visibility of the light at sea. Melville installed a small scuttle door on the
lamp that could be opened or closed to admit or exclude the vapors of the external air and
thus prevent the accumulation of humidity and frost “from collecting on the windows at
all seasons and in all states and temperatures of the atmosphere.” This small adaptation
could even dislodge frost after it had already accumulated.72
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As Baltimore’s mud machine, the colors of the telegraphic flags, Captain Howard
Stansbury’s diskpile foundation, and David Melville’s inventions illustrate, American’s
used science and the arts to overcome environmental challenges. These examples also
demonstrate how the natural world dictated the need for specific technologies to solve
everyday problems in the landscape. The interaction between the environment and early
republic science and the arts was a give and take relationship.
ALTERING THE ENVIRONMENT AND INVOLVING THE STATE
If Americans used science and the arts to overcome environmental challenges,
they also altered the environment to solve problems created by the natural world in an
attempt to realize their vision for America. The dredging of Baltimore’s harbors is a case
in point. As previously mentioned, debris and silt from the Jones Falls continuously filled
the harbor basin making it difficult for shipping to navigate in and out of the port. Port
officials, contractors, and even the Army Corps of Engineers removed dredge buildup
from the harbor using steam powered mud machines. These spoils were then dumped
along the Patapsco River reshaping the river’s geography and altering the area’s
ecosystem. Harbor officials, however, showed little concern with their impact on the
environment. They only had their long-term vision for the port in mind.73 Similar
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situations could be found in other American ports from Portland, Maine to Savannah,
Georgia.74
Dealing with the environment necessitated the involvement of the state, whether
federal or local. Overcoming challenges presented by the natural world was a
monumental task. As nature fought back against the encroaching advances of man, the
struggle became too great for many individuals. Where private enterprise had once
conducted surveys of local harbors, built port infrastructure, and removed debris buildup
from the floor of the harbor, they increasingly lacked the financial resources to conduct
these projects on an ongoing basis. Private individuals could only do so much.
Industrious entrepreneurs, such as Lemuel Moody, may have conquered their local
environment to establish marine telegraphs or chart the depth of local ports, but most
lacked the expertise, finances, and material resources to carry out larger projects or to
fight what became the endless struggle against nature. Moody, in fact, had to finance his
marine observatory and charts of Portland’s harbor through subscriptions of local
merchants. (Moody would eventually payback all of the original subscribers, but it took
him almost 40 years to do so.)75 Projects that were intensively integrated with the
environment, such as canal building, harbor dredging, or a broader survey of the coast,
were simply unattainable by private means. For these projects, private enterprise divested
themselves of responsibility for subduing nature and came to rely on the state. The
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government was the only entity, public or private, that either possessed the necessary
resources or had the political clout to commandeer them.76
In Baltimore, for instance, the Port Wardens notified the City Council on August
13, 1849, “That it required the expenditure of the amount appropriated $2,500.00 to
remove the large amount of dirt at the mouth of the falls, to enable the machine to operate
in cleaning out the falls.”77 In a second letter dated the next day, the Port Wardens
requested an additional $17,000.00 “for the removal of dirt from the bed of Jones Falls
from its mouth” to the Madison Street Bridge.78 It was not uncommon for the Port
Wardens to request appropriations to the tune of $2,500.00 to $5,000.00 on a regular
basis.79 These expenditures proved too much for private enterprise as evidenced by the
Baltimore City Council 1828 resolution authorizing the Port Wardens to “deepen and
clean the Navigation at any wharves or docks” when “they shall be called on by the
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occupiers, occupancy owners or owners.”80 In fact, numerous private owners, such as
George Westman and Alexander Brown, petitioned the Baltimore City Council to have
the debris removed from their wharves.81
The direct costs of overcoming natural world challenges were exacerbated by the
indirect costs of purchasing and maintaining the necessary equipment. As previously
noted, the city of Baltimore originally paid the company of Watchman and Bratt $2,500
for a steam engine dredging machine in 1824.82 Two years later, the city accepted bids
“for the making of two good & sufficient steam Engines, one of not less than six horse
power - and the other not less than Twelve horse power with the necessary apparatus for
the purpose of deepening the Harbor.”83 By1833, Baltimore’s dredging operations
required four discharging machines, three digging machines, 12 horses, 19 large scows, 3
small scows, 8 small skiffs, a small boat, several dozen shovels, picks, wheel barrows,
carts, and oars, and a single steam dredging machine.84
The city owned all of this equipment and held the responsibility of maintaining
and repairing it. Daily engagement with the environment took its toll on the machines.
Maintenance and repair costs alone sometimes amounted as much as the cost of new
equipment or the cost of performing the work. In 1831, repairs to the steam dredging
machine were so considerable, the Port Wardens found the dredging machine “entirely
80
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unworthy of repairs” and sought authorization from the city to purchase a new machine.
The repairs to the old machine “would amount to within a few dollars of what a new iron
boiler would” cost.85 After making their case for a new steam dredging machine, the Port
Wardens then argued for a new machine with a copper boiler. “Taking into consideration
the great difference of the durability of copper over that of iron boilers, and the relative
values when unfit for use; the copper being worth, say one half its present cost, [and] the
iron little or nothing,”86 The City Council agreed with the Port Wardens and passed a
resolution on February 8, 1831 authorizing the Port Wardens to contract with Watchman
and Bratt for the copper boiler.87 Yet, the copper boiler fared little better against a
demanding environment. In the 1833 inventory, just two years after its purchase, the
copper boiler steam dredging machine is listed as needing “some repairs.” Additionally,
two of the four discharging machines in the city inventory “required considerable
repairs,” while one digging machine needed “thorough repairs,”88 The cost of these
repairs added up quickly. They often exceeded the financial resources of private
enterprise, meaning only the government could muster the financial clout to battle the
environment continuously.
Even when private enterprise could afford the expense of combating the
environment, they still deferred to the government. William Patterson, and later his heirs,
continued to have his private dock dredged by the City of Baltimore even though the
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Pattersons had amassed the second largest fortune in Maryland behind Charles Carroll.89
Other private enterprises such as John S. Brown & Company and the Canton Company
also requested the City dredge their wharves.90 William A. Dunnington went so far as to
request “about Twenty five scow loads taken up” at his dock.91 Throughout the 1830s and
1840s the Port Wardens and Baltimore City Council were regularly leasing the dredging
machine and its services for as much as $15.00 a day.92
While many individuals saw port improvements as a function of the state, the
private sector also deferred on issues dealing with the natural world because they lacked
the technical expertise for environmental concerns. The gvoernment, on the other hand,
possessed the scientific knowledge for interacting with the environment, or at the least,
possessed the ability to obtain the expertise.
From its inception as a federal republic on March 4, 1789, the government
worked to build its scientific knowledge base through the Army Corps of Engineers, the
Coast Survey, and the Light-House Establishment. As the Corps, Survey, and
Establishment gained respect for the scientific knowledge they obtained, their value to
the general welfare of the nation increased exponentially and the demand for their
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expertise grew. exponentially. Many individuals petitioned the federal government for
assistance in building port infrastructure, surveying the coast, or deepening harbors
because of the government’s expertise. When Philadelphia merchants petitioned the
federal government in 1826 for a breakwater on the Delaware River, they acknowledged
the Corps of engineers as “most distinguished and experienced.” Philadelphians noted the
Corps’ expertise when they detailed the Corps’ “full conviction of the insufficiency of the
plan contemplated by the appropriation” while suggesting a revised plan that “would
completely answer the intended purpose” and serve as “a lasting monument of the
[state’s] provident wisdom.”93
Other seaports similarly acknowledged the federal government’s expertise when
they petitioned the government for assistance. In 1838, city officials in Bridgeport,
Connecticut praised the harbor improvement plans made the previous year by Colonel
Joseph Totten when they petitioned for more appropriations to expand the work.94 Two
years later in an obvious recognition of the government’s growing expertise, the
Baltimore City Council petitioned Congress for assistance in deepening the port’s
harbor.95 Baltimore dredged the port annually for nearly twenty years on its own before
requesting assistance from the federal government.96 And in 1854, when Portland
merchants applied to the city for an ordinance on private wharves extending too far into
the harbor, the municipal government saw fit to commission the federal government for
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its expertise. The federal government dispatched its three most distinguished experts Professor Alexander Dallas Bache of the Coast Survey, then Commander Charles Henry
Davis of the United States Navy, and now General Joseph Totten of the Army Corps of
Engineers. The government’s report detailed “the method for increasing [the port’s]
accommodations, and at the same time maintaining its depth and capacity.”97 The city
recognized the federal government’s expertise in petitioning the Maryland legislature for
an act implementing the federal government’s recommendations.98
The involvement of the government in concerns of the environment in the early
nineteenth century might be thought of as “big science.” Generally, the term ‘big
science” is used to refer to the large scale scientific enterprises of the post-World War II
era originating out of the Manhattan Project. However, if we define “big science” as
scientific research on so large a scale that it exceeds the abilities of private enterprise and
requires the government’s involvement for financial, labor, and natural resource support
“big science” existed well before the dawn of the twentieth century. One only has to look
at the scientific institution of the United States Coast Survey to find “big science” in
nineteenth century America. The Coast Survey required a very sophisticated scientific
expertise unavailable amongst the general public and large scale financial and material
support from the federal government. The Survey may well be considered the first “big
science” project in the United States.
As the government gained its technical expertise in dealing with environmental
concerns, it often meant trying to simplify nature. The government approached its task of
overcoming environmental challenges with a blind eye toward the varied landscape.
97
98

Willis, 566.
Ibid., 569.
104

Despite the vast amount of scientific research conducted by the Coast Survey, Corps of
Engineers, and the Light-House Establishment, the government failed to acknowledge the
geographical differences of individual locales. Shoals in Boston Harbor were treated the
same as shoals off the coast of southern Florida, even though Boston Harbor experiences
somewhat fewer hurricanes and Florida’s coast sees no ice floes. Republican values of
expediency and frugality took precedent as time and money became the primary factors
for the government in all concerns.99 The government standardized on materials,
scientific methods and technological designs based on costs estimates that disregarded
local environmental conditions. The rocky cliffs and island-filled bays of the New
England ports were dramatically different from the low-lying, wind-swept, sea-level
coast of southern seaports.
Throughout the 1850s, the Light-House Board collaborated with the Army Corps
of Engineers to create a set of standards for lighthouse construction which they published
in the early 1860s. They classified coastal beacons on characteristics of design rather than
on environmental concerns. They published pamphlets with construction specifications
that gave little regard to the local variances of the natural world. First order brick tower
lighthouses, for instance, were expected to be 150 feet “from the level of ground to the
focal plane of [the] lantern.”100 Offshore structures utilizing the screwpile technology
were to “rest on and be secured to five wrought iron piles screwed vertically in the
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shoal…arranged in the form of a square.”101 Additionally, the specifications required “the
four struts radiating from the center pile to be rolled iron, 4 ½ inches in diameter.”102
These specifications failed to take into consideration the various environmental
differences of the localities. A 150-foot tall brick tower lighthouse may have sufficed for
the low-lying coasts of the south, but it would be too tall for the ships to see in the fog
when placed on the rocky cliffs of New England. Similarly, offshore screwpile
lighthouses were common in both the northern bays and the open ocean of the southern
coasts, but they were effected by different elements. Ice floes proved catastrophic to the
design of screwpile foundation in northern environments. Southern screwpile beacons
faced no such adversary. The 4 ½ inch struts radiating form the center pile may have been
sufficient for the hurricane-prone south, but it was no match for the heavy ice floes of the
north. In 1873, an inspection of the Brandywine-Shoals Lighthouse in the Delaware Bay
showed “the lower horizontal system of braces, at about the plane of low water have in
many localities dropped to the bottom; the cast-iron collars which held them having been
broken apparently by the weight of superincumbent ice, and the momentum of masses of
such ice acted on by waves. In this way, the lower system of braces is almost completely
gone on the northern side to an east and west line, just south of the north pile of the main
structure (of 1848).”103 In fact, many northern screwpile lights failed to survive ice floes.
Beginning in the early 1870s, these beacons were replaced with lights built on concrete
filled caissons. Caisson foundations were much more expensive to build, but proved more
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durable in northern environments.104 Public officials, however, did not initially see the
varied environment as an issue. They determined the screwpile design was the best
foundation for all offshore locations because it allowed for destructive waves to pass
through the foundation almost unobstructed during violent storms. Government officials
failed to consider the environmental differences of individual localities. In standardizing
on construction design and methods, the government tried to simplify nature.
The government did not always hold a universal view of nature. In 1801, William
Miller, the Commissioner of the Revenue, wrote to Henry Dearborn, Benjamin H.
Latrobe, and John McComb regarding the construction of lighthouses at Smith’s Point,
Old Point Comfort, and New Point Comfort in the Chesapeake Bay. Miller acknowledged
the three beacons were “adjacent to each other and connected by the same waters,” but he
also recognized the construction of the lighthouses “must depend upon circumstances” of
each locale. He left the final decision on building materials to Dearborn, Latrobe, and
McComb who had surveyed the sites and knew the variances of the local environment.105
Throughout the 1820s and 1830s, the Light-House Establishment under Stephen
Pleasanton repeatedly acknowledged the environmental differences of the various
seaports. Yet, by the late 1840s when Congress appropriated funds for the Carysfort Reef
Lighthouse, the government’s view of the natural world had changed. The federal
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government had standardized the screwpile design using interchangeable parts.106 It
expected the engineers and contractors to build the Carysfort Reef beacon along the same
premise as the Brandywine Shoals Lighthouse in Delaware despite the uniqueness of the
two environments.
The circumstances of the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse should have factored into the
government’s specifications, yet when the Light-House Board wrote the specs for
navigational aids, it used a universal language and did not take local variances into
consideration. The specifications contained no allowances for contractors to use their
expert judgment or make adjustments based on surveys of the local environment.107 Any
deviations from the specifications required contractors to notify the Light-House Board in
writing and await approval before proceeding. If the contractor’s proposed changes were
significant, the whole project could be put on hold while waiting for Congress to pass a
new appropriation. Rather than publish rigid specifications, the Light-House Board
should have created guidelines that left important decisions regarding the local
environment to the individual contractors building the navigational aids. The LightHouse Board opted for the rigid specifications to prevent corruption among dishonest
contractors, which the Board believed created many of the problems that plagued
Pleasonton’s administration and resulted in the establishment of the Board. To the LightHouse Board, the rigid standards were simply an extension of republican values.
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THE ENVIRONMENT FIGHTS BACK
The changing landscape proved to be one of the biggest challenges for both
private enterprise and the government. Between the man-made alterations and the natural
world phenomenon, the environment of the United States’ seaports was in constant
influx. Wharves blocked or slowed the natural flow of the water resulting in buildup of
sediment against the man-made structures. This build up reduced the depth of the harbor
and necessitated additional dredging. Harbor dredging, in turn, reshaped both the physical
geography of the port and the environments where contractors dumped their spoil.
Additionally, natural world processes, such as erosion constantly shifted the environment.
Charts and maps had to be updated more frequently than possible under auspices of
individual cartographers to ensure the safety of commerce and navigation more generally.
As Coast Survey Lieutenant Charles Henry Davis remarked of Boston Harbor, “Some
changes must necessarily have followed from the great diminution of the water receptacle
above the channel, from the construction of wharves and piers, from neglect, and from
the constant operation of those laws of tidal deposit.” Davis admitted that the “gradual
deterioration of Boston Harbor” was now well known “and apprehensions are felt that the
consequences of this deterioration may be, if it is suffered to continue, seriously injurious
to the future prosperity of the city.”108
Apprehensions of the constantly changing environment gave reason for local
communities to consult with the federal government, which was better equipped to deal
with shifting landscapes. Davis acknowledged throughout his survey of Boston Harbor,
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he had “been occasionally consulted as to certain proposed changes in the upper part of
the harbor.”109 To these inquiries, Davis recommended “lay[ing] down those principles of
hydraulic engineering which must be consulted in order that any future constructions,
demanded either by the business of the city or the preservation of the channels, may
prove beneficial, and answer the purposes for which they are designed.”110 According to
engineering historian Terry S. Reynolds, attempts to integrate engineering into the
curriculum of mainstream colleges faltered until at least the 1850s.111 Most civil
engineers learned through practical hands on training.112 Thus, many communities, even
large ones such as Boston, lacked the expertise to oversee projects such as the one
suggested by Davis. The federal government, however, offered engineering curriculum
through its military academies since 1802, giving the state the technical expertise needed
to make such recommendations.113 In fact, in making his recommendations, Davis noted,
“in the preparation of this Memoir, I have only consulted my associates in the Academy”
and that he had “no other responsibility than that which appertains to me as a member of
this Academy.” Davis claimed his responsibility, “demands I should make no statement
of facts that do not appear to be well authenticated” nor “advance [any] principles that are
not admitted or easily proved.”114 Such high standards helped convince local
communities of the federal government’s expertise.
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Man-made alterations created some of the environmental issues. As previously
noted in Portland, private wharves extended too far into the harbor. Portland historian and
former mayor of that city, William Willis, claims Portland Harbor contained “about one
million” superficial feet of wharves, which “was seriously affecting its capacity and
shoaling its water.”115 Indeed, the development of Portland’s wharves in the 1830s and
1840s created a narrow shipping lane through which increasingly larger vessels had to
pass while at the same time causing greater accumulation of silt and debris that reduced
the depth of the harbor. The federal government’s survey conducted by Bache, Davis, and
Totten in 1854 noted, “the creation of a sort of bar reaching across from Fish Point to the
middle ground, making it much shoaler in this spot now than it was in 1820.”116 Willis
noted that a “system of dredging” commenced and ordinances were passed prohibiting
the throwing of “ballast or dirt of any kind into the harbor.”117
Natural phenomenon, such as the “constant operation of those laws of tidal
deposit,” which Davis referred to in his report on Boston Harbor also proved to be of
great concern for the government.118 Erosion not only threatened America’s seaports, it
also threatened the navigational technologies that made the ports safe for commerce.
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, correspondence between the Fifth
Auditor of the Treasury and the Revenue Collectors in various Atlantic ports regularly
spoke of the effects of erosion and how the government was dealing with the issue. In the
port of Washington, North Carolina, for instance, the customs collector, Thomas Harvey
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Blount, suggested stabilizing an aid to navigation by “placing 300 perches of stone
around it.”119 Unfortunately, “those stone are not to be had in probably all of North
Carolina” and the cost carry them “two or three hundred miles” form another location
“would cost more than to remove” the aid.120 The Fifth Auditor of the Treasury, Stephen
Pleasanton, who was responsible for the superintendence of the nation’s navigational
aids, suggested placing piles around the beacon, “if piling the foundation will secure
it.”121 Pleasanton made a similar suggestion for the beacon at Cape Henlopen ensuring
safe navigation into the port of Lewes, Delaware.122 In other instances, the government
recommended moving navigational aids away from the dangers of the encroaching
waters.123
Erosion has proved exceptionally important in the area of the Chesapeake Bay. As
William B. Cronin notes, Poplar Island has lost more than 99 percent of its land mass due
to erosion. In 1627, the island consisted almost 1,500 acres. By 2005, Poplar Island was a
little more than 5 acres.124 The rapid disappearance of this island throughout the early
1800s created a hazardous shoal for ships approaching the ports Annapolis, Baltimore,
and St. Michaels. When erosion threatened federal property at Cove Point in the late
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1830s and early 1840s, the government spent “several thousand dollars” erecting a stone
breakwater between the land and the bay “to arrest its further progress.”125 Although
erosion continues to threaten Cove Point to this day, the government’s efforts proved
successful. Cove Point remains an active aid to navigation on the Chesapeake Bay.
The constant changes in the environment of American ports necessitated surveys
of the ports to ensure accurate navigational information. Although the Coast Survey was
authorized in 1807, it did not publish its first map until the 1830s.126 Before that time,
local seaside communities commissioned learned men, such as Lewis Brantz in
Baltimore, to conduct surveys of their harbors. In some cases, industrious entrepreneurs
with an interest in shipping, such as Lemuel Moody of Portland, took it upon themselves
to survey their respective ports and the surrounding coastlines. In either instance, the
surveyors not only mapped the docks, islands, and peninsulas of the ports, they also took
depth soundings and charted the shipping lanes.
The cost of charting the ports, however, proved quite expensive. Many
communities and individuals had to settle for a single chart, despite the constantly
changing environment. Lewis Brantz, for instance, only produced one chart for the port
of Baltimore in 1819.127 Similarly, Lemuel Moody produced a single chart for Portland.
Moody saw “the great necessity of a correct chart of Portland Harbor,” however, the cost
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of producing the chart was so great, Moody had to advertise for subscriptions to pay the
cost of engraving and printing his map of the port.128 In fact, Moody incurred great
personal expense in publishing the map. According to Moody historian John K. Moulton,
the advertisement resulted in $189 for 63 copies from 58 individual subscribers.129 The
cost of engraving and printing the map, however, totaled $300.130 The subscriptions,
however, did not take into account Moody’s time or personal expenses. Between May
and October 1825, Moody personally spent more than $75 conducting the survey.131
Moody continued to incur expenses after the publication of the chart and by 1836, his
personal outlay totaled $681.31.132 As a result, Moody only completed one chart of
Portland’s Harbor. It was the first chart of Portland’s harbor since the British Navy
published their map in 1776. They had surveyed the area 16 years earlier.133
Moody’s and Brantz’s single surveys highlight the importance of the government
in dealing with an ever changing environment. Infrequent updates of charts could be
detrimental to commerce. Mariners needed accurate information, but outdated charts and
maps exposed ships to the hazards of the natural world. Nathaniel Bowditch’s The New
American Practical Navigator and The American Coast Pilot published by Edmund
March Blunt provided some recourse, but they were not enough. Both publications began
in the late 1790s as a comprehensive handbook for mariners. They included sailing
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directions into the most important ports and were updated every few years. However, the
publishers were unable to conduct surveys of the various ports included in their book.
Publication updates were at the mercy of local communities and individuals because they
relied on second-hand information they gathered from men such as Brantz and Moody.
Only the government could afford to finance the ongoing need for surveying the nation’s
harbors. And even they struggled to meet the needs of the republic.
CONCLUSION
The natural world interacted with early American science and technology in many
ways. To begin with, individuals interested in advancing science and the arts recognized
the environment as an adversary that needed to be tamed. They approached the
environment antagonistically in an attempt to conquer it for their own good. Even as the
attitudes of the romantics changed toward the environment near mid-century, those
engaged in the practice of science and the arts continued to hold a hostile view of the
environment. They remained steadfast in their attempts to subdue their physical
surroundings. They carefully considered how their vision for the world interacted with
their environment.
These same individuals also recognized that the natural world could provide them
with the means for overcoming challenges. The used the environment for its natural
resources to solve everyday problems, many of which were caused by the natural world
itself. In the process, they gained knowledge and advanced their understanding of science
and the arts.
Interacting with the environment, however, was a never ending process. The
landscape constantly changed the nature of the seaports through the addition of man-
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made alterations and natural phenomenon. Because of this, the time, money, and energy
expended in dealing with the natural world was often more than most individuals, or even
communities, could bear. They necessarily turned to the government for assistance. The
government not only possessed the expertise for subduing nature, it also had deeper
pockets and the political means for taking on projects concerning the environment. This
expertise was then shared with individuals and local communities in the form of building
port infrastructure. Internal improvements became a responsibility of the federal
government as a result of it expertise as much as it did for its ability to commandeer the
necessary resources for combating the environment.
As the government expanded its role in dealing with the environment, they
necessarily sought to simplify nature. Republican values of frugality and expediency won
out over best practices. This often resulted in the complications or failures for the
government. Generally, the government tried to wash its hands of the responsibility, but
in the end it paid for its failures.
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CHAPTER 4
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES LIGHT-HOUSE
ESTABLISHMENT
In October 1851, Charles Babbage, the renowned English mathematician and
inventor of the difference engine, wrote to Alexander Dallas Bache promoting one of the
Englishman’s original mathematical theories. Babbage believed his theory would be
useful in the United States for distinguishing navigational beacons and “night telegraphic
communication between ships at sea.”1 Babbage chose Bache for his correspondence
because the latter was the Superintendent of the Coast Survey, a member of the LightHouse Board, and one of the most prominent scientists in America at the time.2
Babbage’s theory numbered the lighthouses irregularly and made each navigational aid
“continually repeat its own number during the whole night by means of occultations.”3
Babbage proposed eclipsing the beacon’s light in short pauses and long intervals equal to
that lighthouses’ number, making it easier for mariners to identify the lighthouse and
ascertain their navigational position. To further avoid mistakes, the renowned
mathematician suggested, “Light-houses must not be numbered in the order of their
position” and that adjacent lights “must have such a number assigned to it, that no digit
occurring in the number denoting the several lighthouses nearest to it on
1

Martin Campbell-Kelly, ed., Charles Babbage: Passages from the Life of a
Philosopher, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 245.
2
Babbage to Bache, October 20, 1851, Mss. B. B123 Alexander Dallas Bache Collection,
Box 1, Folder 30, APS.
3
Ibid.
117

either side shall have the same digit in the same place of figures.”4 Babbage believed his
theory was superior to the systems then in use by both Britain and the United States
because the theory promised to make it “almost impossible” for mariners “to mistake any
casual light, on shore or at sea, for a lighthouse,” and to ever “mistake one light-house for
another.”5 The Englishman acknowledged his theory was, “crude in many respects and
merely suggestive in others,” but noted, “a little inquiry might produce still a better
arrangement.”6
As a member of the newly formed Light-House Board, Bache forwarded
Babbage’s proposal to the Board’s president, William Branford Shubrick. Shubrick
promised to “use every endeavor to have a full trial made of the method.”7 Shubrick and
the Board charged John Henry Alexander, an American engineer and physicist, with
conducting the experiments. Alexander was to report back on “how far the alternation of
light and darkness in the occultations…tends to increase or diminish the efficiency of a
given light.”8 Congress appropriated $5,000 for the experiments.9 Alexander choose the
“Merchants’ Observatory on Federal Hill” in Baltimore for his illumination experiments
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because the signal tower allowed for a “wide extent of the harbor” to be viewed from a
single vantage point.10
In conducting his experiments, Alexander observed that the light from a fixed
signal proved less intense than the light from a revolving signal. As Babbage’s proposal
called for all of the lights to be fixed lights, altered only by the occultations, Alexander
sought “to define what is the amount of this difference in general; and also to ascertain
how far the actual or possible mechanical arrangements of the proposed plan tend to
increase or diminish” the difference.11
Babbage believed one minute would be sufficient for a light to signal its number,
repeating once every minute following. After performing the experiment at the
observatory on Federal Hill and calculating the duration of illumination and occultations,
Alexander found that Babbage’s one-minute interval to have practical advantages and felt
it “would be hardly advisable to increase” the intervals proposed by the English
mathematician. Additionally, Alexander observed three seconds for the occultations “as
affording the maximum of advantage.”12 Three seconds allowed an observer to clearly
distinguish the number being signaled, but it limited the range of numbers that could be
displayed in the given interval of one minute. Signaling a nine, for instance, required 27
seconds of darkness from the occultations. If the observer first witnessed the signal in the
middle of its revolution, Alexander surmised it would take four minutes and thirty-two
seconds to convey the number 299. Alexander supposed the number 345 would be the
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highest number needed on the American coast, making 299 the longest number requiring
conveyance.13
Although Alexander could not answer whether or not signaling the number 299
took too long, he did voice concerns that in certain circumstances “where the mariner
cannot afford to be so long as five minutes without an identification of the light,” that an
alternative might need to be considered. Alexander also expressed concern that an
observer would have to simultaneously observe, “two phenomena, viz: the disappearance
of the light, and the movement of the index of the time-keeper.” Under the present
system, mariners only needed to observe the light.14 Alexander noted the Commissioners
of the Northern (Scottish) Light-Houses of Great Britain advised against the system for
similar reasons.15 Based on his scientific findings and despite his concerns, Alexander
believed the system to be “advantageously applied at any and all points where the range
demanded does not transcend the power of a first order Fresnel lens.”16
The Fresnel lighthouse lens was an optical apparatus invented by a French civil
engineer, Augustin Jean Fresnel, in 1821. Fresnel worked for the Corps des ponts et
chaussées (bridges and roads) and conducted experiments in optical diffraction in his
spare time. Three years before the invention of the lens, Fresnel confirmed that light
traveled in waves. Fresnel used this knowledge to improve France’s coastal lighting for
navigation. Fresnel’s lens worked in conjunction with an open flamed oil lamp and
reflector. By placing several glass polyhedrons above and below a centrally positioned
bullseye lens, Fresnel was able to capture more of the light from the lighthouse lamp as it
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was reflected outward (Fig. 4.1). The polyhedrons bent the reflected light into a more
concentrated beam, producing a brighter light that could be seen further out to sea.
Fresnel developed the lens in three different orders (later expanded to six) which varied
in size and weight depending the location of the lighthouse and its importance to
commercial activity. A first order lens, the largest of the Fresnels, stood eight and a half
feet tall and weighed more than six tons.17 The lens represented the very best scientific
knowledge of the time in optical diffraction and illumination.
Alexander’s experiments were fraught with problems. Two in particular stand out.
First, Alexander conducted his experiments in ideal weather conditions. He
acknowledged that he had, “no means of estimating” what allowance, “should be made
for storm and darkness on ship-board,” and he made no reference to the role that fog may
play in hindering the identification of lights using this method. This alone would have
rendered Alexander’s experiments invalid, or at the very least inconclusive. Alexander,
however, made no effort to redress the flaws in his methodology and he made no
explanations for this oversight.
Second, Alexander conducted his experiments with the help of an assistant. The
assistant operated the machinery in the experiment while Alexander made his
observations. Operating the machinery by hand would never work in reality due to the
duration of the occultations and the necessity of the occultations occurring without
interruption. Self-acting machinery was the only proper way to ensure the accuracy of
Alexander’s findings. Alexander acknowledged this fact when he asked to conduct
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further experiments using self-acting machinery. Additionally, the use of an assistant
limited the range by which Alexander was able to make his observations as the two
needed to communicate with each other in the dark of night. With the self-acting
machinery, Alexander proposed he could conduct the experiments over a “distance about
15 miles across land and water, adequate to developing all the good and bad points of the
system as cannot be predicated of the limited range I have been able to use hitherto.”1
The Light-House Board followed the recommendations of the Scottish
Commissioners and rejected Babbage’s plan for use in the United States. The Board’s
decision resulted from the concerns raised by Alexander and the Scottish Commissioners
as well as the incompleteness of Alexander’s experiments. The decision disappointed
Babbage, who believed the system was “so simple that the only wonder seems to be that
it has not been proposed and adopted long ago.”2 Babbage had hoped Britain and the
United States would “unite in adopting the numerical system” and make it universal
noting, “few things would give me more pleasure than that you should successfully carry
into execution the principle I have pointed out.”3
If the commercial problems discussed in Chapter 2 pushed Americans to engage
in science and the mechanical arts, and if environmental concerns examined in the
previous chapter created a need for scientific engagement, the solutions were explored in
the homes, workshops, and ideas of the average American. These skilled artisan, laborers,
merchants, and tinkerers innovated new mechanical apparatuses to solve the commercial
and environmental problems facing the young nation. Nowhere is that more obvious than
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in the United States Light-House Establishment, which was one of the nation’s leading
scientific organizations in the early nineteenth century.
In making the claim the United States Light-House Establishment was a scientific
organization prior to the 1850s, it is important to understand what counted as science and
by whom. Few individuals of the time would disagree that Alexander’s testing of
Babbage’s theory was science. The experiments were authorized, overseen, and peer
reviewed by some of America’s most prestigious scientific minds. Alexander was chosen
by these men of science to perform the experiments because he himself was recognized
as a man of science. But the testing of Babbage’s numerical theory of illumination does
not count as science just because it was performed by educated men engaged in scientific
practice. Alexander’s experiment counts as science because the test used an objective,
repeatable method and the results were based on observable facts. Theoretically, anyone
could have performed the experiments in place of Alexander and those experiments
would still have been considered science. Some individuals however, disagreed on what
counted as science. Men such as Edmund Blunt, Lieutenant Thornton Jenkins and
Lieutenant I. W. P. Lewis believed science could only be conducted by those who were
formally trained in such fields as engineering, surveying, and navigation. These men
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claimed the the Light-House Establishment was unscientific.4 Historians of the LightHouse Establishment have tended to side with this assessment.5 Their assessment fails to
consider Andrew J. Lewis’ argument of natural philosophy in the early American
republic. According to Andrew J. Lewis, despite the naturalists’ claims to a “unique
expertise to catalog and explain the natural world,” natural philosophy in the early United
States was “founded on the convictions of Americans’ everyday engagements with
nature.”6 Natural philosophy, thus, was as much the work of ordinary Americans as it
was the educated and trained naturalists. If we accept Andrew J. Lewis’ argument that the
collecting of natural world specimens by the average American counted as natural
philosophy, then similarly we must accept the experiments in fuels, illumination, and air
temperatures conducted by everyday American inventors and tinkerers as science. As
noted in the previous chapter, Stephen Pleasonton, the Fifth Auditor of the Treasury and
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Superintendent of the Light-House Establishment, promoted science within the
Establishment. Pleasonton authorized, monitored, and even suggested scientific
experiments and practical improvements. These included Winslow Lewis’ experiments
with David Melville’s oil heater, the testing of various types of fuels, and Captain
Howard Stansbury’s innovative diskpile foundation for off shore structures such as the
Carysfort Reef lighthouse. Through these experiments and ground breaking construction
techniques, the Light-House Establishment was a significant contributor to the fields of
science and engineering in early nineteenth-century America.
The Light-House Establishment was therefore one of the leading scientific
institutions in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. This mirrors the
arguments of Todd Shallat, Ann Johnson, and Hugh Richard Slotten regarding the Army
Corps of Engineers and the United States Coast Survey. Shallat sees the Corps of
Engineers as the premier American institution in the sciences of geology and hydrology.
Johnson claims the Corps lead the nation in strength of materials testing.7 Slotten argues
the Coast Survey was the premier institution for scientific practice in astronomy,
cartography, and surveying.8 The primary difference between the Light-House
Establishment and these other institutions was the nature of the scientific work. The
Corps of Engineers and Coast Survey engaged in previously established scientific fields.
The Light-House Establishment’s work, however, occurred in fields that were still
7
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emerging, such as chemistry and what is known today as physics. The Establishment’s
work in the mechanical arts paralleled that of the Franklin Institute. Bruce Sinclair argues
the Franklin Institute was the leading enterprise for advancing mechanical arts in the
United States, but the Institute’s work lay more in the evaluation of the mechanical arts.9
The Light-House Establishment, on the other hand, provided an arena for the
development of the practical arts.10
SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS
Scientific experiments were the foundation for finding solutions to the
commercial and environmental problems facing the United States. As one of the leading
scientific institutions in the early nineteenth century, the Light-House Establishment
conducted numerous experiments with lamps, lenses, fuels, and other apparatuses
designed to keep the nation’s coastal navigation safe. These experiments gave the
average American an outlet for bring science into the public realm and helped solidify the
involvement of the state to scientific practice when these individuals promoted their
solutions through government agencies like the Light-House Establishment.
Oil Burning Lamps
Experiments with lamps and coastal lighting began as early as 1810 and possibly
earlier, when on May 8, members of the Boston Marine Society conducted an experiment
similar to Alexander’s, but without the occultations. Their experiment tested the
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illumination of a new lamp and reflector system “invented” by Winslow Lewis.11 Chapter
1 previously looked at Lewis’ lamp and reflector as a commercial opportunity for the
retired shipmaster. Here, Lewis’ innovation is examined as part of the scientific
experiments taking place in the Light-House Establishment prior to 1850.
The Boston Marine Society’s three-member committee “proceeded about five
leagues into the bay, bringing the Boston light to bear about W. S. W. and Baker’s Island
light to bear about N. N. W. both nearly at the same distance.”12 Both lights were lit in
their usual manner until about 10 PM, at which time, the Boston Light was extinguished.
Lewis then set up his lamp and reflector system and relit the light. The difference was “as
great as would appear between a well-trimmed Argand lamp and a common candle.”13
The committee moved about the harbor and “saw no sensible diminution of the
brilliancy.”14 The light was extinguished after an hour and relit in the usual manner. The
committee found “The effect produced by this change from light to comparative darkness
was more striking than the first.”15 At midnight Lewis’ Argand lamp and reflector system
was relit with the usual light still burning. At two and a half leagues, the power of Lewis’
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new lamp and reflector “was so great as to throw a strong shadow upon the deck of the
vessel.”16
The committee found other advantages to Lewis’ system, including a reduction in
emission of smoke. Smoke from the usual lamps diminished the light’s effectiveness by
clouding the glass windows on the lantern room, thus reducing the distance the light
could be seen at sea.17 The committee deemed the experiment a success and
recommended the adoption of Lewis’ system to General Henry Dearborn, the Collector
of Customs and Regional Lighthouse Superintendent in Boston.
The success of Lewis’ experiment earned him the contract for fitting up all the
lighthouses in the United States. Despite the exclusivity of this contract, Lewis was not
the only mechanic to experiment with lamps and reflectors for the Light-House
Establishment. Many complaints befell Lewis because of the poor quality of
workmanship in his lamp and reflector system. These complaints compelled other
mechanics, such as Edmund March Blunt of New York, Benjamin F. Greenough of
Boston, and David Melville of Newport, Rhode Island to pursue their own experiments in
the science of luminosity and the mechanical arts.18
Chemicals, Natural Gas, and Other Fuels
In addition to experimenting with lamps, the Light-House establishment also
experimented with various fuels to find which fuel produced the best light. In 1812, the
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company of Ward, Wilson, and Waldron of New York petitioned David Gelston, the
Customs Collector and Regional Lighthouse Superintendent for the Port of New York, to
conduct an experiment with “inflammable gas.”19 Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the
Treasury wrote Gelston, authorizing him to allow the experiment if “you think it
advisable,” but warned “no obligation on our part will be given, whatever the success
may be, to employ them for other Light Houses.”20
Unfortunately, no other records exist regarding Ward, Wilson, and Waldron’s
experiment. Five years later, however, David Melville of Newport, Rhode Island,
similarly petitioned the Commissioner of Revenue to experiment with using natural gas
in instead of spermaceti oil. Melville argued natural gas would eliminate many of the
problems associated the illumination in American lighthouses such as the condensation of
humid air, the high cost of oil, and the need to warm winter pressed oil to a liquid state
for continuous burning. Melville believed an experiment would show the utility of natural
gas and prove its worth. An apparatus designed to burn natural gas was installed in the
Newport Lighthouse in October of that year and Melville recorded his daily observations,
noting every kind of weather and its effect on the light. At the conclusion of the yearlong
experiment Melville found natural gas afforded “mariners an increased and more certain
light.”21 He also confirmed his beliefs that natural gas was cheaper than spermaceti oil
and that natural gas lamps did not allow for the accumulation of frost or humidity on the
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lens or lantern windows as it did with traditional Argand style oil lamps.22 In 1830,
Charles W. Morgan, a New Bedford, Massachusetts whaling entrepreneur and spermaceti
oil manufacturer, acknowledged the superiority of natural gas in a speech to the Lyceum,
stating, “Carburetted Hydrogen Gas is now extensively used, and possesses advantages
for fixed lights and when greater brilliancy or intensity is desirable.”23 Melville’s findings
were confirmed more than three decades later when the United States Light-House Board
commissioned John Henry Alexander to test Babbage’s theory on identifying lights.
Alexander preferred to use natural gas in his experiment because “the gas light was the
more brilliant” and it “preserved the normal volume of flame corresponding to the
capacity of the lens.”24
Despite Melville’s conclusions and the potential benefits of switching, the United
States Light-House Establishment did not universally adopt natural gas for its coastal
beacons. There are several reasons why Melville’s experiment received a disapproving
nod from the Light-House Establishment. First the use of natural gas as a fuel was still in
its infancy in 1817. As Mimi Sherman notes, gas “was very new in the second decade of
the nineteenth century,” and that its use was “cutting-edge technology 1830.”25 Many
feared natural gas was unsafe.26 Charles W. Morgan noted in his lecture to the lyceum the
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“the liability to explosion is a great objection to its use.”27 Sherman notes “the flame
could follow the receding gas, causing a flashback.”28 Second, early natural gas burners
were “primitive and inefficient” and the distribution system was subject to leakage; a
problem Daniel Mattausch notes plagued the gas industry “well into the 1870s.”29 In
addition to leakage, Sherman notes that problems with delivery sometimes caused the
flame to involuntarily extinguish itself “by a sudden drop in pressure.”30 Mariners’ relied
on the light as a matter of life and death. A light extinguishing itself involuntarily because
of “a sudden drop in pressure,” was not only problematic, it was potentially catastrophic.
Although many feared the safety of natural gas, political reasons most likely
caused the state’s inaction on adopting natural gas. Melville lacked the political clout of
Lewis within the Light-House Establishment. The former had to rely on his friendship
with the latter to promote interest natural gas. Melville’s interests, however, were in
conflict with Lewis’. Lewis held an exclusive contract with the government to supply
spermaceti oil to all of the nation’s lighthouses for $35,000 a year. Lewis worked against
Melville and the superiority of natural gas to protect his own interests. According to
Melville, Lewis expressed an “unfavorable opinion” of natural gas, vehemently
“combatted the utility of introducing them in the light houses,” and declared “he would
not relinquish his contract to furnish the light houses with oil.”31 Eventually, the state
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approved the permanent use of natural gas for the lighthouse at Portland Harbor, New
York on Lake Erie (present day Barcelona Light at Westfield, New York).32
Acknowledging the possibility that the government might not adopt natural gas as
the fuel of choice for lighthouses, Melville simultaneously conducted other experiments
on oil. He analyzed the combustion of fuels and found “the intensity of light is not as has
generally been supposed, in proportion to the quantity of oxygen consumed but in
proportion to the carbon and caloric contained in the material used.”33 This experiment
showed that summer strained oil produced a stronger light than winter pressed oil.
Summer strained oil was not only cheaper than winter pressed oil, it also burned at a
slower rate. Melville figured the Argand style lamps used by the Light-House
Establishment consumed strained spermaceti at a ratio of 7:8 to the pressed oil.34
In 1838, the Light-House Establishment conducted several tests using colza oil.
Colza oil, alternatively known as carcel oil after the carcel lamps that burned it, is
extracted from vegetables. Colza oil provides a superior light, but many contemporaries,
including Stephen Pleasonton and Army Corps of Engineers Lieutenants. I. W. P. Lewis
and Thornton A. Jenkins, noted colza oil was much harder to manufacture than other
types of fuel. American farmers were also less inclined to grow vegetables for the oil
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market because they were less profitable than growing other crops, such as wheat..35
Pleasonton thought “very highly of the principle upon which the carcel lamp is made.”36
In a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, Levi Woodbury, Pleasonton noted,
“According to experiments already made with the improved carcel lamp…it affords 2 ½
times more light than the astral light, with the consumption of the same quantity of oil.”
Pleasonton was convinced that when the carcel lamp and oil was combined with the
parabolic reflector “it will not only afford a light to be seen sufficiently far, if not as far
as any other light, but that it will be more to be relied on, and at the same time more
economical than any other yet discovered.”37 Despite Pleasonton’s praise for the carcel
lamp, he would wait until the trial was complete to ascertain whether or not the oil and
lamp should be adopted universally within the Establishment.
The following year, the Light-House Establishment allowed Benjamin F.
Greenough to experiment with a “chemical oil.” Greenough’s “chemical oil” was a
“chemical mixture or compositions of alcohol, spirits of turpentine, and such other
matters or fluids as are generally substituted for common oil.”38 Greenough’s began his
experiment at the Boston [Harbor] Lighthouse, but renovations to the light forced
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Greenough to transfer his research to the light on Long Island.39 While there is no solid
evidence that Winslow Lewis interfered with Greenough’s experiment, Lewis was the
individual who reported to Pleasonton which lighthouses were in need of repair. Given
Lewis’ opposition to Melville’s natural gas experiments in Newport, Rhode Island, it
seems plausible that Lewis might have fraudulently reported to the Boston Lighthouse as
needing repairs in hopes of forcing Greenough to abandon his experiments and protecting
his own oil contract. Sherman, however, notes chemical fuels had “very real drawback,”
particularly the potential for the volatility of the fuel to lead to conflagrations.40
Southerners also got involved with finding alternative oils for the Light-House
Establishment. According to H. C. Nixon, planters in South Carolina began promoting
cottonseed oil as early as 1815, with the major push coming from experiments in Virginia
and the Carolinas 1820s and 1830s. Nixon notes when Professor Olmsted of the
University of North Carolina tested cottonseed oil in lamps, he found “a fine illuminating
gas” could be obtained from the seed. Southern planters they found the seed oil
“decidedly” better than spermaceti oil.41 Many suggested that if New England mariners
were risking their lives searching for oil on the seas, perhaps cottonseed oil could be used
without so much danger.42
In the time between Melville’s experiment with natural gas in the 1810s, the
experiments with carcel oil, and Greenough’s “chemical oil” in the late 1830s, the United
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States Light-House Establishment ran numerous experiments on the quality and viscosity
of spermaceti oil to ensure consistency in the nation’s navigation aids.43 These
experiments began with the oil manufacturers. Oil manufacturers experimented with
blending spermaceti with other substances, including whale blubber and fish oil. Most of
the time these experiments were designed to increase the manufacturer’s profit by
combining the spermaceti with lower quality additives or by substituting for the
spermaceti altogether. Upon arrival at the various lighthouses, local superintendents,
naval officers, lighthouses keepers, and private citizens tested samples from each barrel.
In their experiments, these individuals observed the consistency of the oil, noted how
quickly it burned, and commented on how much smoke each sample of oil produced.44
Others individuals conducted scientific experiments to see how the Establishment
might make better use of its spermaceti oil. Whalers harvested the headmatter from
Sperm whales in the fall. They then boiled the headmatter to remove any impurities and
reduce the amount of water in the final product. Once this was done, the liquid was drawn
off, producing the clearest sperm oil. This became known as winter pressed oil. Winter
pressed spermaceti oil was considered the best of the spermaceti oils and therefore was
also among the most expensive.45 Summer strained oil came from the third pressing.
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Despite its purity, summer stained oil was considered by many to be inferior because it
could not be burned during the winter months. Summer oil was too thin and congealed
too quickly. For this reason, summer strained oil was much cheaper than the winter oil.
David Melville, however, sought ways to use cheaper summer strained spermaceti oil
during the winter months. Melville’s experiments with both summer and winter oil led to
his discovery of a mechanical solution, but he did not discover a chemical method for
using summer oil in the winter.
The Light-House Establishment and private marine telegraph shared similar
interests in shipping, and as such, some lighthouses keepers served double duty as agents
signaling the arrival of ships for the telegraph. These included Jonathan Bruce and
Charles Beck in Boston, and Michael Mabrity in Key West, Florida. By serving in the
dual role of lighthouse keeper and signaling agent, the Light-House Establishment was
able to extend its scientific experiments in illumination and the chemistry beyond the
lighthouse service. In 1824, the lighthouse keeper at Boston’s Long Island, Charles Beck,
conducted experiments on fabrics and dyes used in the making of the telegraph’s signal
flags. Fabrics had to be strong enough to stand up to the strong winds blowing in from the
ocean, while and dyes had to resist fading in sun. Beck tested a white cotton fabric and
found it “very unfit” for its purpose.46 The fabric frayed too easily to be of any use to the
telegraph.
Worn and faded flags were difficult to distinguish, often resulting in
communication errors. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, atmospheric refraction
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affected the ability to see certain colors, shapes, and flag designs. Worn and faded flags
exacerbated this problem. In 1831, Frederick W.A.L. Brown, the telegraphic agent on
Georges Island in Boston, feared “my communications may in thick weather be
misunderstood,” because of the “contraction and expansion” of the yarns “according to
the state of the weather.”47 Brown, himself, had mis-communicated the arrival of the ship
Triton as the ship Mercury just two weeks earlier.48 Using “every exertion in my power
from eleven A.M. till two P.M,” Brown attempted to obtain accurate intelligence of the
arriving ship. Unfortunately, “the wind was then blowing very fresh at west north west
and the tide also being at ebb.” Brown “had little prospect of being able to announce the
name of the ship before sunset,” due to his inability to read the ship’s worn flag. Brown
took the intelligence from the Point Aderton Station. Regrettably, the Point Aderton
Station mistook the Triton’s worn flag for the signal of the Mercury. As the Mercury was
expected, neither station supposed the signal could be incorrect.49
Beck, Bruce, and Mabrity also experimented with improvements to the signaling
code. Beck and Bruce both suggested changing colors within Boston’s signal code to
improve the visibility of the signal. In a letter to his superior, John Rowe Parker, Beck
acknowledged he altered the numerals on the number 2 and number 3 flags so that they
were easier to read.50 Presumably he did the same with the other numerals. Bruce, on the
other hand, suggested changing the colors for each number “viz. No. 1 – Blue / No. 2 –
Red / No. 3 White / No. 4 – blue & white / No. 5 – blue & red / No. 6 – black green or
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yellow…”51 There is no indication that Parker accepted either of these changes, and
perhaps did not because he was in negotiations with James Maud Elford of Charleston,
South Carolina, to adopt a more universal system of signaling.
Bruce also wrote to Parker, “I have thought upon a plan (which I offer, to you, for
your consideration) which will save a great deal of time as well as trouble in spelling the
names of vessells [sic].” Bruce suggested, “to get the names of all the merchant vessels
which you wish to signalize & place numbers against their names.” Bruce’s plan was
especially useful when “there are three or four vessells [sic] in the Light House Channel
at the same time.” The speed of the vessels made it impossible to spell the name of all
arriving ships when the telegraph agent had to signal multiple arrivals.52 Ultimately,
Parker accepted the lighthouse keeper’s suggestion, but not because of Bruce. What
Bruce did not know is that Elford had already patented a system of assigning numbers to
ships and Parker was negotiating terms with Elford to adopt the system in Boston and the
surrounding areas.53
MECHANICAL INNOVATION
The Light-House Establishment offered engineers, entrepreneurs, and mechanics
numerous opportunities to invent new apparatuses. Many of these mechanical devices
were patented by their inventors and can be found among the various sources related to
early United States patents. Several of the patents discussed here have been previously
mentioned in Chapter 2 as they related to providing individuals with opportunities for
commercial profit. Here those patents are used as examples supporting the argument that
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the Light-House Establishment was one of the United States’ premier scientific
organizations before the Civil War.
One of the early patents under the United States Light-House Establishment was
Winslow Lewis’ lamp and reflector system discussed earlier. Lewis’ patented his lamp in
1810 after he witnessed a lamp in a barber shop projecting a light out into the dark street.
Lewis noticed the barber had put a lens in front of the lamp and Lewis felt this idea
would be useful in the Light-House Establishment. Lewis’ “discovery” convinced him to
conduct experiments on “his” innovation at the Boston Lighthouse as discussed at the
opening of this chapter. The scientific observations conducted at the Boston Lighthouse
helped negotiate with the Treasury Department on adopting the patent throughout the
Light-House Establishment.
Lewis also experimented with “double glais[ing]” the lantern and “leaving a space
between the panes of 3-8ths inch” in order to “prevent the humid air from condensing on
the glass in Cold weather, or what the keepers Call the glass sweating.”54 Glass sweating,
as Lewis called it, diminished the effect of the light as it passed through the lantern glass.
Unfortunately, it does not appear that Lewis ever patented his “double glais-ed”
windows. Modern sources trace the double glazed window to the late 19th or early 20th
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century, indicating Lewis could have patented the concept and profited handsomely from
it.55
Others devised mechanical devices to solve the condensation problem. David
Melville developed an improvement to the Argand lamp to eliminate condensation of
humid air or the accumulation of frost. His improvement “consist[ed] in having a tight
scuttle door to close at pleasure the communication with the lantern from the bay next
below; and the lantern fitted with four or more air ports, under the windows fitted also, so
as to be closed at pleasure; then by opening the air ports to admit the external air, and
keeping the scuttle closed to exclude the vapor of the lower part of the Light House from
the lantern, and both humidity and frost will be prevented from collecting on the
windows at all seasons and in all states and temperatures of the atmosphere, and the frost
may even be dislodged after it has accumulated.”56
Keeping the winter oil from congealing was another concern for the Light-House
Establishment, especially in north where the winters were the coldest. As Stephen
Pleasonton informed his superior, Levi Woodbury, Secretary of the Treasury, “the best
Spermaceti from head matter, pressed in Winter, will congeal and and become hard

55

Thermotek Windows, “History of Double Glazing,” February 22, 2016
http://thermotekwindows.com.au/2016/02/ (accessed February 12, 2017). Aeroseal
Solutions, “The History of Double Glazed Windows,” December 1, 2014
http://www.aerosealsolutions.ca/resources-page/?pg=1&pgtitle=the-history-of-doubleglazed-windows (accessed February 12, 2017). Abbie Clarke, “History of Double
Glazing,” December 1, 2012 http://www.doubleglazingprices.org.uk/history-of-doubleglazing/ (accessed February 12, 2017). Sarah Clark, “A Brief History of Double
Glazing,” February 7, 2012 http://ezinearticles.com/?A-Brief-History-Of-DoubleGlazing&id=6866863 (accessed February 12, 2017). Door and Window.com, “The
Evolution of Your Double Pane Window Starts with Ancient History,” January 8, 2012
http://www.doorandwindow.com/windows/types/double-pane/double-pane-windowsand-ancient-history.html (accessed February 12, 2017).
56
Melville, 10.
141

whenever the mercury in Fahrenheit’s Thermometer descends as low as 24 degrees.”57
Several mechanics invented oil heaters that could be attached to the lighthouse lamps as a
possible solution to the congealing problem. Captain Alexander Black, for instance,
patented an improvement to Lewis’ Argand lamp in 1817. Black’s patent embraced “an
improvement for trimming the lamps used in Light Houses, for heating the oil, for raising
the wick, for snuffing the lamp.” The Light-House Establishment, however, found
Captain Black’s improvement “does not answer” the purpose for which it was designed.58
Luckily for Captain Black, his invention had many other uses outside the Light-House
Establishment including “for keeping seaman’s hands and feet warm while at helm, for
warming the feet of persons while traveling on horseback or in carriages, and lighting the
road, and for gas lights.”59
Lewis also took out a patent for a heating element designed “to obviate the
difficulty of keeping the oil in a fluid state in the winter season.” Lewis’ design captured
the heat rising from the flame via a “trumpet formed, or funnel mouth” metal tube
positioned above the lamp and returned the heat to the bottom of the lamp where the heat
was “communicated…to the oil in the fountain.”60 Lewis, however, obtained the patent
illegally. David Melville had expressed the idea to Lewis a few years earlier and went so
far as to draw a diagram of the idea. Melville claimed his mechanical solution could keep
the oil in a fluid state “to such a degree that summer strained oil may be used in the
winter season without difficulty.”61 Burning summer strained oil in “the coldest weather

57

Pleasonton to Woodbury, December 3, 1838.
Melville, 8-9.
59
Ibid., 11.
60
Ibid., 5
61
Ibid.
58

142

without difficulty” would save the Establishment thousands of dollars annually because
summer strained oil was cheaper than winter pressed oil.62 Lewis, of course, opposed the
idea of burning summer strained oil in the winter because it directly impacted his
government contract with the Treasury Department for supplying oil to the Light-House
Establishment. If the Establishment choose to burn the cheaper summer oil in the
wintertime, Lewis would lose money on the loss of the winter oil supply. This is perhaps
the reason Lewis attempted to secure the oil heater patent for himself. Lewis recognized
the need for the heater, but by utilizing it without Melville’s knowledge, Lewis could
hide the fact that the heater allowed summer oil to be burned in the wintertime from
Pleasonton and the Light-House Establishment.
Melville had “practised [sic] for more than ten years,” keeping the oil in a fluid
state in Argand lamps. He challenged Lewis on the latter patenting the improvement
illegally. Lewis did everything in his power to undermine Melville and keep the patent
for himself. Lewis claimed he had received nothing from the Light-House Establishment
in exchange for installing the apparatus on lamps in northern lighthouses. He also argued
the savings to the Establishment would be inconsequential. As the exclusive supplier of
spermaceti oil to the Light-House Establishment, Lewis’ claims were obviously intended
to protect his own interests. Despite Lewis attempts, Melville successfully defended his
right to the invention and Lewis vacated the patent in 1819.63
The United States Patent Office fire of 1836 destroyed many patents related to the
Light-House Establishment prior to that date, yet the frequency with which the patents for
improvements in lighthouses were taken out after 1837 provides some evidence of the
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Establishment being a center for innovation. In 1841, Benjamin Hemmenway of
Roxbury, Massachusetts, patented a separate oil reservoir for the Argand lamp that
allowed for the replenishing of oil in the lamp without having to remove the oil chamber.
Hemmenway noted the removal of the oil chamber was not only inconvenient, but had a
“tendency to cause a derangement of the connecting parts from wear incident thereto, is
generally attended with the accident of an overflow or dropping of oil on the exterior of
the lamp.”64 Three years later the United States Patent Office granted Hemmenway and
Winslow Lewis a shared patent for a lighthouse lamp.65
The same year Hemmenway patented his improvement to the Argand lamp,
Benjamin F. Greenough of Boston patented another improvement. Greenough’s
improvement consisted in constructing the button of the lamp, that part “which serve to
spread the flame of the wick,” out of platina and placing it atop a conical shoulder and
adjusting rod so that the button is not destroyed by the light.66 Greenough noted “the heat
caused by the current of air passing over both sides of the flame is so intense as to often
melt down, or soon burn out, or destroy the button, if the same is made of brass, iron, or
copper, in the usual manner.”67 Greenough also designed an adjustable air flow for the
lamp. The adjustment mechanism not only facilitated the air flow to the flame, but also
accommodated Greenough’s different fuel mixtures. Different fuels required a different
ratio of fuel-to-air in order to achieve the brightest light and maximum burning
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efficiency.68 Other lighthouse lamp improvements were patented by Charles Wheeler in
1846 and Abraham Coates in 1856 and 1859.69
Benjamin F. Coston of Washington “invented a new “for generating, condensing,
and burning gas from oil, resin or coal, and in applying the gas in light-houses”70
Coston’s improvement obviated “the disadvantages arising from the collection of
sediment in the ordinary siphon,” which allowed the resin or oil to be “introduced into the
hottest part of the retort without any portion coming in contact with the sides.” Coston’s
innovation provided for a “jacket around the pipe,” which kept the pipe “cool and
prevent[ed] the tar from baking onto said pipe.” Coston also desired a Letters Patent for
his particular method of construction which he claimed heated the gas “to a high
temperature before burning.”71 Unfortunately, for Coston, the United States Light-House
Establishment did not see the benefit of gas in lighting the coast. They chose not to adopt
Coston’s innovative catoptric gas burner.
Not all patented improvements for the Light-House Establishment related to the
lamp. Alonza Farrar applied for a Letters Patent for an improvement he made to the
construction of metallic reflectors.72 Winslow Lewis’ reflectors were known for their
poor quality. Lewis added silver to his brass and copper reflectors to give them a greater
reflecting power, but because Lewis only plated his reflectors with silver, the silver easily
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rubbed off.73 Smoke and dust accumulated on these reflectors causing them to tarnish.
The repeated cleansing and re-polishing of the lens diminished the reflector’s power and
eventually destroyed the reflector altogether.74 Farrar’s improvement consisted in
“applying a surface of flint glass, or what may in fact be termed a parabolic lens,” to the
reflector.75 This improvement did not eliminate the accumulation of smoke and dust on
the reflector, but it did provide for a more reflective surface and eliminated the
diminishing of the reflective power due to the silver plating rubbing off.
In 1839, Benjamin F. Willard, patented an improvement on his father’s, Simon
Willard, clockwork mechanism.76 The younger Willard’s improvement “effected in the
following manner: In addition to the ordinary clock-work heretofore used for imparting a
regular rotary motion to the main or vertical shaft…there is arranged upon and secured to
the frame of the clockwork in a horizontal position a circular rim or railway…of any
required diameter.” The addition of this circular railway reduced the friction of turning
the lamps, thus allowing for a smoother rotation of the light. Willard’s patented
improvement also “cause the lights to appear and disappear” in a quicker “succession of
sudden flashes.”77 According to Willard, this quicker “succession of sudden flashes”
would “render the light clearly distinguishable from all others.”78 Willard’s patent was
successful enough that he continued to provide clockworks to the Light-House
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Establishment until 1850 when Congress reorganized the institution under a five member
Light-House Board.79
Not all mechanical innovations in the Light-House Establishment went through
the United States Patent Office. In 1838, Army Corps Engineer Lieutenant. I. W. P.
Lewis invented an oil lamp for use in lighthouses. Lewis offered his lamp to the LightHouse Establishment for $500, but he did not apply for a Letters Patent.80 Ten years later,
as noted in Chapter 3, Captain Howard Stansbury innovated an adaptation to Alexander
Mitchell’s screwpile foundation because the environment would not support the use of
Mitchell’s innovation without Stansbury’s adaptation. No known patent exists for
Stansbury’s diskpile innovation. Similarly, Lieutenant George Gordon Meade invented a
five wick hydraulic lighthouse lamp in 1852 while he waited for appropriations from
Congress to finish lighthouse at Sand Key in Florida. Meade’s lamp raised the oil “to the
level of the burner by being discharged from the reservoir in the dome of the lantern”
rather than by “pumping up the oil by clockwork.” Meade demonstrated the lamp’s
simplicity and claimed its “uniform working afforded great relief to the keepers.”81 The
newly formed Light-House Board agreed with Meade’s assessment and universally
adopted the lamp to replace those installed by Winslow Lewis over the past 40 years.
Meade did not apply for a Letters Patent for his hydraulic lamp.
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The reasons Lieutenant I. W. P. Lewis, Captain Howard Stansbury, and
Lieutenant George Gordon Meade did not patent their inventions are not always clear.
Lewis, Stansbury, and Meade all possessed a strong sense of civic duty, which may have
influenced their decision not to apply for a Letters Patent. The cost of applying for a
Letters Patent might also have been a factor. From 1793 to 1861, the fee to apply for a
letters patent was $30.82 These fees remained the responsibility of the individual even
though their inventions were part of the innovator’s government service. In Meade’s case,
the fees were not affordable. As Elinor De Wire acknowledges, Meade’s financial
problems were a driving force in his re-enlistment in the United States Army. Meade’s
father lost large sums of money in a loan to the United States government that was never
repaid and private survey work did not provide enough financial security for Meade to
support his wife and children.83 For the others, the $30 fee probably was probably not
worth the time and trouble of going through the patent process.
SEAPORTS: SCIENTIFIC LABORATORIES AND MECHANCIAL WORKSHOPS
The scientific experiments and mechanical innovations within the Light-House
Establishment turned American ports into scientific laboratories and workshops for the
practical arts. This is not a novel argument, yet it is an important one. Understanding
American port cities as scientific spaces and centers of knowledge construction helps
scholars move past the notion that ports were gateways of economic, social, and cultural
exchange. It helps us see that ports were more than just end nodes on a global trade
network and that they were more than just distribution centers. Port cities contributed
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significantly to the advancement of the arts and sciences in the United States, especially
in the first half of the nineteenth century. Knowing this, and understanding how ports
contributed to the construction of knowledge clarifies both our understanding of the role
that ports played in history of the United States and the the advancement of science in
this country in the early nineteenth century.
Because of their urban nature, ports were better positioned to provide the
necessary resources for performing science and constructing knowledge than rural
villages and farms. As centers of population, ports cities contained more human and labor
resources with a greater diversity of ideas. According to Economic historian Jacob Price,
all towns in the United States with a population of 4,000 people or more in 1790 were
port cities.84 Their coastal location and status as entrepôts, added to the ports’ diversity
over other urban spaces. Immigrants who arrived in American ports with their different
ideas did not always migrate out of the city. As commercial centers, ports had more
financial resources and expendable wealth that could be devoted to science and the arts.
Cities had huge financial resources, but the could be concentrated around a single good or
industry. Lowell, Massachusetts, for instance was tied to the textile industry. While port
cities may have specialized in certain commodities, they offered access to a diverse set of
goods, thus increasing their capital resources over non-port cities. As political centers,
America’s entrepôts had stronger channels for garnering state support than the
hinterlands. From a political standpoint, it may be hard to differentiate the port from other
urban centers.
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The engagement in mechanical arts was essential to the construction of
knowledge. Here too, it may be difficult to separate the port city from other urban areas,
however, the ports’ coastal location made them ideal places for the Light-House
Establishment to pursue the mechanical arts. Alexander’s use of mechanical occultations
in testing Babbage’s mathematical theory for distinguishing lighthouses and the Boston
Marine Society’s observations regarding Winslow Lewis’s lamp and reflector are just
two examples illustrating the importance of ports to the Light-House Establishment’s
engagement in the arts. These men of science, and others like them, used port cities to
construct knowledge as much as they used the ports to transfer and disseminate existing
knowledge from other parts of the globe.
Although this chapter has focused on the United States Light-House
Establishment as one of the nation’s premier scientific enterprises, other institutions also
used early republic seaports as scientific laboratories. For instance, the Army Corps of
Engineers also used ports as centers of research and as spaces to construct engineering
knowledge. In 1826 near Lewistown, Delaware (present day Lewes, Delaware) Corps
Engineer Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Totten conducted research at the request of
Philadelphia merchants regarding the construction of a breakwater. Philadelphians
wanted a breakwater to create a secure harbor at the mouth of the Delaware River as a
safe haven for their ships against ice floes, storms, and winds. Totten’s research did not
limit itself to engineering. Totten also studied elements of the natural world – the winds,
the tides, and the even the marine life. This research led Totten to rule out the possibility
of constructing a wooden pier. Totten noted a pier constructed of, or enveloped by, wood

150

was subject to “the ravages of the worm, in the lower part of the bay.” The worms, Totten
claimed, “would soon destroy any wall, in which timber entered as an essential part.”85
Scientific laboratories were uncommon in the early United States. Individuals
engaging in the practice of science used a variety of spaces to conduct their research and
construct knowledge. Seaports were no exception. Ports offered access to the natural
world and the material resources needed for scientific practice. Seeing seaports as centers
of knowledge construction rather than just centers of commerce and distribution not only
opens a whole area of for studying seaports, it also creates a bridge between economic
history, maritime history, urban history, and the history of science and technology.
Studying seaports as scientific laboratories and mechanical workshops can help us
integrate the history of science and technology into more mainstream history. Protecting
commerce was the focus of the Light-House Establishment, thus America’s seaports were
an integral part of making the Establishment one of the nation’s leading scientific
enterprises.
SCIENTISTS AND MECHANICS
If the Light-House Establishment turned American seaports into scientific spaces
and centers of knowledge construction, the experimenters, inventors, and mechanics
engaging in science were a diverse lot. While elites such as John Henry Alexander,
Alexander Dallas Bache, and Joseph Henry helped make a name for American science
among Europeans near the middle of the nineteenth century, science in the early United
States was practiced in a large part by commoners. Farmers, merchants, women, free and
enslaved African Americans, and even children.
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The population diversity in the seaports equated to a democratic stage in the
development of science. As many historians, including Thomas S. Kuhn, George H.
Daniels, and Andrew J. Lewis, argue, the democratic stage was a necessary step in the
development of science.86 This is true regardless of the geographic location of science.
Jan Golinski, for instance, shows a similar scientific democracy in Great Britain with the
sale of barometers and study of the weather in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.87
Thus, the development of science and the arts in America were not exceptional. They
followed a path similar to the development of science in other nations.
Andrew J. Lewis argues natural history in the early American republic was
largely observational and classificatory.88 The same cannot be said for science in the
Light-House Establishment, where experimenters and mechanics performed science to
gain new knowledge. Charles Beck, Winslow Lewis, and David Melville did more than
observe and classify. Their experiments constructed knowledge in the fields of physics
and chemistry. In genteel society, it was expected that new knowledge would be
published for all, but few commoners had the connections to disseminate their findings
and many probably did not see the need to publish their findings. As illustrated in the first
two chapters, the men of the Light-House Establishment simply applied their findings to
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solving practical everyday problems before carrying on.89 This lack of records makes it
difficult for the historian. Evidence of the Light-House Establishment experiments were
recorded in the correspondence between peers, between the Treasury Department and the
mechanics, and between the Establishment and other society men.
Aside from the engineers, such as Lieutenant I. W. P. Lewis, Lieutenant George
Gordon Meade, and Captain Howard Stansbury, most of the individuals engaged in
science and the mechanical arts for the Establishment did not consider themselves
philosophers, scientists, engineers, or mechanics. Their writing lacks the scientific
terminology and references found in the work of other scientists, such as Ferdinand R.
Hassler and John Henry Alexander. David Melville, for instance, uses a common
vernacular to describe his inventions and explain their workings.90 This challenges
Andrew J. Lewis’ argument that men who engaged, even part-time, in the natural world
of the early republic saw themselves as contributing to American philosophy and
science.91 Rather, these men saw themselves as businessmen, inventors, and laborers.
Winslow Lewis, for instance, ran a cordage shop and distributed oil for the Light-House
Establishment in addition to his tinkering and lamp work for the Establishment.92 Lewis
essentially had his hands in any prospect that presented an opportunity for his own profit.
He employed other men whom he considered to be the real mechanics. Similarly, David
Melville owned a hardware and stationary store, yet he promoted the use and expansion
of gas lighting. The natural gas industry was still in its infancy in the 1810s/ The industry
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did not become more viable until the second half of the century. Melville’s inventions
were something he tinkered with on the side. He too saw it as an opportunity to advance
his own financial interests. Melville also employed mechanics to assist him as he tinkered
in the practical arts.93
Additionally, both Lewis and Melville saw themselves as inventors. In a letter to
Albert Gallatin dated March 10, 1812, Lewis stated, “I am confident that there never was
a reflector made before my invention in any Optical principle.”94 Melville also saw
himself as an inventor. In a letter to his friend John Boss, Melville claimed he could
prove “myself to be the first inventor” of an improvement to the Argand oil lamp.95 In
separate notarized affidavits, Melville again acknowledged “himself to be the original
Inventor” of two improvements to the Argand lamp.96
Charles Beck, Frederick W. A. L. Brown, and Jonathan Bruce, however, saw
themselves as laborers. All three were engaged at various times in what Bruce referred to
as simply, “tending the telegraph” at Boston between 1823 and 1837.97 In October 1824,
Bruce complained of another agent offering for Bruce to do “two-thirds of the work,”
while the other agent got “two-thirds of the money.” Bruce threatened, “I shall not tend
the Telegraph any longer,” but apparently recanted later. In their correspondence with the
proprietor of the Boston marine telegraph, Beck and Brown spoke frequently of their toils
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with menial tasks including painting, repairing the telegraph’s ropes and chains, and
replacing the telegraph’s connector arms.98
Although men like Winslow Lewis and David Melville did not see themselves as
engineers, mechanics, philosophers, or scientists, the state on the other hand did view
them as such. Stephen Pleasonton often referred to Winslow Lewis and the other
lighthouse contractors as engineers when corresponding with them and others about the
work Lewis and the other contractors performed.99 In his report to Congress, Pleasonton
claimed, “in building all the more important lights I have employed engineers, with as
much science, united to practice, as any to be found in the country.”100 Some might argue
Pleasonton did not know the difference, but in a letter dated October 3, 1838, he
specifically called out those engineers formally trained in that field as inadequate
compared to those who learned the trade through the hands on practical experience of
building structures.101
The state also viewed lighthouse keepers as mechanics. A lighthouse keeper’s
duties included properly adjusting and repairing the lamps, lenses, and in revolving
lights, the clockwork mechanisms. These adjustments required the keeper to possess a
mechanical ability. Many of these adjustments were done through screws, but sometimes
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the adjustments meant precisely filing the lamp burner to ensure an even flame. As
Winslow Lewis explained to Stephen Pleasonton in 1822, if the flame caused the lamp’s
air tube to “become uneven,” the uneven part must be “taken off with a file.”102 Filing the
burner of an Agrand lamp not only required a keeper to possess precise mechanical
knowledge of the lighthouse lamps, but also an understanding of chemistry and physics.
When filed correctly, Lewis claimed “the lamp then is the same as when new,” but if the
burners were filed too much, the lamp was rendered useless. This filing of the lamp
burner may have resulted from the inferiority of Lewis’ lamps.
Wicks were another aspect the required the lighthouse keeper to perform the
duties of a mechanic. Lewis noted that if the wicks were not expertly trimmed and raised,
the keeper will “fill the lantern with smoke in much less time than one hour.”103
Trimming and raising the wick required the keeper to possess a basic knowledge of
chemistry and physics. They also required precision on the part of the keeper. The
Argand lamp used a wide flat woven wick, usually made of cotton fibers. If the wick
were trimmed too close to the burner, the flame would cause the wick to char, or “crust.”
Crusting prevented the lamp from burning properly and wicks were required to be
trimmed every four hours through the night as a result.104 Once the wick burnt down
completely, the lighthouse keeper had to replace the wick. This task required the keeper
to disassemble the burner before inserting the wick and reassembling it afterwards.
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Cleaning the lamps, lenses, and reflectors also required a mechanic’s hand.
Cleaning could easily cause a misalignment that needed to be fixed. Often times keepers
had to remove the lamp from the lantern in order to clean it properly. Removal from the
lantern presented its own set of mechanical problems since each lamp required precise
placement to ensure the light’s maximum brightness and efficiency. Lewis’ lamp and
reflector system used screws to adjust the lamp’s placement in front of the reflectors.105
Keepers had to be careful in their removal and replacement of the lamps. Even a small
adjustment could affect the quality of the light and impact mariners at sea.
Perhaps the most mechanically involved aspect of a keeper’s duties was
maintaining the clockworks mechanism for revolving lights. Revolving lights, that is
those that appeared to “flash,” helped mariners distinguish one lighthouse from another.
The speed of the light’s revolution determined how often the light “flashed” its signal.
To create the effect of a “flashing” light, the lamp and reflector system rotated on a gear
driven mechanism. The motor operated by a gravity-fed weight attached to a cable. The
lighthouse keeper would raise the weight by hand cranking the mechanism and wrapping
the cable around a barrel. Once the weight reached the top of the lighthouse, it would fall.
The falling weight caused the barrel to rotate and this motion was transferred to the lens
through a series of gears somewhat resembling the interior workings of a clock.106
According to John T. Graham, because Winslow Lewis’ Argand-style lamp and reflector
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system was relatively light, the amount of weight needed to turn the clockwork
mechanism was correspondingly very little.107
This clockwork mechanism ran continuously from dusk until dawn each day.
Keepers were responsible for maintaining the mechanism to ensure the gear-driven motor
ran smoothly. The keeper inspected gears and weights daily making sure everything was
properly aligned for an effortless rotation of the lens. If the gears jammed, became
misaligned or worn, or for any other reason prevented the mechanism from rotating the
lamp and reflector, the keeper was responsible for the repairing the mechanism.
Sometimes repairs might require extensively mechanical work such as filing rough spots
or adjusting the spacing between gears. Other times, simply keeping the gears properly
oiled might prevent future problems.
If the state saw these men as mechanics, the keepers themselves did not
necessarily see themselves in that same light. The keepers most likely saw themselves as
laborers, rather than as mechanics. A poem written by Fred Morong, a lighthouse keeper
in Maine, illustrates how much lighthouse keeper’s self-identified with their labor.
excerpt from the poem “Brasswork”
by Fred Morong
“Oh, what is the bane of the lightkeeper’s life,
That causes him worry, struggle, and strife,
That make him use cusswords and beat up his wife?
It’s brasswork.
What makes him look ghastly consumptive and thin,
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What robs him of health, of vigor, and wim,
And causes despair and drives him to sin?
It’s brasswork.
The devil himself could never invent
A material causing more worldwide lament,
And in Uncle Sam’s service about ninety percent
Is brasswork.
The lamp in the tower, reflector and shade,
The tools and reflectors pass in parade
As a matter of fact, the whole outfit is made
Of brasswork.
The oil containers I polish until
My poor back is broken, aching, and still
Each gallon and quart, each pint and gill
Is brasswork.
I lay down to slumber all weary and sore,
I walk in my sleep, I awake with a snore
And I’m shining the knob on my bedchamber door
That’s brasswork.
From pillar to post, rags and polish I tote
I am never without them, for you will please note
That even the buttons I wear on my coat
Are brasswork.
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The machinery, clockwork, and fog signal bell,
The coal hods, the dustpans, the pump in the well,
Now I’ll leave it to you mates, if this isn’t, well
Brasswork.
I dig, scrub and polish, and work with a might,
And just when I get it all shining and bright,
In comes the fog like a thief in the night
Good-bye brasswork.”108
Although this poem was written several years after the period under study here, it is still
relevant. Aside from the “buttons on the coat,” the life of the lighthouse keeper was much
the same at the time the poem was written as it was in the first half of the nineteenth
century. There were a few more modern conveniences, but the daily tasks were the same.
The keepers’ lists of duties consisted chopping firewood, cleaning, painting, and other
routine tasks that required much more labor than it did mechanical ability. The keeper at
the Black Rock Light in Connecticut claimed they “never had much time to [even] get
lonely” before listing all of their daily toils.109 When the retiring keeper at Egg Rock
Lighthouse in Massachusetts in 1850 welcomed the new keeper, the former warned the
latter of the extensive labor required to maintain the light.110 In 1851, when the newly
formed Light-House Board surveyed the various keepers, they listed many as having “no
vocation.” Several, including James Hubbard, the keeper at Navesink Twin Lights in
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New Jersey (appointed 1851); Epraim L. Lockerman, keeper of the Reedy Island
Lighthouse (1850); and William Vennard, keeper of the Portsmouth Harbor Light (1849)
were farmers before their respective appointments as keepers.111
Reading the correspondence between the lighthouse keepers in Boston and the
marine telegraph shows lighthouse keepers to be primarily unskilled and untrained in the
arts. Although the state considered Lighthouse keepers to be mechanics, Stephen
Pleasonton acknowledged that many keepers possessed little training or experience in the
arts when he was called before Congress to defend his administration of the Light-House
Establishment. In a letter to John P. Kennedy, Chairman of the House Committee on
Commerce, Pleasonton stated, “There is not a single keeper, out of about two hundred
and forty, in charge of the reflector lights, so far as my knowledge extends, who is
capable of taking charge of and conducting a lens light properly; and there are few in our
country who are capable and would be willing to receive the inconsiderable sum for their
services which we give Mr. Lopez, the present keeper at Navesink….It would, therefore,
only be in the vicinity of large towns that we should have it in our power to obtain
suitable keepers, and at the same time proper assistants, and materials with which to
repair the machinery.”112
Natural philosophy and the mechanical arts were primarily practiced by white
males in the early United States republic, but this democracy of science did not limit
itself to the Anglo-American genteel society. Andrew J. Lewis argues, all classes
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participated in natural philosophy during the first few decades of the nineteenth century
and that scientific practice was a far more variegated enterprise than simply white men
observing and classifying nature.”113 Lewis uses the example of South Carolina slaves
assisting Dr. William Read, a rice plantation owner, with analyzing fossilized teeth of an
unknown creature. But scientific practice was even more variegated than Lewis contends.
African Americans, women, and even children engaged in the collection and construction
of scientific knowledge.114 This was true even in the United States Light-House
Establishment.
The records and examples of African Americans, women, and children
participating in science are sparse due to the high degree of paternalism in the white male
community towards these classes of individuals, yet there is evidence of their
participation. In the south, the Light-House Establishment offered opportunities in
science and the arts for a predominantly African-American labor force. Although their
participation in science was forced upon them due to their bonded state, African
Americans engaged in early American science in the construction of port infrastructure.
In 1811, Thomas Walker and James Evans were awarded a contract to build a lighthouse
for the port of Georgetown, South Carolina. With few other options for labor, Walker and
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Evans hired slaves from local plantations to haul and lay the bricks of the tower.115
Hauling bricks for the tower required manual labor, but laying the bricks required slaves
to have knowledge beyond even basic schooling. The tapered brick tower stood 87 feet
tall. Calculating the gradient of the walls was no easy task. It required a strong
knowledge of mathematics and construction techniques. Local historian Robert
MacAlister describes the beacon as having walls five and a half feet thick at the bottom
and two feet thick at the base of the lantern room.116 While knowledge of brick
construction and mathematics may have been available on the plantations, experience in
building structures of the lighthouse’s height was only available in the seaports, where
imposing structures were a necessity for the safety of maritime commerce and navigation.
African Americans thus participated in and were taught the art of practical engineering.
They gained useful knowledge which they carried with them back to the plantation or on
to other projects, such as the construction of the lighthouse at Cape Romain outside
McClellanville, South Carolina.117
Women also served as mechanics in the Light-House Establishment. In 1826, the
Establishment appointed Edward Shoemaker’s widow keeper of the Old Field Point
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lighthouse in New York.118 Although other women such as Catharine Moore had
unofficially performed the duties of the lighthouse keeper at Black Rock Harbor,
Connecticut as early as 1817, Shoemaker was the first woman officially hired by the
federal government to serve in the position of a keeper. Appointing the lighthouse
keeper’s widow as the new keeper followed the long standing tradition of European craft
guilds. As Londa Schiebinger notes, “guild regulations gave a widow the right to run the
family business after the death of the husband.”119 Elinor De Wire acknowledges, it
“became an unofficial rule concerning the appointment of most women” as lighthouse
keepers and the state “had few reservations about hiring women with several years of
apprentice-type experience.”120
In many cases, the widow was already familiar with the duties of keeping the
lighthouse, having assisted their husbands in an unofficial capacity. The state recognized
this fact in appointing widows to their husbands’ former post. De Wire notes, “lighthouse
keeping was largely a family affair.”121 The state preferred to appoint married men with
families as lighthouse keepers knowing the family could assist them in tending the light.
De Wire continues stating that “by 1851, 30 widows had succeeded their husbands at
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American lighthouses.”122 In all, 53 women were officially employed by the United
States Light-House Establishment as lighthouse keepers between 1820 and 1859.123
Interest in female lighthouse keepers has increased substantially in the last three
decades as several scholars have examined the role of women in the United States LightHouse Establishment and later the Lighthouse Service. These include the motherdaughter team of Mary Louise and J. Candace Clifford, Patricia Majher, Elinor De Wire,
Bethany Bromwell, and Virginia Neal Thomas among others.124 Thomas and Majher
acknowledge the duties of the keeper by including a transcription of Stephen
Pleasonton’s instructions to lighthouse keepers, but unfortunately, none of these studies
fully examine female keepers as mechanics or scientific experimenters. Most explore the
social aspects of female lighthouse keepers and focus on women laboring in a man’s
world without addressing their engagement in practical science. Thomas’ thesis comes
the closest by comparing the work of the lighthouse keeper to the domestic work of a
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homemaker. Majher surmises that this oversight into the science and mechanical arts may
result from the “remarkably little detail about these women’s lives.”125
Despite these studies overlooking the scientific and mechanical role of female
keepers, it is possible to understand the extent that women lighthouse keepers were
mechanics and experimenters by examining the primary sources relating to male keepers.
Those sources can be applied to female keepers as well since they performed the same
job. As previously discussed, serving as a lighthouse keeper required one to possess a
mechanical ability. Keepers were responsible for properly adjusting and repairing the
lamps, lenses, and the clockwork mechanisms used in revolving lights. While Thomas
notes that women’s domestic work involved tending fires and lamps in the home, filing
the burner of a lamp would not have been common practice for women in the nineteenth
century.126 Filing was considered a man’s work and in many cases the artisan craft of a
metalworker. According to Catherine E. Beecher’s 1843 treatise on domestic housework,
if a lamp burner in the home needed to be filed, it was to be done by the male in the
household.127 Londa Schiebinger, however, complicates this idea and the notion of
gender roles. Schiebinger argues what went on in private homes outside the view of the
public eye may or may not have followed the accepted gender conventions of the day.128
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Within the Light-House Establishment, the tasks for tending the light were the same for
men and women with the exception of painting the lighthouse. According to Dennis
Noble, “Stations whose principle keepers were women were excused from this chore.”129
Additionally, as previously noted, cleaning the lighthouse lamp required
mechanical knowledge. The Argand oil lamps used in lighting the United States’ coastal
beacons were nearly identical to the Argand lamps used in homes. Catharine Beecher’s
domestic manual instructed women to “take the lamp to pieces and cleanse it.”130
Disassembling the lamp to clean it not only required knowledge of the lamps mechanical
construction, but again, also required the keepers to remove the lamp from its very
precise placement between the lens and reflector. Some lighthouses had as many as thirty
lamps; each with their own exact placement for providing the best light possible.131
Even children participated as mechanics and scientific experimenters within the
Light-House Establishment. As early as 1813, David Melville employed Benjamin
Marshall to assist him in “attending the gas apparatus.” The boy was only thirteen years
old at the time. In a deposition supporting Melville’s patent infringement suit against
Winslow Lewis, Marshall claimed he had worked for Melville off and on for at least the
next five years.132 While neither Melville or Marshall specify the latter’s exact duties in
assisting Melville, it is logical the Marshall’s duties included mechanical work. Melville
would have instructed Marshall on how to perform that mechanical work until the boy
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became proficient enough to complete the tasks on his own. Because of the inconsistency
of Marshall’s off and on employment, it seems unlikely that the boy was any sort of
apprentice to Melville. Rather it is more likely that Marshall was an assistant whom
Melville hired when he needed an extra set of hands to help him with the mechanical
duties tending to the gas apparatus.
Children were also employed in tending the light. In 1857, fifteen-year-old
Idawalley (Ida) Zoradia Lewis took charge of the Lime Rock Lighthouse when her father,
Hosea Lewis, the keeper of record, had a stroke.133 Normally the task of keeping the light
would have fallen to Hosea’s wife, Zoradia Lewis. Zoradia, however, was pre-occupied
with caring for her husband and Ida’s younger sister who had also fallen ill.134 Most
historians have focused on Ida’s daring and heroic rescues, but the fifteen-year-old girl
also performed all the mechanical duties of keeping the light. She trimmed the wicks,
polished the reflectors, filed the burners, maintained the clockworks mechanism and
made all of the necessary adjustments for keeping the light lit every night. Ida’s
contributions went unpaid because she was tending the light while her father was
incapacitated. As Elinor De Wire notes that it was not uncommon for children to assist in
keeping the light. In many ways it was unofficially expected. According to De Wire, the
Light-House Establishment preferred to hire married keepers with families because of the
shear amount of work that needed to be done at the lighthouse.135 De Wire also notes
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there were no age restrictions for lighthouse keepers in the first half of the nineteenth
century.136
What is at issue here is the question “What constituted science in the early United
States?” Science can be defined simply as knowledge. Individuals performing science
and engaging in the mechanical arts gained knowledge through empirical observation and
testing. Although the Charles Becks, James Hubbards, Ida Lewises, and Benjamin
Marshalls of the Light-House Establishment were simply doing what they had to do to
get by in their day to day tasks, they were engaged in scientific activities. These
individuals constructed knowledge through their daily tasks because their daily routine
relied on empirical observation and testing. Many of these individuals did not even
realize they were engaging in empirical observation and testing and even if they did, they
were not necessarily interested in the knowledge the produced. Beck, Hubbard, Lewis,
Marshall and the so many other average Americans in the Light-House Establishment
may have constructed knowledge for their own gain, but their primary goal was doing
their job and doing it to the best of their ability. As we will see in the following chapter,
civic duty played an important role in early nineteenth century American science. The
lack of interest in the knowledge produced by these individuals does not change the fact
that they were engaged in science. Their work helped make the Light-House
Establishment one of the leading scientific institutions in the United States in the early
nineteenth century.
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CONCLUSION
Similar to the Coast Survey’s impact on surveying, the Army Corps of Engineers’
influence on American engineering, and the marine telegraph’s role in the advancement
of communications, the United States Light-House Establishment played a major role in
the creation of scientific knowledge in America. As this chapter has demonstrated, the
Establishment conducted numerous experiments in the chemical analysis of fuels and the
physical science of illumination to produce new knowledge about the natural world. This
construction of knowledge and engagement in scientific experimentation made the LightHouse Establishment one of the premier scientific organizations in the United States and
placed the agency at the forefront of American science prior to the outbreak of the
American Civil War.
The Establishment employed a diverse lot of workers including men, women, and
children of all ages. The Establishment’s men and women of science also included both
the formally educated, such as the engineers of the Topographical Corps, and the
tinkerers who learned through the successes and failures of their practical experiences.
These mechanics and scientists did more than make observations and record their
findings. They engaged in the construction of knowledge; knowledge that these
scientifically-minded individuals used to find ways of improving the nation’s coastal
navigation. They invented dozens of lighthouse innovations including new new lamps,
lenses, reflectors, clockwork mechanisms, and other devices designed to provide a
brighter, more consistent light. Some of these mechanics applied for Letters Patents and
the United States Patent Office granted many patents for lighthouse innovations between
1789 and 1860. Men, such as Winslow Lewis and David Melville, sought to profit from
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their ideas and secure their livelihood. Others, including including Winslow’s nephew,
Lieutenant I. W. P. Lewis, Lieut. George Gordon Meade, and Captain Henry Stansbury
were content with knowing they had done their civic duty. Although it is possible that
Lewis, Meade, and Stansbury did not wish to pay the fee to patent their inventions, they,
and others like them, seem to have cared more about improving navigation than they did
about any personal gain they might have received from their work. For this reason, many
innovations went unpatented by their inventors. There are no known records of the LightHouse Establishment’s female mechanics inventing new apparatuses for the service.137
Other historians have argued that women of the Light-House Establishment, such as Ida
Lewis, seemed more concerned with performing their civil service faithfully, accurately,
and to the best of their ability.138 This may be true, but it may also be the easiest
assessment given the lack of records within the Light-House Establishment highlighting
the scientific and mechanical contributions of women. Ruth Oldenziel argues nineteenthcentury women made all kinds of things, they simply were not the sort of thing one
would patent.139 Additionally, it is also possible the Establishment’s women invented
new devices and innovated new methods, but simply did not record their discoveries or
share them with anyone else.
With the majority of the nation’s lighthouses being placed in or near its harbors,
the Light-House Establishment provide the perfect opportunity for men and women to
engage in science. The environment of the harbor provided the perfect space to pursue
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experiments. These experiments turned early republic seaports in to scientific laboratories
and workshops for the practical arts. Ports were more than gateways of exchange. They
were more than end nodes on a global trading network. Early republic ports were centers
for the exploring and obtaining knowledge. They were field schools for those who wished
to learn about science, the arts, and the natural world.
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CHAPTER 5
REPUBLICAN VALUES AND INNOVATION
If the environment necessitated the involvement of the state in science and the
practical arts as discussed previously in Chapter 3, the government’s entrance into these
fields was heavily influenced by republican values. Specifically, the values of civic duty,
prudence, honesty, and self-reliance shaped the manner in which the government engaged
in scientific endeavors. These values were at the core of American republicanism. Values
such as civic duty and self-reliance promoted the advancement of practical science and
mechanical innovation, while prudent management of government expenses seemed, at
least on the surface, to slow, or even oppose, scientific progress. Opinions over defining
these republican values also developed into a long-standing debate over who was best
qualified to manage the government’s scientific endeavors.
In the late 1830s, complaints against the Fifth Auditor of the Treasury, Stephen
Pleasonton, and his administration of the Light-House Establishment began to mount. By
the mid-1840s, those complaints had reached the halls of the Capitol Building.1 The
complaints were of a scientific nature. Edmund Blunt, Assistant to the Coast Survey, and
Lieutenant I. W. P. Lewis of the Topographical Engineers were the most critical of
Pleasonton’s administration, but even the Secretary of the Treasury, Walter Forward,
chimed in on the need for a “competent scientific and practical engineer” to provide
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guidance for the Establishment.2 Of the three, Blunt was by far the loudest critic. He
wrote to public officials, editors of important newspapers, and mariners involved in the
transatlantic trade. Blunt argued the lights in the United States were “greatly inferior in
brilliancy, in the distance they may be seen, and in good management” in comparison to
those in Britain and France.3 Blunt continued, stating, “We have been for years behind
other nations in taking advantage of other improvements.”4 Lewis confined his
complaints to his official report, which was authorized by Congress and commissioned
by the Secretary of the Treasury. Similar to Blunt, Lewis claimed the lights in France and
Great Britain were far superior to those in the United States, Lewis argued, France and
Great Britain had “called in the aid of their most eminent scientific men to improve the
construction and illumination of their coastal lights,” but noted “the establishment of this
country has languished under the rule of ignorant and avaricious contractors, unrestrained
by law or other influences requisite to the proper government of so important a branch of
public service.”5 Lewis went on to say, “everything like systemic arrangement is utterly
unknown; obscure inland beacons have more lamps than exterior lights of the highest
importance.”6 As an example, Lewis noted, “the beacon-light on the Penobscot river has
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as many lamps, and much larger and better reflectors than the great coast light of Petit
Manan, where three wrecks have occurred since the period of this examination.”7
While Blunt and Lewis shared common views, it is difficult to say whether or not
the latter came to his views independent of Blunt. The young Lewis was an up and
coming engineer who undoubtedly sought to make a name for himself. Blunt on the other
hand already held a great deal of influence through his association with the Coast Survey.
Blunt was the first Assistant appointed to the Coast Survey under Ferdinand Rudolph
Hassler.8 In a letter to Walter Forward, the Secretary of the Treasury, Lewis
acknowledged his debt to Blunt, “who in the most liberal manner, supplied me,
graciously, with a number of costly astronomical instruments that I could not have
obtained from any other source.”9 Lewis needed these instruments to perform his survey
of the coastal beacons. With Blunt’s views being previously known, it is plausible to
believe Blunt had ulterior motives for supplying Lewis “in the most liberal manner” of
such expensive equipment.10
Might Blunt not have been trying to influence the outcome of Lewis’ report? As
an Assistant to the Coast Survey, Blunt was a man of formal science. He believed the
Coast surveyors and the Army Corps engineers were the true keepers of science in the
United States. Blunt wished to see the Survey and the Corps take charge of the Light-
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House Establishment similar to how the Navy had taken control of the Coast Survey
earlier. Additionally, Blunt invented a lighthouse lamp that he hoped would be adopted
by the Establishment. By making formal charges of mismanagement against Pleasonton’s
administration, Blunt attempted to undermine Winslow’s Lewis’ exclusive lamp contract
with the Establishment so that the former would get an opportunity to introduce his lamp
into the agency.
As Secretary of the Treasury and Pleasonton’s direct superior, Walter Forward
also expressed his concerns about the possibility of mismanagement in the agency. In a
letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, John White, Forward stated, “it
has been found impossible to guard against all abuses,” because the Establishment was
“unaided by the science and skill now sought.”11 Despite the Secretary’s belief that it was
“impossible to guard against all abuses,” he did not blame the Fifth Auditor’s
management of the system.12 Forward stated the abuses “necessarily result from the
existing defects in the system, and must not be readily imputed to mismanagement of the
Department.”13 The defects mentioned in Forward’s letter resulted from the republican
values that guided Pleasonton’s administration of the Establishment. Those values
included a strong sense of civic duty, prudent management, honesty, and a focus on selfreliance. Pleasonton was a staunch Jeffersonian republican. Jefferson appointed
Pleasonton federal office in the state department as a reward for the DemocratRepublicans delivering Pleasonton’s home state of Delaware to Jefferson in the election
of 1800.
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For his part, Pleasonton defended his administration of the Light-House
Establishment stressing the growth of the Establishment and his prudent fiscal
management of the agency.14 Pleasonton claimed the Establishment was “maintained
annually at about one-third the expense of the British lights of the same kind, upon an
average, and for a somewhat less sum than the French light-houses cost for their
maintenance.”15 Pleasonton also stressed his strong sense of civic duty noting that he did
“all I can do, under a clause which has been inserted in each light-house law for some
years past.”16 Pleasonton argued that he built up the Establishment “from the
inconsiderable number of 54 to the number of 330 light-houses and 41 light-ships, with
numerous buoys, beacons, &c., within the 32 years I have had charge of it.”17 Lastly,
Pleasonton stressed the importance of eliminating corruption in government transactions.
He cited the lighthouse at Parmet river as an example. Pleasonton argued, the
“commander in the navy, of high standing,” who surveyed the site and recommended the
establishment of the lighthouse, was irresponsible in his civic duty. According to
Pleasonton, the river “was supposed to be a harbor for vessels in bad weather,” but it
“was found to be only two feet deep.”18 Pleasonton stated, “for some years past” the navy
had “recommended the establishment of lights where they have since been found useless
or unnecessary.”19 Although Pleasonton did not explicitly state why the navy

14

Pleasonton to Thomas Corwin, March 8, 1852, in United States Treasury Department,
Light-Houses: Letter From the Secretary of the Treasury…in Reply to a Report Made to
Congress by the Light-House Board, by Thomas Corwin, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 1852, H.
Doc. 88, 6-7.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
177

recommended useless sites, he implied either the naval officers were incompetent or they
had a personal, corrupt interest in the establishment of the lights. The Fifth Auditor
believed only, “a single officer attached to the Treasury Department” could provide for
“the proper application of the moneys appropriated” for the navigational aids and “insure
the best attention” the the Establishment with “the most economical expenditure of the
public moneys.”20 Pleasonton thus demonstrated that he not only believed in the core
republican values of civic duty, prudence, honesty, and self-reliance, but that he also
embodied those ideals with every effort.
Much has been said about republican values their relationship to innovation and
commerce in the early nineteenth century United States. David Nye, for instance, claims
the Jeffersonian idea of an agrarian republic was not about “preserving the wilderness or
halting development,” but rather “the citizen who contemplated such public
improvements became aware of the power of democracy” and saw it as his civic duty to
be a vanguard for the republic.21 Nye’s mentor, Leo Marx, argues Americans failed to
acknowledge the “root contradiction between industrial progress and the older, chaste
image of a green republic.”22 Indeed, Joyce Appleby and Drew R. McCoy earlier noted,
the idea of a truly agrarian republic devoid of any industrial development was a myth.23
McCoy argues there was “an uneasy suspicion (and sometimes recognition) among the
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Revolutionaries” that America “was already a relatively advanced commercial society”
and that an agrarian republic was unrealistic.24 And as John F. Kasson argued, “the
ideology of republicanism helped to provide a receptive climate for technological
adaptation and innovation.”25 More recently, Mehdi Achouche argues Jefferson did “not
repudiate science when he laud[ed] the rural virtues, but he [did] express an extreme
defiance towards science’s practical applications,” because he felt they “theaten[ed] the
virtue underpinning the American republic.”26
American republicanism and innovation were therefore not in direct opposition to
one another. As Eda Kranakis demonstrates, rural communities, such as those in Fayette
and Lancaster counties in western Pennsylvania, relied heavily on innovation for access
to commercial markets.27 Yet in the sphere of government there was a mixed reaction to
innovation and scientific progress. The state embraced commercial expansion by
providing for the Coast Survey, the Light-House Establishment, and the coastal defense
system. According to Merritt Roe Smith the government also held an interest in
exchangeable part manufacturing for supplying the nation’s military needs.28
In terms of the specific values discussed in this chapter – civic duty, prudence,
honesty and self-reliance - Hugh R. Slotten argues some viewed scientific practice as a
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civic duty. According to Slotten, Ferdinand R. Hassler, Superintendent of the Coast
Survey, “argued it was the ‘duty’ of every government to ‘to promote as much as possible
the general benefit of the nation, and especially its scientific improvement.’”29 Yet, the
state practiced prudence in its involvement with innovation and scientific enterprise
because the state feared corruption. Slotten notes Congress was concerned about
Hassler’s slow progress on the charting the coast because they worried “the longer the
results were kept within the Coast Survey office, the more easily they might be
manipulated or ‘cooked’ by some unscrupulous employee.”30 Similar feelings of
prudence were expressed toward the Army Corps of Engineers. According to Todd
Shallat, Jefferson objected to the public financing of internal improvements because
Jefferson “viewed as a source of boundless patronage” and “a bottomless abyss of public
money.”31 Shallat goes on to say that “science, engineering, and internal improvements –
the things Jefferson loved – might feed the dens of corruption.”32 Honesty and the
prevention of corruption were key values in Jefferson’s republican ideology. Smith
acknowledges that “Jefferson wanted to proceed with caution” and was pained with
anxiousness over balancing progress with republican values.33 Smith claims Jefferson
“simply did not want to jump headlong into a frenzied program of national development
at the expense of what mattered most – the preservation of values associated with a rural
society” and a virtuous republic. John Lauritz Larson’s political study of public works
29
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projects confirms the state’s prudence with their tepid involvement in internal
improvements.34 Smith, however, claims innovation and scientific progress reinforced
republican values rather than undermining them.35
This chapter adds to the historiography of the history of science and technology in
two significant ways. First, it examines science and technology in the early United States,
a period that has often been wanting in the history of science and technology. Ann
Johnson surmised this lack of science, technology, engineering and medicine (STEM) in
the early American republic is because STEM played “a key, but unmentioned role” in
negotiating the interaction between mankind, nature, and society.36 This chapter confirms
Johnson’s theory showing the importance of science and innovation in the early United
States while at the same time demonstrating why it remains mostly invisible. Second, this
chapter examines the interaction of innovation and scientific progress and the American
brand of republicanism. Whereas others have generically alluded to the republican values
that influenced innovation and scientific progress, this chapter takes a deeper look at
some of those republican values. Particularly, this chapter examines how civic duty,
prudence, honesty, and self-reliance impacted science and innovation in the first half of
the nineteenth century in the United States.
CIVIC DUTY
Civic duty was one of the most important republican values held by the state and
those who served in government. Gordon S. Wood first equated republicanism with the
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“public good” in his The Creation of the American Republic (1969).37 Wood argues by
definition, republicanism has “no other end than the welfare of the people,” and that civic
duty, that is sacrifice, was seen as a public virtue.38 Those individuals who engaged in,
oversaw, and promoted practical science in the early American republic believed their
scientific endeavors represented their civic duty. Learned men, such as Ferdinand R.
Hassler, Alexander Dallas Bache, and George Gordon Meade saw their work in the
sciences as their duty to their country; whether that country be their native home or their
adopted one.
As previously noted, Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler, the first superintendent of the
United States Coast Survey, believed it was the government’s duty to promote scientific
advancement. In his “Report on the Works executed for the Survey of the Coast of the
United States, upon the Law of 1832, and their junction with the Works made in 1817 by
and under the direction of F. R. Hassler,” which he included in his 1834 publication of
the Principal Documents Relating to the Survey of the Coast of the United States since
1816, Hassler argued it was the government’s responsibility to promote “scientific
improvement,…upon a liberal scale.”39 Hassler also believed that it was his civic duty to
employ military officers in the Coast Survey’s scientific work because they were more
economical than civilians and he valued the military’s obedience and discipline.40
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Hassler, however, argued the “character of our Republican military” mandated their
subservience to a civil power.41
Hassler saw himself as a man of science. He believed Americans were incapable
of producing science and men of science in the same mold as European nations.42 As a
civil servant of the United States government, Hassler saw the promotion of science as
his personal civic duty. Hassler attempted, in his mind, with every effort to carry out that
civic duty faithfully. Unfortunately, according to Slotten, Hassler did not understand the
differences between American and European political cultures. Slotten argues Hassler,
“ignorant of Washington politics” did not do “enough to educate Congress and cultivate
influential friends and political supporters.”43 Hassler tried to force the United States to
accept European scientific standards, such as the French metric system, civilian oversight
of government surveys, and the belief that scientists possessed superior moral qualities.44
Hassler may have been one of the premier scientists in the United States at the
time, but his mightier-than-thou attitude prevented him from seeing that everyday
Americans were producing science. This was actually the case with many formally
trained engineers, philosophers, and scientists. Interpreting Hassler’s actions and attitudes
returns us to the question asked in Chapter Three – what constitutes science? Hassler did
not believe the work of Americans constituted science because many had not be formally
trained in the sciences. Hassler, however, failed to realize that science had less to do with
training than it did with the methodology. Even though many Americans had not been
formally trained in philosophy or science, they still engaged in a method of empirical
41
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observation and testing. Empirical observation and testing is what qualified the work of
Americans as science.
Congress refuted Hassler on several occasions including the use of the French
metric system. Congress’ rebuttal of Hassler mainly resulted from the latter’s arrogance,
but the rebuttal nevertheless gives the appearance that the American brand of
republicanism conflicted with science. This is clearly not the case. If one sees Hassler’s
point of view on the relationship of civic duty and the promotion of science, it becomes
easy to reconcile republican values with innovation and science.
Similarly, Pleasonton understood it was his civic duty to promote science within
the Light-House Establishment. Over the course of his 32-year tenure as Superintendent
of the Light-House Establishment, Pleasonton authorized, monitored, and even suggested
experiments and practical improvements conducted by local entrepreneurs and mechanics
working for the agency. Some of those experiments and practical improvements were
discussed in the previous. In 1823, for instance, Pleasonton authorized the installation of
lamps and reflectors at Cape May, New Jersey “on the principle of a revolving triangle
including the apparatus of Melville & Black’s improvement for heating the oil.”45 David
Melville ran experiments on his apparatus for heating oil in lighthouse lamps “for several
years previous” to 1814 in order “to keep the oil in a fluid state” during cold winters.46
Melville’s experiments proved successful enough that Pleasonton authorized the
45
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installation of the improvement in northern lighthouses. In other instances, Pleasonton
monitored experiments involving lamps and lenses in Boston and New Jersey, a
“ventilator” to eliminate frost and condensation on lenses and lantern windows in
Newport, and fuel experiments in various locales.47 In 1840, Pleasonton wrote to one of
his contractors, “this is an age of improvement and we must keep up with it.”48
One instance that Pleasonton monitored very closely was the manufacturing of the
lamp and reflector system used by the Light-House Establishment. Throughout February
1840, Pleasonton advised Winslow Lewis to change his method of manufacturing
lighthouse reflectors. Lewis hammered his reflectors while others manufactured theirs
using molds.49 Pleasonton noted that reflectors made on molds had a “true parabola
form.”50 Pleasonton continued saying, “I would advise you to also have your reflectors
made in moulds, for without adopting that mode, it is impossible to have them of a true
parabola, or the focus properly made.”51 When Lewis objected by explaining his method
of manufacturing, Pleasonton replied that reflectors made in molds were, “so much
superior to the hammered reflectors, that there can be no room for hesitation in
employing them in preference to the those that are hammered.…the moulds not only
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produce a smoother surface than can be obtained by hammering, they must necessarily all
be alike, which is a matter of great consequence.”52 Still Lewis was reluctant. Perhaps
Lewis felt his friendship with Pleasonton was stronger than reality.53 Lewis did not
interpret Pleasonton’s advice with much concern until Pleasonton took a more direct
tone, stating,
As I understand your mode of making them [the
reflectors] however, I am clearly of the opinion that it is
not as good as that adopted by the British and as tried by
Mr. Blake of Boston. You hammer yours upon a block, as
I understand you, to give them the proper curve, whilst
the British and Mr. Blake form theirs in a die of steel and
pressure. Whilst yours therefore presents an uneven
surface, theirs presents a surface as smooth as plate glass,
and is capable of reflecting the light in a much greater
degree. It was for this reason I recommended to you to
employ moulds or dies of steel in making your
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reflectors…I am apprehensive that he [Mr. Blake] will
obtain a preference over you in supplying the
Lighthouses, unless you adopt the same mode, and I
should very much regret that you should be cut out of this
business after you have devoted so long a time to it.54
Lewis had been in the “business” for thirty years and it was with Pleasonton’s response at
the end of February indicating Lewis would be left out of government contracts, that the
contractor finally understood the Fifth Auditor’s polite ultimatum. Thereafter, Lewis
agreed to use molds for manufacturing his reflectors, and Pleasonton was “glad to learn”
that Lewis would “not be superseded by new comers.”55
Pleasonton took his civic duty seriously. In September of 1807, for instance,
while serving as a clerk in the state department, Pleasonton refused to issue a commission
signed by President Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson appointed Benajah Nicholls as the
surveyor of the Port of Windsor, North Carolina. Pleasonton “discovered” a previously
issued commission to “William H. Ruffin appointing him to the same office,” and
therefore refused to execute the President’s orders.56 In a letter to Pleasonton, Jefferson
claimed he had “no recollection of the name of William H. Ruffin,” but found
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Pleasonton’s actions “perfectly right.”57 Jefferson’s lack of recall is surprising. Jefferson
was well known for his meticulous note taking. Pleasonton, for his part, simply carried
out his civic duty, without regard to Jefferson’s higher authority. Another President might
have viewed Pleasonton’s actions as disrespectful and insubordinate. Jefferson’s
acquiescence, however, illustrates the importance of civic duty and the correctness of
Pleasonton’s action in adhering to his civic duty as a core republican value.
Pleasonton often performed his civic duty at great personal expense; neglecting
his own family or risking his own life for the greater good of the nation. For instance, in
1821, Pleasonton remained at his post in the federal government despite his wife
Matilda’s “obstinate & distressing disease.” In a letter to his cousin Caesar Augustus
Rodney, Pleasonton acknowledged, “Mrs. P[.’s] health has been so bad for the last two or
three weeks, and continues to get worse, that I have concluded to take her to the
Shenandoah Springs in Virginia,” but would “return myself immediately.”58 Another
time, Pleasonton wrote to family and friends that “Mrs. P[.] is absent in Pennsa.”59
Pleasonton’s most well-known civic duty came during the War of 1812 when he
risked own life to save valuable State Department papers during the British attack on
Washington in 1814. Pleasonton’s boss, Secretary of State James Monroe, serving double
duty as James Madison’s Secretary of War, scouted British encampments on the
Chesapeake, Patuxent, and Potomac and sent word back to Washington of the impending
57

Jefferson to Pleasonton, September 20, 1807, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Series 1,
General Correspondence, 1698-1827, LOC, Washington D.C.,
http://memory.loc.gov/master/mss/mtj/mtj1/039/0400/0464.jpg (accessed March 3,
2013).
58
Pleasonton to Caesar Augustus Rodney, July 16, 1821. H. Fletcher Brown Collection
of Rodney Family Papers, 1676 – 1898, Vault Box 25, Folder 9, DelHS.
59
Pleasonton to Thomas M. Rodney, September 12, 1837. H. Fletcher Brown Collection
of Rodney Family Papers, 1676 – 1898, Vault Box 25, Folder 10, DelHS.
188

attack. Pleasonton, with the help of First Lady Dolly Madison answered the call, taking
the State Department papers and hiding them at Roxeby Plantation near Leesburg,
Virginia until it was safe to return them to the city.60 Among the papers Pleasonton
gathered and couriered out of the city were the original copies of the Articles of
Confederation, the Constitution of the United States, the Declaration of Independence,
and Washington’s Commission as General of the Continental Army. Several historians,
beginning with John B. Ellis in 1869, have diminished the importance of Pleasonton’s
actions and relegated the incident to the status of mere trivia. Michael Farquhar calls the
incident a “footnote” in the historical record.61
Years later, Brigadier General William H. Winder asked Pleasonton to explain
why State Department books and records were moved during the attack on Washington.
Pleasonton responded in a modest republican fashion stating he could not recall whether
or not it was he or Mr. John Graham, the chief clerk of the office, who received Colonel
Monroe’s message. Pleasonton remembered only that “it was the part of prudence to
preserve the valuable papers of the Revolutionary government.”62 Not once in his
recollection did Pleasonton portray himself as anything more than a civil servant doing
60
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his civic duty. He did not play the hero, nor did he so much as acknowledge the danger to
his own personal life. The British torched Washington as Pleasonton crossed the Potomac
into Virginia.63
Such devotion to civic duty was not uncommon in the early American republic
and Pleasonton extended his expectations of civic duty to his subordinates and
contractors working for the Establishment. In 1830, Winslow Lewis requested partial
payment for work already completed in order to meet his expenses, but Pleasonton was
unable to make an exception for even his most favored contractor. Pleasonton explained
that, “although the law of January 1823, allows a discretion to make payments for work
done for the United States as it progresses,” he found it necessary “to lay down a rule to
defer all payments until the entire work executed.” He further explained, “From this rule I
have made no exceptions, and I regret that my duty now, will not permit me to make an
exception in your favor.”64 In another instance, Pleasonton denied a leave of absence for
a subordinate stating, “it is considered inconsistent with the public service to grant leave
for so long a period.”65
Entrepreneurial mechanics, such as James Elford, David Melville, and Winslow
Lewis also saw their work as part of their civic duty. Historian Robert E. Shalhope sees
entrepreneurial work as a commercial brand of republicanism that allows “men to view
themselves as committed to the harmony, order, and communal well-being of a republic
while actively creating an aggressive, individualistic, liberal one,” based on their
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capitalistic desires.66 Elford, a resident of Charleston, South Carolina, patented a
universal signal code for maritime communication. Elford and his Boston agent, John
Rowe Parker, believed the advantages of early communication were important to local
merchants, but that a universal system was advantageous to the state.67 Elford’s and
Parker’s civic duty was to see the national adoption of the universal code. Such
widespread adoption of Elford’s system would not only tie the nation together, it would
help facilitate national economic growth by accelerating port operations and reducing the
time in port.
Melville invented several apparatuses for the Light-House Establishment
including an oil heater, a method of eliminating the accumulation of frost and humidity
on lenses and lantern windows, and a method for burning natural gas in the lighthouse
lamps instead of spermaceti oil. The entrepreneurial mechanic detailed these inventions
in a report to the government in 1819. Although the purpose of the report was to expose
the alleged abuses of his inventions by an agent of the Treasury Department, Melville
provided a glimpse into his sense of civic duty regarding his scientific experiments and
practical improvements .68 Melville began conducting his experiments and perfecting his
apparatuses five years before his report. Melville believed it was “a duty of every citizen”
and a “privilege of the citizens to represent” the sanctity of their work to the
government.”69
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Lastly, Lewis saw his entrepreneurial work on lamps and lenses as his civic duty.
In a letter to Albert Gallatin, Lewis demonstrates his sense of civic duty noting his work
for “Commodore Rogers [sic],” and the Light-House Establishment over the past four
years inventing lamps, reflectors, and other lighting apparatuses.70 In an earlier letter to
Gallatin, Lewis’s sense of civic duty is also apparent when he offers to “reimburse the
money paid for [his] patent as well as every Expense [the] government may have been at”
should his improvements “be found not to answer the purpose now calculated & that the
saving of oyl [sic] is not equal to one half of the quantity consumed in the present
system.”71 Additionally, Lewis offered to repair “att [sic] my own expense all the
apparatus that may be put into any lantern under my direction” if they failed to meet this
standard.72
Others also viewed Lewis’ improvements to the lighthouse lamp as part the
general idea of civic duty. The editors of the Boston Gazette noted Lewis’ invention was
part of the “ingenuity and public spirit” exhibited by Americans. The newspaper
continued by saying Lewis’ invention, along with the inventions of other Americans,
“exhibit to the world, the most unequivocal proofs” of their republican virtue.73
As individuals and the state constructed knowledge and gained experience in
innovation and practical science, they did so for the benefit of the nation as a whole.
Civic duty was one of the most important characteristics of American republicanism.
Civic duty was the responsibility of every citizen to look out for the public good. As
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Chapter 2 highlighted, individuals engaged in science and the arts to solve commercial
problems. While some participated for profit, many others produced scientific knowledge
out of their sense of civic duty. Chapter 4 highlighted the many individuals who forewent
patenting their inventions and improvements out of their sense of civic duty. Today,
innovating technologies is much more a choice. Individuals are more inclined to
participate because of profit because the nation’s most absolute, most basic needs have
already been met. In the young nation, innovation was a necessity to secure the future of
the country. In seeking to solve commercial and environmental problems before profit,
American engineers, mechanics, and tinkerers invoked their sense of civic duty. Civic
duty, in turn, thus shaped the development of innovation and practical science in that it
determined the sorts of inventions that were produced and the type science that was
performed.
PRUDENCE (cautious and responsible management)
Prudence was also a core republican value and those who demonstrated prudent
management of government affairs were rewarded with long tenures in office. Of the
republican values discussed here, the virtue of prudence might be the one most opposed
to science. Noah Webster’s 1828 and 1844 dictionaries claimed prudence was “wisdom
applied to practice.” The dictionary noted that, “prudence implies caution in deliberating
and consulting on the most suitable means to accomplish valuable purposes.” Webster’s
dictionary continued stating, “prudence differs from wisdom in this, that prudence
implies more caution and reserve than wisdom, or is exercised more in foreseeing and
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avoiding evil, than in devising and executing that which is good.”74 These definitions of
prudence were well articulated by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in
their essays on the Federalist system which have since been collected under the title The
Federalist Papers. Madison championed, “shrewdness in management of affairs” and
“good judgment in the use of resources,” in the 43rd essay of The Federalist Papers.75
“Shrewdness in management of affairs” and “good judgement in the use of resources”
was synonymous with “caution in deliberating…the most suitable means to accomplish
valuable purposes.” Madison then argued “theoretical reasoning…must be qualified by
the lessons in practice,” and that “the existence of a right to interpose will generally
prevent the necessity of exerting it.”76 Although Madison’s language is speaking to
explicit powers of government, Madison is advocating moderation and accommodation,
or “caution and reserve.” Madison also championed “caution” as a republican value in the
38th essay of The Federalist Papers. Madison argued, “whence could it have proceeded
that a people, jealous as the Greeks were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules
of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen.”77 Madison went on to
say the lessons learned from the American improvement of the ancient system exposed
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the “great imprudence” of multiplying the hazards, difficulties, and objections “to such
experiments.”78
Any one of the above referenced definitions, and in some cases all of them,
defined the federal government’s involvement in innovation and practical science in the
early United States. Science was, and still is for that matter, an expensive endeavor. The
federal government, however, had limited experience and resources with which to engage
in the scientific practice. In terms of management of affairs, Congress forced the
superintendents of the Coast Survey, Corps of Engineers, and Light-House Establishment
to pursue shrewd fiscal policies by repeatedly underfunding those agencies and their
scientific endeavors. Pleasonton proved a most able administrator in this respect, but
others, particularly Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler of the Coast Survey, often drew the fury
of Congress for their lack of fiscal accountability.
Although Hassler garnered the indignation of Congress, his administration of the
Survey actually embodied the republican value of prudence. To begin with, Hassler was a
shrewd administrator. He insisted on doing things properly, which meant conducting the
survey with accuracy and precision. In fact, Hassler felt so strongly about the accuracy
and precision of the survey that he refused to allow his assistants to perform any of the
calculations associated with completing the survey.79 This display of caution slowed the
progress of the work, but Hassler remained unconcerned. He understood the importance
of the survey and the dangers associated with even the smallest inaccuracy, or what
Hassler perceived as evil. Miscalculations on charting the coast and underwater hazards
put the lives of mariners and passengers at risk; not to mention the dangers to commerce.
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Hassler felt his assistants were unqualified. He felt they would make mistakes in their
computations. Hassler, therefore, chose to prevent his assistants from performing the
essential functions of the survey and handled all of the mathematical calculations
himself.80 In preventing his assistants from performing the core of the survey work,
Hassler attempted to avoid what he perceived as the evil of unqualified assistants
computing the triangulation.
Drawing on European precedents, Hassler requested military officers to assist him
in the triangulation of the Survey. According to Slotten, Hassler believed the use of
military personnel was compatible with Jefferson’s brand of republicanism because it
reduced expenses and waste. Military salaries were already accounted for under the Army
and Navy. As the survey was conducted primarily during times of peace, the use of
military officers provided an efficient use for soldiers who would otherwise be under- or
un- employed. Prudence thus came from the shrewd frugality of shared expenses. There
was no need to pay out expenses twice when there were a number of highly skilled
military officers available. Additionally, the Coast Survey trained military officers in
practical science, which Hassler believed aided the officers in performing an essential
part of their civic duty.81
Congress, however, did not see the Superintendent of the Coast Survey as fiscally
responsible. In 1841, Congressman Caleb Cushing, for instance, claimed Hassler was
spending millions of dollars of taxpayers’ money with little to show for the expenses.82
According to Slotten, Congress claimed the work on the Survey was “too expensive” and
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progressing at “too slow” a pace.83 Congress shut Hassler out of the Survey in 1818 and
shifted responsibility for the work to the military in part because of the slow progress
being made.84 Hassler was reappointed as head of the Survey in 1832, but Congress
moved control back to the military between 1834 and 1836 on account of what they
deemed was Hassler’s lack of prudence and adherence to republican values of responsible
fiscal management.85 As a result of Cushing’s attack on the Survey, Congress forced
Hassler to be more accountable for the Survey’s finances in the final years of his
employment with the agency.86
The state’s republican value of prudence did not limit itself to the Coast Survey.
Nearly every government agency was affected by the state’s prudent fiscal policies.
Similar to the Coast Survey and the Light-House Establishment, appropriations for the
Army Corps of Engineers were often insufficient for their purpose.87 Additionally,
economic historian Mark R. Wilson illustrates how the republican virtue of prudence
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influenced the actions of the United States Army’s Quartermaster Corps throughout the
American Civil War.88 According to Sally Kenney and James F. Nagle, the state’s frugal
fiscal policies originate in the republican values of the early nineteenth century.89 Shortly
after Congress authorized the Coast Survey in 1807, the legislative body passed laws
regulating government contracts, which codified the bidding process and payment
procedures.90
In the early nineteenth century, as they often are today, government appointments
were politically motivated. Many of these appointees possessed little experience in
financial management beyond their own personal finances. Others did not see fiscal
accounting as a high priority. Hassler, for instance, even believed accounting was beneath
him. In a letter to President Andrew Jackson, Hassler is noted as saying anyone could be
a “Voodbury [sic]” (referring to Levi Woodbury, secretary of the Treasury and meaning
anyone could be a treasurer or accountant), but there could only be one Hassler.91
Similar to Hassler, and perhaps even more so, Stephen Pleasonton was a shrewd
administrator who took his civic duty for prudent fiscal management seriously.
Throughout his tenure, Pleasonton ensured that government contracts were executed in
the most cautious manner. When bids were too high for the Congressional appropriations,
he either returned the money to the surplus fund for the next fiscal year or he got
contractors to lower their bids. For instance in 1835, Pleasonton asked Winslow Lewis to
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“reconsider the subject” and inform him if he could refit the lighthouse at Mobile Point
for $500 less than Lewis’ original bid.92
At least one historian of the Light-House Establishment has argued that
Pleasonton took pride in returning funds to the Treasury, but this claim shows a general
lack of understanding about government spending policies. 93 By law, any unspent
appropriations must be returned to the Treasury.94 Much of the money Pleasonton
returned to the surplus fund resulted from insufficient congressional appropriations.
Pleasonton could not move forward on projects that were not adequately funded by
Congress. Fifth Auditor returned the money to the Treasury, not because he was a pennypinching bureaucrat, but because he was forced to return it by law and Pleasonton saw it
as his civic duty to follow the letter of the law.
If Pleasonton is to be viewed as a shrewd penny-pinching bureaucrat, it is because
Congress consistently failed to provide adequate appropriations for the Establishment.
Pleasonton, however, repeatedly informed Congress of the need for additional
appropriations. On December 19, 1823, for instance, Pleasonton noted that he could not
accept Winslow Lewis’ proposal for the Fort Gratiot Lighthouse because the
appropriations were “but $3,500.” Pleasonton went on to say, “An additional sum has
been asked for, and when the appropriation shall be made, proposals will again be
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invited.” 95 In December 1835, Pleasonton wrote to Joel B. Sutherland, Chairman of the
Committee of Commerce, noting “an appropriation was made at the last session of
Congress of one thousand and fifty dollars, for placing buoys in Nanticoke, Wicomoco,
and other rivers on Eastern Shore of Maryland,” but “that the sum of three thousand
dollars more is desirable for the purpose of procuring additional buoys for the rivers; and
a further sum of one thousand dollars to employ persons to take care of them.”96
Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Pleasonton had to ask Congress for additional
appropriations for the construction of the Carysfort Reef lighthouse in 1838.97
The lack of sufficient funding for the Light-House Establishment did not limit
itself to Pleasonton’s administration. Even before Pleasonton’s administration, Albert
Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, was known to ask Congress for additional funding.
On December 11, 1811, Gallatin informed Thomas Newton, Chairman of the Committee
on Commerce, that extending an improvement recently adopted in the Boston area “to all
the light houses…would however exceed the ordinary appropriations.” Gallatin
continued, “Should it be thought proper to authorize the expense, nothing more will be
necessary than to introduce an item to that effect in the general appropriation law.”98 In
September 1819, the Treasury Department acknowledged the possibility of insufficient
appropriations for a lighthouse at Long Island Head, but the Treasury Secretary declined
“making any application to Congress for any deficiency in the appropriation.”99
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In reality, any money Pleasonton saved because of his prudence was likely spent
on unexpected expenses. It was impossible to predict when a beacon or pier might be
destroyed by a storm and need to be replaced. These unexpected expenses had to come
from the Light-House Establishment’s general appropriations and similar to the
appropriations for specific projects, they were often inadequate. If Pleasonton’s prudence
in managing his accounts is to be interpreted as pride, it is because Pleasonton prided
himself on being a good civil servant, doing his civic duty and possibly on being able to
cover these unexpected expenses without having to ask Congress for more money, not
because he took pride in returning money to the Treasury.
Although Pleasonton’s prudence is most evident in his frugal management of the
Light-House Establishment, the Fifth Auditor was prudent in other aspects of his
administration. For instance, Pleasonton was cautious about wasting resources and
supplies. In November 1819, Pleasonton was cautious about letting Lewis reduce the
number of lamps in certain lighthouses, even though Lewis’ reduction provided a better
light. In a letter to the then Secretary of the Treasury, Pleasonton wrote that “I am of the
opinion that a deduction should be made of the oil allowed Mr. Lewis of at least 5,000
gallons; that he should be required to replace all the lamps originally fitted up, unless
otherwise directed by the [local] Superintendent of the Light House.”100 In another
instance, Pleasonton allowed Winslow Lewis to reuse some of the bricks from Benjamin
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Henry Latrobe’s lighthouse on Frank’s Island when Lewis contracted to rebuild the
beacon after Latrobe’s collapsed.101
HONESTY (elimination of corruption)
Closely related to prudence and civic duty is the republican value of honesty.
American republicanism sought honest men to serve in and watch over government. One
of the chief concerns was the elimination of corruption that naturally came with the
power of governing. As the United States continued to industrialize, the vices of greed,
power, and wealth began challenging the Jeffersonian value of honesty. In the early
republic period, land speculators were among the most corrupt. They often lied to
prospective landowners about the quality of the land and future amenities to sell the land
a values higher than its real worth. According to Drew McCoy, Jefferson expressed some
concern with the problem of land and the challenges the land speculators created for an
ideal republic even though Jefferson’s vision for a virtuous republic was grounded in
landownership.102 After the Civil War, corruption ran rampant in reconstructing the South
and the expansion of the railroads. For instance, in a stock-for-votes exchange, the
railroad industry’s Crédit Mobilier scandal reached to the highest levels of government
implicating the Vice President of the United States along with several Senators and
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Congressmen.103 Rampant corruption during reconstruction and the Gilded Age following
the American Civil War finally buried the Jeffersonian ideal of a virtuous republic.104
In 1828, Noah Webster defined corruption as “Depravity; wickedness; perversion
or deterioration of moral principles; loss of purity or integrity.”105 At least one modern
historian adds intent and purpose to Webster’s definition arguing corruption can be
defined as an intentional act of dishonesty, usually with the purpose of achieving some
sort of personal gain for the perpetrators.106 Aside from land speculation, corruption in
the early United States usually resulted from large scale public investment in
infrastructure projects.107 These large-scale infrastructure projects could range from
canals and turnpikes to coastal defenses, lighthouses, public piers, and surveys; projects
which involved commerce, engineering, innovation and the state through the
government’s institutions of science.
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, government officials feared
corruption. They made it their civic duty to prevent corruption whenever possible. When
fraud occurred, government officials sought to immediately remove the source of the
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dishonest actions. The elimination of corruption was thus a chief factor in the state’s
funding of practical science. As previously mentioned, Congressman Cushing accused
the Coast Survey of spending millions of taxpayers’ dollars, without anything to show for
it.108 Where were all the appropriations going? Congress initiated an investigation into
the Coast Survey for possible fraudulent activity before it would authorize the coming
year’s appropriations.109
In his position as Fifth Auditor of the Treasury, Stephen Pleasonton spent his
entire career combating corruption. Early in his tenure with the Treasury Department,
Pleasonton refused to pay for work on a Grand River pier. In a letter to Thomas Foster,
the regional customs agent for the Sandusky, Ohio area, Pleasonton noted his suspicions
of fraud. The Grand River Harbor Company offered to sell one of its piers to the federal
government. In anticipation of the purchase the Grand River Harbor Company hired
Abraham Skinner to make repairs to the pier. The company sought to increase the value
of its property so the company could ask a higher price for the structure. Skinner sought
payment from the United States before the repairs were completed rather than from the
Grand River Harbor Company. Pleasonton saw through the scheme informing Foster that
the Grand River Harbor Company “expect[ed] the United States to buy it [the pier],
probably at a high rate. This could not have been the intention of the law, and I cannot
undertake to authorize any such measures.”110
In another instance, Pleasonton reprimanded Winslow Lewis, one of the primary
building contractors for the Light-House Establishment for poor workmanship at two
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Florida lighthouses. Lewis won the contract to build the beacons at St. John’s River and
St. Mark’s Island by underbidding all other contractors. In turn, Lewis subcontracted the
job to a local builder who “committed so great a fraud,” in the workmanship of the
buildings.111 In the original contract, Lewis had the “option to build the house either of
brick or stone, but none to erect the walls of both materials.”112 Lewis’ subcontractor
built both lighthouses of brick and stone against the protests of the regional
superintendent. Pleasonton stated that in deviating from the specifications of the contract,
Lewis “exonerated the United States from all obligations to receive the work [finished
lighthouse] or to pay you one dollar for it.” Pleasonton was “determined in all cases
where contractors make arbitrary alterations in executing work for the United States,
under contracts, they shall be the sufferers.”113 After a lengthy correspondence on the
subject, Lewis rebuilt both lighthouses at his own expense.114 In fact, Pleasonton closely
watched all of Lewis’ contracts and corresponded regularly with Lewis on issues of
fraudulent work performed by the contractor or his workers.115
In January of 1842, Pleasonton questioned the unexpected increase in oil
consumption at the two Erie, Pennsylvania lighthouses. In a letter to Charles W. Kelso,
the regional superintendent of the lighthouses, Pleasonton demanded an explanation for
the excessive oil usage,
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Now on referring to your return for the year 1840, I find
there was consumed at both the light houses and beacon,
in that year, 364 gallons of oil, making it not quite 23
gallons per lamp. How has such a difference arisen? Your
letter affords no explanation,….It seems to me incredible
that there should be a difference of eight gallons per lamp
between the two years, or that 31 gallons per lamp could
have been consumed, if the keepers had done their
duty.116
But that was not all. Pleasonton continued,
And what appears to be equally strange, is that although
you inform me you had suspended both lights, one on the
18th and the other on the 25th December, neither of which
can be relit before April, yet you inform me you had been
under the necessity of purchasing forty-four gallons of oil
for the present quarter and insert a sum of 73 06/100
dollars in your estimate, to enable you to pay for it.117
Clearly, Pleasonton had uncovered a fraud which most likely stemmed from Kelso or the
keeper’s selling the oil to supplement their income. A similar instance occurred in 1829
in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Pleasonton wrote to John P. Decatur, a recently
appointed customs collector, telling Decatur not to hire a man named Godfrey as an
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assistant keeper. According to Pleasonton, Godfrey had “embezzled oil and iron from one
of the lighthouses.”118
Pleasonton’s strong commitment to the eradication of corruption in the LightHouse Establishment is best demonstrated by the importation of the Fresnel lighthouse
lens. In 1838, Congress responded to Lieutenant I.W. P. Lewis’s report on the LightHouse Establishment by authorizing the purchase of two French made Fresnel lighthouse
lenses to be used on an experimental basis. If the lenses proved to be an improvement
over the current system, Congress would authorize the purchase of additional lenses. To
facilitate the purchase of the lenses, the Treasury Department commissioned Captain
Matthew Calbraith Perry of the United States Navy to meet with Monsieur Lepaute, the
French manufacturer of the Fresnel lens, and Léonor Fresnel.119 Perry was also to visit
Britain and report on the state of the lighthouses there. Pleasonton authorized Perry’s
expenses to be paid for by the Treasury through its agent General Lewis Cass.
Perry completed his commission, yet he encountered difficulties in paying for the
lenses. In a letter to his friend Eugene A. Vail a year after his assignment, Captain Perry
complained of “General Cass communicating his determination not to comply with the
request of Mr. Pleasonton in reference to the payments for the lenses manufactured by
Mr. Lepaute.” Perry believed “Mr. Pleasanton has purposely thrown these difficulties in
the way.”120 Scholars have cited this letter as evidence condemning Pleasonton, however,
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the Fifth Auditor had nothing to do with General Cass’ refusal to pay Perry’s bills.121
Perry did not submit his bills in accordance with the agreed upon contractual installment
plan; a plan designed to prevent corruption in government transactions. As Pleasonton
noted in his September 27, 1838 correspondence with Perry, “Although we do not make
advances for work done at home, yet, in the case of these lenses, which are made by
artists employed by the French Government, you will make such advances, from time to
time, as may be necessary to secure a prompt and faithful execution of the work.”122
General Cass followed protocol, a fact Perry acknowledged in his letter to Vail. “General
Cass was undoubtedly right in declining a responsibility that might at some future time
involve him in trouble.” Pleasonton, however, had no hand in the matter until later when
he criticized Perry for “neglecting or declining” to fulfill the agreed upon arrangement.123
Pleasonton admonished Perry, “Had you drawn bills for the different instalments [sic],
stipulated to be paid Mr. Lepaute, agreeably to the arrangement made with this
Office,…every difficulty and inconvenience would have been obviated.”124 In fact,
Pleasonton hoped Perry would be able to speed up the purchase by procuring “the lens
and apparatus already made for the French Government, paying them for it whatever sum
the one you have contracted for will cost.” Pleasonton wanted to have the lenses sent over
“in time to try it before the meeting of Congress, as their next session will be a short one,
and I should be very glad to have something definite done in regard to our lighthouse
121
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establishment before they adjorn.”125 Pleasonton remained faithful to his republican
values of civic duty and the elimination of corruption.
When Pleasonton learned of the difficulties created by Captain Perry, he wrote to
General Cass and requested that Cass pay Monsieur Lepaute for the lenses. In making his
request of Cass, Pleasonton stated very plainly the reasons for the difficulties. Perry,
entered into a contract with Mr. Lepaute at Paris for the
manufacture and delivery by him, at Havre, of two sets of
Dioptic and Lenticular apparatus, with a lantern for
Lighthouses, for which Mr. Lepaute was to be paid by
installments in the manner described in the
contract….Capt. Perry, on leaving Paris, made no
provisions for paying these several installments to Mr.
Lepaute, as they became due.126
Perry was apparently too consumed with his naval duties in testing the new steam
frigate Fulton to concern himself with properly securing the two Fresnel lenses. Perry
admitted as much in a April 10, 1840 report to Congress when he claimed he was “deeply
occupied with other official engagements.”127 Pleasonton’s tight-fisted and prudent fiscal
policies, thus, must be viewed in the light of Jeffersonian values as the Fifth Auditor’s
most effective weapon against greed and corruption, or the possibility thereof. Despite
Pleasonton’s attempts to prevent corruption in the Light-House Establishment, his
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Jeffersonian values were an obstacle to the individuals working with the Fifth Auditor.
Pleasonton’s efforts at preventing corruption were greatly appreciated by his superiors
and others concerned with the Light-House Establishment. For instance, in 1852, the
Light-House Board noted, “great credit is due to the zeal and faithfulness of the present
general superintendent, and to the spirit of economy which he has shown.”128 Walter
Forward, the Secretary of the Treasury, found not fault in Pleasonton’s management of
the Light-House Establishment. Forward wrote the Speaker of the House of
Representatives that “defects in the system” and not the “mismanagement of the
department,” were the root cause of any complaints against the Establishment.129
Other historians have noted Perry’s mission, but have sided with Perry when he
stated, “Mr. Pleasanton has purposely thrown these difficulties in the way.”130 These
historians have ignored Pleasonton’s explanation that Perry failed to follow the proper
procedures for procuring the lens. Pleasonton was simply doing his civic duty to prevent
any possible corruption from occurring by making sure Captain Perry followed the
Treasury’s protocol.
SELF-RELIANCE (small domestic production)
In addition to civic duty, prudence, and honesty, self-reliance played a significant
role in technical labor and commercial products in the early United States. To
Jeffersonians, the core value of self-reliance translated to domestic production by small
artisan shops in the fields of innovation and practical science. As Jefferson noted in 1821,
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the value of science to a republican people, the security it
gives to liberty by enlightening the minds of citizens, the
protection it affords against foreign power, the virtue it
inculcates, the just emulation of the distinction it confers
on nations foremost in it; in short, its identification with
power, morals, order and happiness…these
considerations are always present and bearing with their
just weight.131
Hugo A. Meier argues Jefferson and his followers understood the United States would
have to rely heavily on foreign science until the nation could establish its own scientific
institutions and programs.132 According to Terry S. Reynolds, many of the engineering
instructors were French.133 Ferdinand Hassler, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, was a
Swiss mathematician. However, the state also expected that the reliance on foreign
science would be brief and that America would be producing its own science and
scientific identity before long. According to Merritt Roe Smith, by the 1850s, “the young
republic had relinquished its abject dependency on European technology and no longer
stood in awe of the Old World’s industrial prowess.”134
Self-reliance also meant domestic production of the equipment used by the state’s
scientific endeavors. Early in the Coast Survey’s history, Hassler travelled to Europe to
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purchase all of the equipment used by the Survey. Hassler could not find high quality
scientific instruments manufactured in the United States. When Hassler regained control
of the Coast Survey in the early 1830s, he continued the practice of procuring the
Survey’s scientific equipment abroad. Hassler also shipped the Coast Survey work abroad
to be engraved for printing. Eventually, the Secretary of the Treasury, Levi Woodbury,
informed Hassler on the necessity of using domestic producers and suppliers for the
Survey’s needs.
In reply to your letter of the 27th ultimo, asking
permission to send abroad for Engravers to execute the
Coast Survey Charts, I would observe, that it is deemed
preferable by the President & myself, that you should
make inquiry and employ engravers in this Country, for
the Coast Survey work, if suitable ones can be obtained,
And it should be only in the event of a failure to obtain
such ones here, after a full inquiry, that persons should be
obtained elsewhere.135
The republican value of self-reliance was one of the primary concerns early in the
history of the Light-House Establishment that prompted Congress to approve the
purchase of Winslow Lewis’ patent lighthouse lamp and reflector system. As the editors
of the Boston Gazette noted, “such inventions raise the character of a nation and
essentially contribute to its real dignity and importance.”136 Lewis’ business was that of a
mariner turned small artisan mechanic. Lewis was an entrepreneur, but in his nearly forty
135
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years of supplying the Light-House Establishment with his patent lamps, he never
employed more than a few workmen. His lamps and reflectors were handmade one at a
time as needed by the establishment. Lewis, thus was the embodiment of small artisan
manufacturer desired by early republican values.137
Self-reliance proved essential for ensuring prudence in the Light-House
Establishment. Throughout his tenure as Superintendent of the Light-House
Establishment, Pleasonton maintained Lewis’ domestically produced lamps and reflectors
were both cheaper and superior to the apparatuses used in Britain and France.138
Furthermore, Pleasonton argued the United States’ reliance on domestically produced
spermaceti oil also realized the state a savings over colza oil used by France.139
Yet there were some items the United States was simply unable to produce of
high enough quality to protect the lives of mariners and the safety of commerce. Glass
was one of those items. Although glass manufacturing was one of America’s first
industries, production and quality were limited prior to the mid-nineteenth century. In
1798 when Lewis first “discovered” the effect of placing a lens in front of a lamp, he
“found that the Lenses Could Not be made in this Country.”140
There are several reasons for the limited production and quality of American
glass. First, as Steve W. Martin argues, American glass manufacturers, such as the
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Boston & Sandwich Glass Company, used wood as their primary fuel for manufacturing
glass until the second half of the nineteenth century when coal came into more common
use.141 Wood does not burn as hot as coal. The lower intensity of heat from wood creates
imperfections in the glass. The most common imperfections are bubbles.142 The French
glass manufactories at Saint-Gobain experienced similar issues in the late eighteenth
century according to industrial revolution historian John Raymond Harris.143
The low heat from wood fired furnaces also caused American glass manufacturers
to produce a thicker glass. For the lenses used in lighthouses, the thickness of American
glass was a major concern. As Francis Ross Holland, Jr. points out, when Lewis used
domestically produced glass, the glass had a greenish tint which diminished the brilliancy
of the light.144 Presumably, the green tint of Lewis’ glass resulted from the iron oxides
present in soda-lime. These oxides become more apparent with thicker glass made from
soda-lime.
The production and quality of American glass was also limited by the lack of
skilled gaffers. A gaffer was a skilled master artisan who oversaw a team of glassmaking
laborers. According to Brooke Hindle, most gaffers in the United States had to be brought
over from Europe, while Arlene Palmer contends the most prominent gaffers in the
eighteenth century United States were from Germany, including Caspar Wistar, John
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Frederick Amelung, and Henry William Stiegel.145 Joan E. Kaiser notes English gaffers
staffed the many Boston glassworks factories, but they too, experienced labor issues with
high turnover and a lack of experienced gaffers.146
Finally, glassmaking was an expensive venture. Many early American glass
manufacturers fell victim to poor fiscal management. As one historian notes, prior to
Deming Jarves’ acquisition of the New England Glass Company of East Cambridge in
1817, “the company continually suffered from management problems and changed hands
several times until it was ready to go under.”147
For the reasons stated above, Lewis limited his use of American glass to inner and
outer wick tubes.148 These tubes were responsible for providing the proper draft (air flow)
to the wick to ensure the wick burned at an acceptable and uniform rate. Elsewhere, such
as the plate glass windows in the lantern room, Lewis used “the best French plate
glass.”149 Although the French experienced problems at Saint-Gobain in the late
eighteenth century similar to the Americans, the French produced a higher quality glass
than the Americans. The quality of French glass came from their longer duration of
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experience in manufacturing glass at lower heat and their industrial espionage of the
British glass manufacturing processes.150
CONCLUSION
Clearly, a political battle was brewing over the control of the Light-House
Establishment and science was at the heart of the arguments. Military officers, such as
Blunt, Lewis, and later Lieutenants Richard Bache and Thornton A. Jenkins, used science
to support their claims that the Light-House Establishment could be better managed by
the military and the scientifically trained men who made up the military’s officer ranks.
Although Pleasonton’s main defense was grounded in his republican beliefs, he too used
science to support some of his arguments. For instance, according to Edmund Blunt,
Pleasonton noted “the distance that each French light is visible,” and compared them to
the distance at which each American light can be seen.151 Yet, the Blunt brothers argued
that Pleasonton’s distances at which the American light could be seen were unrealistic.
The Blunts noted, “the distance at which any object may be seen, or the limits of extreme
visibility, is determined by the tigure [sic] of the earth; and it is demonstrably impossible
for an observer at sea, at any attainable height, to discover lights at the distances he
pretends.”152
A similar battle had raged over the control of the Coast Survey since mid 1810s.
Civilian and military leaders clashed over the who was best suited to manage the survey
and science was at the forefront of the political conflict. Civilian science eventually won
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out over the military in 1836. Diplomatic efforts of the Survey’s second superintendent in
the 1840s smoothed the relationship between the Survey and the military.
The republican values of civic duty, prudence, honesty and self-reliance did not
exist in isolation from one another. They provided the foundation of American
republicanism and created a sense of completeness for the citizen striving to help build
the young nation. One could not be self-reliant without being prudent. One could not
claim a sense of civic duty without honesty. One could not thrive in the new nation
without the passion of holding these values as part of their being. Thus, these core
republican values worked together as men of science sought to solve commercial and
environmental problems while using practical science and the mechanical arts to secure
the future of the republic.
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CHAPTER 6
STATE INVOLVEMENT IN INNOVATION AND KNOWLEDGE
CONSTRUCTION
The previous chapters have shown how commercial problems facilitated
Americans’ engagement in practical science and innovation, how the environment
necessitated the government’s interaction, the solutions the resulted from both the
government and its citizens, and how the values of a republican society impacted the
development of science and shaped the government’s involvement in the field. This
chapter explores the government’s involvement in America’s early scientific ventures.
What follows is an examination of government’s uneven acquiescence of its role in
practical science and innovation.
On October 23, 1770 the HMS Carysford ran aground a previously uncharted reef
on the outer reaches of the Florida Keys.1 The HMS Carysford’s “discovery” of the shoal
prompted the British Admiralty to add the underwater hazard to their nautical charts over
the next five years.2 Despite the barrier’s inclusion on British maps, Carysfort Reef, as it
was mistakenly named, remained physically unmarked for more than 50 years.3 It was
only after the United States Light-House Establishment placed a floating lightship, the
1
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Caesar, on the reef in 1826 that the shoal’s location become physically and visually
marked for the first time.4
The lightship, however, proved ineffective. A year after the Light-House
Establishment stationed Caesar at the reef, the coral barrier claimed both the Spanish
slave ship Guerrero and the British anti-slaver HBM Nimble. According to historian Gail
Swanson, the signal from the lightship “had been too weak to warn where the dangerous
reef was.”5 Additionally, hurricanes frequently blew Caesar off its moorings.6 As a
result, the Light-House Establishment commissioned a second lightship, Florida, to
replace Caesar in 1830. Although the lightship Florida fared better than Caesar in terms
of longevity, it too proved inadequate for the intended purpose. In 1851, Thomas Budd,
Captain of the U.S. Mail packet steamship Union noted the lightship at Carysfort Reef
“shows two miserable lights, and does more harm than good.”7 That same year,
Lieutenant David Dixon Porter remarked, “On the reef near Cape Largo, the floating
lightship, showing two lights, intended to be seen twelve miles, but they are scarcely
discernable from the outer ledge of Carysfort reef, which is from four to five miles
distant. On two occasions, I have passed it at night, when the lights were either very dim
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or not lighted.”8 Porter went on to acknowledge, “Five vessels have gone ashore on and
about Carysfort reef since I have been running this route, all of them a total loss, and no
doubt all of them deceived by the lightboat.”9 Historian Kraig Anderson claims 63
vessels ran aground at Carysfort between 1833 and 1841 while the lightship Florida was
stationed at the reef.10
In 1837 Congress appropriated $20,000 for a more permanent light station at
Carysfort Reef. The Light-House Establishment in turn commissioned Lieutenant I. W. P.
Lewis of the Army Corps of Engineers to survey the reef, a practice that gradually
became more common after the late 1830s.11 Lewis’ survey suggested three possible sites
for the Carysfort beacon, but more importantly indicated the Congressional appropriation
would be insufficient for the work that needed to be done. Stephen Pleasonton, the Fifth
Auditor of the Treasury and Superintendent of the Light-House Establishment responded
to the survey noting, “a further appropriation of 80,000 dollars,” was needed, but
“doubted whether anything more will be appropriated this year.”12
Congress made further appropriations for Carysfort in July 1838, but as
Pleasonton remarked to one of his contractors, it was only “forty thousand instead of
8
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eighty thousand dollars.”13 With the funds for the lighthouse still lacking, the Fifth
Auditor was unable “to commence the work this season.”14 In 1847, ten years after
Congress originally authorized the construction of the Carysfort Reef lighthouse, the
legislative body finally appropriated sufficient funds to build the beacon.15 According to
Michael J. Rhein, the federal government eventually spent $105,069.00 building the
Carysfort light.16
While awaiting further appropriations, Pleasonton solicited proposals for the
construction of the Carysfort light. He settled on the design submitted by Lieutenant
I.W.P. Lewis. Lewis’ plans incorporated a new construction technique known as a
screwpile foundation. Alexander Mitchell, a blind Irish engineer, pioneered the screwpile
technique in England earlier that year when he superintended the construction of the
Maplin Sands lighthouse in the mudflats of the Thames Estuary. Prior to Mitchell’s
innovation, most contractors constructed offshore foundations by driving piles into the
ground. Mitchell premised his technique on the principles of a screw; attaching a coiled
flange to the end of his piles and twisting them into the seafloor until they were securely
anchored in the earth. Mitchell reasoned the spiral blades would hold more securely in
the soft ocean bed than driven piles.17
The iron piles used in constructing the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse represented the
latest knowledge in innovation and practical science. They were manufactured in an iron
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foundry at Philadelphia with such precision and exactness that any one section of the
piles could be interchanged with any other section. The piles were then assembled in
Philadelphia to ensure their universality before being shipped to the engineers and
contractors building the lighthouse at Carysfort. Merritt Roe Smith, a historian of science
and technology, argues the government’s involvement in interchangeable parts
manufacturing began with assembling weapons for the Ordinance Department in 1823.18
Thus, by the late 1840s, the government had more than twenty years of experience
producing interchangeable parts. This experience represented the most advanced
knowledge and innovation available at the time.
In addition to the screwpile foundation, Lieutenant Lewis’ plan also called for the
installation of a Fresnel lens, an optical apparatus invented by French civil engineer
Augustin Jean Fresnel discussed in Chapter 4. Unfortunately for Lewis, the Fresnel lens
purchased for the Carysfort Lighthouse was misplaced when it arrived in New York. The
lens arrived in several crates that were not clearly marked. The customs agent in New
York sold the crates at auction, only to find out later that it was the lens intended for
Carysfort. By the time the government recovered the lens, it was too late. The Carysfort
Reef lighthouse was already complete and operating with a different set of lenses.19
Physically marking the shoal with a navigational beacon may have helped mariners
visualize the boundaries of the coral reef, but charts and maps also needed to be updated
with more accurate information. Numerous shipwrecks over the previous two decades at
the site highlighted the necessity of having an accurate map of the area. (Anderson holds
18
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the Carysfort Reef responsible for 20 percent of all Florida Keys shipwrecks in the
1830s.)20 The federal government recognized physically marking the underwater hazard
was not enough and ordered a survey of the site. Under the direction of Alexander Dallas
Bache, Army Lieutenant James Totten completed the triangulation portion of the survey
while civilian cartographer Isaac Hull Adams carried out the topographic survey at
Carysfort.21 Totten and Adams completed their charting of the shoal in 1855.
Marking the Carysfort Reef represented two things for the state. First, the
Carysfort Reef Lighthouse was the culmination of the state’s expertise in innovation prior
to the Civil War. The lighthouse showcased the latest innovations in engineering and the
most current knowledge of practical science. Second, Carysfort also represented the
collaborative efforts of the government’s most prolific scientific institutions in the first
half of the nineteenth century – the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Survey, and the
Light-House Establishment. While these institutions worked together previously on other
projects prior to Carysfort, marking the Carysfort Reef was the one of the first
infrastructure projects in which all three organizations came together for the common
goal of protecting commerce and navigation. The triumvirate achieved this aim through
innovation and scientific practice.
This chapter chronicles the story of how the aforementioned government agencies
interacted and constructed knowledge. These institutions were the United States’ leading
scientific centers and at the forefront of the federal government’s involvement in
20
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constructing knowledge in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Corps of
Engineers, Coast Survey, and Light-House Establishment actively constructed, learned,
and transmitted knowledge through their interactions with each other and their individual
engagement in practical science and mechanical innovation along the nation’s coasts.
HISTORIOGRAPHY
The story of the triumvirate begins with institutional histories of government
agencies. In 1889, Arnold Burges Johnson chronicled the history of the United States
Lighthouse Service in The Modern Light-House Service. Johnson became Chief Clerk of
the United States Light-House Board in 1869.22 Johnson completed the history of the
Light-House Service in his spare time at the request of the International American
Congress.23 His narrative is a broadly encompassing work that not only chronicles the
administration and growth of the United States Light-House Establishment and LightHouse Board, but also provides a comparison with the lighthouses of other nations.
Johnson includes the technical specifications for the construction of lighthouses and
lightships and provides information on customs duties, tonnage, and other commercial
statistics. It is the first comprehensive history of the Light-House Establishment and
succeeding Light-House Board presented in a straightforward, unbiased, factual manner.
In 1910, President William Howard Taft transferred the responsibilities of the LightHouse Board to a newly created civilian managed Lighthouse Bureau. He appointed
George Rockwell Putnam the first Commissioner of the Bureau. Seven years after his
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appointment, Putnam wrote the most comprehensive history of the Lighthouse Service (to
that date) with Lighthouses and Lightships of the United States.24 Putnam’s narrative
places American lighthouses in the realm of humanitarian work and provides an overly
“general and rather non-technical” examination of the history and administration of the
Service. Putnam’s study is divided geographically, which became a common trend in
future histories of the Lighthouse Service. Despite its age, it remains one of the most
cited references on American lighthouses.25 Putnam served as the Commissioner of the
United States Lighthouse Bureau for 25 years from 1910 to 1935.26
Government sanctioned histories of the Army Corps of Engineers began
appearing in the 1970s. These narratives were based on the activities of the individual
Corps districts and while they were written by government employees, each narrative is
as unique as the work of each district. There is an attempt at standardization among these
narratives. They present a factual history of the Corps with very little interpretation.
Notable editions used in this study include Harold Kanarek’s Mid-Atlantic Engineers: A
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History of the Baltimore District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1774-1974 (1975),
Aubrey Parkman’s Army Engineers in New England: The Military and Civil Work of the
Corps of Engineers (1978), and Henry E. Barber and Allen R. Gann’s A History of the
Savannah District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1989). Frank N. Schubert’s The Nation
Builders: A Sesquicentennial History of the Corps Topographical Engineers (1988)
provides a brief, but informative history of the Corps’ short-lived topographical survey
division.27 These government-sanctioned histories tended to look inward at the activities
of the institutions under review rather than placing them in the context of social, political,
and cultural events.
About the same time the government began sanctioning the histories of the Army
Corps of Engineers, mainstream historians began writing histories of government
institutions. Francis Ross Holland, Jr’s America’s Lighthouses: Their Illustrated History
since 1716 (1972) provided a much needed update to Putnam’s 1917 history of the
United States Lighthouse Service. Todd Shallat’s Structures in the Stream (1994)
examines the work of the Army Corps of Engineers in building breakwaters and clearing
obstacles from the nation’s rivers and harbors. Hugh R. Slotten’s Patronage, Practice,
and Culture of American Science (1994) explores the interrelationship of patronage,
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politics, and science in nineteenth century government institutions.28 Newer studies of the
United States Lighthouse Service, such as Elinor De Wire’s Guardians of the Lights
(1995) and Dennis L. Noble’s Lighthouses and Keepers (1997) tend to focus more on
individual lighthouses and their keepers rather than the institution.29 One of the most
recent histories of a government agency is Mark R. Wilson’s study of the United States
Quartermasters Corps during the American Civil War. The Business of Civil War:
Military Mobilization and the State 1861- 1865 (2010) argues the North won the war
between the states because the officers in charge of procuring the Army’s war supplies
pieced together a system of highly functioning relationships between the government,
suppliers, and labor production in a holdover of ideals based on Jeffersonian
republicanism.30
The issue with these institutional studies is the they examine the institutional
structures in isolation of the other agencies. Thomas G. Manning’s U. S. Coast Survey vs.
Navy Hydrographic Office (1988) is one exception. Manning looks at the long running
political battle between the two government agencies regarding the role of civilians and
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the military in state science.31 Unlike the existing narratives, this chapter seeks to
highlight the interaction of the Army Corps of Engineers, Coast Survey, and the LightHouse Establishment rather than examining them in isolation.
In addition to the institutional histories, this chapter engages the literature of
knowledge construction. How knowledge was constructed in the United States in the first
half of the nineteenth century has been a topic of interest for historians of science and
technology since at least 1976 when Alexandra Oleson and Sanborn C. Brown published
an edited volume of essays on The Pursuit of Knowledge in the Early American Republic.
The Pursuit of Knowledge examined the influence of regional learned societies regarding
the construction of knowledge in the United States prior to the American Civil War.
Oleson argues these learned societies, “fostered the development of science and
scholarship and provided invaluable communication links between the far-flung members
of the young republic’s intellectual community.”32 Andrew J. Lewis’s more recent
monograph, A Democracy of Facts (2011), contradicts Oleson’s claims arguing
Americans generally mistrusted the knowledge constructed by learned men. In Lewis’
study of naturalists in the early American Republic, Lewis found natural philosophers did
not achieve credibility with the general populace until after it became involved with the
state.33 In between these two narratives, Eda Kranakis’ Constructing a Bridge and Ann
Johnson’s essay “Material Experiments: Environmnet and Engineering Institutions in the
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Early Republic,” focus more on the individuals constructing knowledge and the methods
they used. Kranakis’s study of James Finley’s suspension bridge argues the construction
of knowledge was shaped by both class and society. According to Kranakis, early
Americans constructed knowledge through their experiences, but later adopted a hybrid
method of experience and mathematical theory after the French attempted to build a
version of Finley’s bridge across the River Seine.34 Johnson’s essay examines the work of
Army Engineer Joseph G. Totten in constructing coastal defenses for the young nation.
Johnson argues engineers constructed knowledge on the strength of materials using a
“cookbook formula” of empirical research that led engineers to predicting how
construction materials would react once they were part of a built infrastructure.35
This study compliments the aforementioned works by examining government institutions
as centers of knowledge construction.
DEFINING THE STATE
While my research studies the work of individuals, I consider individuals
employed by the state to be a part of the state. I define “the state” as the agent of
government. My definition of the state includes the federal, state, local municipalities,
and the individuals in the employment of these entities. The actions and decisions of
individuals employed by the state were not necessarily seen as being the work of the
individual. Rather, these actions and decision, especially those by individuals in positions
of authority, often became viewed by society as the actions, decisions, and policies of the
34
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the government. Henry A. S. Dearborn’s and Samuel Harrison Smith’s decision not to
adopt natural gas for use in the Light-House Establishment discussed later in this chapter
provides an excellent of how individual actions become government policies. Dearborn
was the Collector for the Port of New York and Smith was the Commissioner of
Revenue. At the time of their decision to forego the adoption of natural gas lighting, the
two individuals were in charge of managing the lighthouses in the region surrounding
New York.
TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS
The government’s involvement in innovation and knowledge construction went
through many trials and tribulations. Their involvement began with the new constitutional
government. In just the ninth official act of Congress, passed on August 7, 1789, the
federal government assumed responsibility for the safety of the nation’s commerce and
navigation. The act provided for the:
…support, maintenance and repairs of all lighthouses,
beacons, buoys, and public piers erected, placed or sunk,
before the passing of this act, at the entrance of, or within
any bay, inlet, harbor or port of the United States, for
rendering the navigation thereof easy and safe…36
The passage of the act thrust the government into the realm of practical science for which
it was ill-prepared. The federal government not only acquired the 12 lighthouses then in
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existence, but also two beacons under construction; one in Massachusetts and one in
Virginia.37
Assuming responsibility for the nation’s navigational aids immediately invested
the government with a need for practical knowledge of engineering and mechanical arts if
it were to properly oversee the construction, maintenance and repairs of the aids as
required by the new law. Although a few of the engineers who served in the Continental
Army continued to serve the new government in various positions, as a whole,
government employees and contractors lacked the practical knowledge and expertise
needed for managing coastal navigation as the nation entered the nineteenth century.
Europe earlier experienced a similar problem identifying proper expertise. As Eric H.
Ash notes, “The rise of the expert and the development of the early modern state are
parallel stories.”38 In his Power, Knowledge, and Expertise in Elizabethan England, Ash
argues the the meanings of the word “expert” was undergoing a transformation from
meaning experience to also include skill. Ash claims it was this transformation that gave
rise to expert mediators as the state sought expertise in the various areas of knowledge.
Ash’s expert mediators were the go-betweens between the royal administrators and those
who were experts in their fields of knowledge and scientific practice.39 Deborah Harkness
makes a similar claim for Elizabethan London arguing it was the city of London that
nurtured the development of the expert through its “minor vernacular figures and their
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small successes, trial-and-error progresses, and mundane aspirations.”40 The author
surmises these minor figures embraced the emerging empirical and print cultures
available to them. In the fourth case study of her narrative, The Jewel House, Harkness
examines “Big Science” in Elizabethan London and how the municipality sought out and
vetted expertise knowledge.41 Across the English Channel, the French were equally
seeking out expert knowledge. Chandra Mukerji’s Impossible Engineering examines the
search for engineering expertise in building the Canal du Midi in the late seventeenth
century. Mukerji argues the learned men and so-called engineering experts were unable
to solve the problem of getting water to flow up the mountains without the expertise of
local female peasants who lived and worked with the water on a daily basis.42
INITIAL INVOLVEMENT
Between 1789 and the turn of the century, the federal government finished the
Portland Head and Cape Henry lights. In Portland, the government contracted with stone
masons Jonathan Bryant and John Nichols. Bryant and Nichols used local rubblestone to
build the Portland Head Light, employing teams of oxen to haul the rubblestone more
than six miles overland to the construction site near Cape Elizabeth. Initially, the
government contracted with Bryant and Nichols for a fifty-eight-foot tower. As the tower
neared the expected height, however, everyone involved with the project realized the
light’s focal plane would not be tall enough to provide an adequate aid to navigation. The
area’s frequent heavy fogs diminished visibility as the clouds lifted off the ocean along
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Cape Elizabeth’s rocky coast. Public officials worked with the contractors on altering the
original plans for the lighthouse. They increased the height of the Portland Head Light to
72 feet with a focal plane of 101 feet above sea level.43
Construction on the Cape Henry lighthouse at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay
also experienced problems which public officials and contractors failed to anticipate. The
federal government contracted with John McComb, Jr., a bricklayer from New York, to
complete the lighthouse started by the Virginia Commonwealth at Cape Henry.
McComb’s contract called for a foundation 13 feet deep, but the instability of the cape’s
sandy ground forced McComb to alter the plans. At one point, after McComb had cleared
the area for the foundation, the wind whipped up the sand and deposited fifty cartloads of
the coastal ground cover over McComb’s work. In the end, McComb added seven feet to
the depth of the foundation to compensate for the instability of the sandy shore.44
Although the government contractors ran into unforeseen problems when building
the Portland Head and Cape Henry lights, the projects were ultimately successes. Not
only did both structures provide protection for the safety of commerce and navigation for
many decades, those involved with the projects also gained valuable knowledge in the
fields of engineering and natural philosophy. The successful completion of the Portland
Head and Cape Henry lights gave ship owners, merchants, and mariners something to
feel good about with regards to the new national government.
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FAILURE AT FRANK’S ISLAND
The issues at the Portland Head and Cape Henry, however, were minor in
comparison to the problems the government experienced in the first decade of the
nineteenth century at the Frank’s Island lighthouse near the mouth of the Mississippi
River. Within three years of securing the Louisiana Purchase from France, Congress
authorized the construction of a lighted beacon to mark the entrance of the Mississippi
River.45 Gallatin initially inquired of Barthelemy Lafon, a local architect and surveyor, to
draw up plans for the Frank’s Island light. Gallatin, however, found Lafon’s plan
unacceptable and commissioned Benjamin Latrobe, the Surveyor of the Public Buildings,
for a proposal. Latrobe was the United States’ leading architect and engineer at the time.
Latrobe studied engineering and architecture in England under the famed John Smeaton
and Samuel Pepys Cockrell, respectively.
From the outset, the proposal for a lighthouse at the mouth of the Mississippi
River was fraught with problems. To begin with, the government took 12 years to adopt a
plan for the lighthouse. According to architectural historian Michael W. Fazio, Latrobe
submitted four proposals between 1805 and 1817. Latrobe’s first design was very
utilitarian. The plan called for a simple octagonal stone tower similar to the beacon at
Sandy Hook New Jersey.46 Latrobe’s estimate for the building was $20,000.47
Latrobe’s first proposal also incorporated engineering methods he had previously
used in constructing the Bank of Philadelphia, which “spread the weight over the whole
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surface covered equally.”48 Gallatin, however, questioned Latrobe’s expertise, fearing the
“the top of the pyramid would bend, in heavy storms.”49 The Treasury Secretary asked
Latrobe to “dispel [his] fear of the bending,” before he solicited construction bids “in
conformity with [the] plan.”50 Latrobe dispelled Gallatin’s fears by engineering a
structural innovation that allowed the tower to act monolithically. Fazio explains
Latrobe’s method as a reinterpretation of “Smeaton’s achievement [interlocking stone
joints] at Eddystone,” by “bond[ing]the courses of stone at intervals by means of the
individual units of the spiral staircase extended ‘thro’ the wall from inside to outside.’”
According to Fazio, Latrobe’s innovation significantly reduced the structure’s mass,
“allowed the masonry cross-sections to act monolithically,” and integrated “internal
spaces and structure into a single system.”51
Second, while the potential bending of the tower was a concern for the Gallatin,
congressional leaders, and other government officials, it proved minor in comparison to
the ground upon which the lighthouse was built. The mouth of the Mississippi was (and
still is) an alluvial delta. The soft, muddy ground made the weight of the structure much
more important than its height. Concern over the alluvial soil’s suitability slowed the
process of erecting a beacon at the mouth of the Mississippi River. Gallatin
commissioned Latrobe’s assistant, Lewis De Mun to survey the mouth of the Mississippi
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River.52 De Mun took soil samples of three possible sites and visually analyzed them for
their content and suitability. De Mun’s survey determined the alluvial soil was mostly
made up of clay. He then issued his report to Latrobe and the Treasury Department with
his recommendation for building the lighthouse on Royal Island to the west of the
Southwest Pass of the Mississippi River.53 Latrobe seconded the recommendation solely
on De Mun’s report, telling Gallatin “the deeper you dig, the harder it [the soil]
becomes.” Latrobe also claimed the clay soil “is perfectly watertight.”54 Latrobe,
however, never personally inspected any of De Mun’s three sites in making his
recommendation. Years later, Latrobe noted in his journal, “these old islands consist of a
hard blue Clay from the surface to a depth of 45 feet.”55
In the interim, Latrobe’s redesigned the lighthouse. According to Fazio, the new
design incorporated several architectural innovations that surpassed the brilliance of
52
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Smeaton’s work and transcended anything yet seen in European engineering, practice or
theory.56 Yet, the final design also abandoned the simplicity and frugality of Latrobe’s
original proposal. Recognizing the future importance of New Orleans as an entrepôt to
the world, Latrobe’s last proposal intended to showcase the grandeur of the new nation.
Latrobe’s latest vision included arches, columns, an elegant piazza, and marble stairs
imitating the style of the ancient Greeks.57
Although Latrobe found the the alluvial soil suitable for his design few others
agreed. Over the next several years, the Treasury Department advertised for bids to
construct the beacon according to Latrobe’s plans, but it received no offers. Fazio claims
this was mostly Latrobe’s fault. Latrobe wanted to circumvent the federal government’s
bidding process and hand-pick his own contractor. In soliciting bids, Latrobe wrote a
very technical and complex advertisement which he knew few contractors would be
willing to undertake. An excerpt of Latrobe’s advertisement read:
…The buttress walls (which must be founded upon
sprayed arches (sic) turned on a brick wall erected on the
rim of a smaller inversed Cupola turned within the larger
one) to be united with each revolution of the stairs, by
brick splayed arches forming the well of the staircase and
extending to the external wall of the tower; and on the
crown of those splayed arches, reverse arches must be
turned, the reverse feet of which support the buttresses
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above. These arches forming a succession of recesses
rising with the spiral line of the steps will continue to the
elevation of fifty feet;…58
Carter et als., believe the lack of interest in contracting for the lighthouse lie in the
unfamiliar environment of the Gulf coast.59 In either case, contracting issues stalled the
government’s progress for seven years before the War of 1812 delayed the construction
further.
After the War of 1812 ended, the Treasury Department commissioned another
survey of the mouth of the Mississippi River under the direction of United States Navy
Commodore Daniel Patterson, Benjamin Henry Latrobe’s eldest son Henry Sellon
Boneval Latrobe, and the customs collector for the state of Louisiana, Pierre LeBarbier
Duplessis, Jr. Similar to De Mun’s earlier survey, the 1816 survey found the clay soil got
harder the deeper they surveyors dug. After digging to a depth of fifty feet at several
sites, Patterson, Latrobe, and Duplessis found the soil on Frank’s Island “the most solid
of all those in the neighborhood, and even more so than that selected by Mr. De Munn
[sic].”60
At the conclusion of the survey, the Treasury prodded Winslow Lewis, into
bidding on the project. As previously mentioned in earlier chapters, Lewis contracted
with the Light-House Establishment to fit up all the lighthouses with his patented lamp
and reflector system. He also contracted with the government to deliver the annual supply
of spermaceti oil to each lighthouse. While fitting up the navigational aids with his
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patented lamp and reflector system, Lewis made minor repairs to the lighthouses. Lewis,
however, had never built a complete lighthouse. Similar to the others who refused to bid
on the project, Lewis recognized the inherent problems with Latrobe’s design and
adamantly refused to be held accountable for the foundation’s failure if he undertook the
contract.
Despite the federal government’s careful approach to the construction of the
Frank’s Island lighthouse by commissioning two surveys, building the lighthouse at
Frank’s Island proved to be one of the young republic’s biggest failures regarding coastal
navigation. Government officials made two fatal decisions. First, on the advice of
Patterson, the younger Latrobe, and Duplessis, the government selected Frank’s Island on
the Northeast Pass, for the lighthouse’s construction.61 De Mun originally recommended
Royal Island, but noted that all three sites he surveyed, including Frank’s Island, were
suitable for building the elder Latrobe’s simplistic tower. Over the course of planning for
the lighthouse, the design changed several times. With each new design, the architecture
of the lighthouse grew more elaborate and the weight of the structure increased
significantly. De Mun could not have anticipated the new design and therefore his survey
provided no assurances of the soil’s suitability beyond the original plan for a simple
tower. The survey by Patterson, Latrobe, and Duplessis took the revised plans into
consideration when recommending Frank’s Island. As noted in a letter to Samuel H.
Smith, the Commissioner of the Revenue, Patterson, Latrobe and Duplessis stated, “it is
our opinion that a building may be erected of the heaviest materials.” The three surveyors
understood the government’s “decided preference would be given to a stone or brick
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building.” They included their own plan, presumably drawn by Henry Latrobe, “to be
built principally of the latter materials.”62
This brings up the second, more fatal decision made by the Treasury. Treasury
officials accepted the design submitted by Henry Latrobe. Similar to the senior Latrobe’s
last proposal, Henry’s design was quite elaborate. The younger Latrobe incorporated
several of his father’s features into the design including the integration of the tower
resting atop the keeper’s house and a wraparound cast-iron column supported piazza. The
elder Latrobe praised his son’s work as doing him “infinite credit,” and noting that
“Smeaton himself could have designed nothing of better construction.”63
Unfortunately, Henry Latrobe succumbed to yellow fever in 1817 a year after he
submitted his design for the Frank’s Island light and a year before Winslow Lewis and
his contractors began construction on the lighthouse. Henry’s father became the point of
contact for any questions relating to the plans for the lighthouse. The elder Latrobe was
already in New Orleans simultaneously working on the city’s water supply with his other
son, Benjamin Henry Latrobe II during the lighthouse’s early construction. The senior
Latrobe inspected the lighthouse in 1819 while it was still under construction and claimed
the work was “faithfully executed & of good materials.”64 Fazio, however, argues the
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senior Latrobe never inspected the piles underneath the lighthouse. If he had, the elder
Latrobe would have known the piles were improperly constructed and not watertight.65
Even before construction was finished, the beacon’s foundation settled sixteen
inches. Latrobe found this settling harmless because the foundation had not cracked and
the settling was uniform.66 Eventually, however, the foundation did crack under the
massive weight of the structure. As the foundation gave way, the lighthouse sunk into the
soft alluvial soil and collapsed entirely. The Treasury Department commissioned an
inspection of the wreckage to determine its salvageability. Various inspections between
April 1820 and March 1821 gave conflicting reports. The first expressed optimism of
rebuilding the tower with guidance from Latrobe. This option ultimately proved
unattainable. Similar to his son Henry, Benjamin Latrobe succumbed to yellow fever in
September 1820 while inspectors were continuing their assessment of the collapse. The
second inspection, conducted by Major Joseph Jenkins deemed the repairs too costly,
having already spent 15 years and $85,000 constructing the light.67
Mr. Ruddock, a civil engineer from Carolina who happened to be in New Orleans
at the time, unofficially conducted a third inspection. What possessed Ruddock to inspect
the lighthouse remains a mystery. The government did not commission his opinion,
having already received two reports from other qualified engineers. Fazio says, Ruddock
claimed, “had I not have seen the necessity of interfering in this business, never should I
have run myself into the trouble, expense, and hazards, that I on this account have
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done.”68 Fazio claims Ruddock was the only engineer to inspect the pile foundation and
takes soil samples from below the lighthouse.
Patterson, Latrobe, and Duplessis took soil samples “to the depth of fifty feet” and
similar to De Mun’s survey, found the clay “grew gradually harder as we descended.”69
Ruddock’s inspection noted the clay “weighed 95 lbs. to the cubic foot,” but also that the
island was being inundated by water from below; a fact that seems to be confirmed by the
elder Latrobe’s visit in April 1819 when he acknowledge the erosion on the island.70
When Ruddock “thrust a pole two inches in diameter, down among the pilings, ten feet
deep…and drew the same out again…the water, immediately rose within two inches, of
the top of the ground, being 4 feet above high water.”71 According to Ruddock, the
contractors had failed to fill the piled timbers with “shells or solid materials” as called for
by the contract which would have prevented the water from undermining the structure.
Ruddock also claimed the workmen “removed the scaffold poles too soon, before the
work had got properly dry, and consolidated together.” Ruddock further noted, “the
arches were not sprung, in a proper manner” and the “walls were carried up too high.”72
The consequence of this poor workmanship, according to Ruddock, was the weight of the
structure proved too heavy for the foundation and the supports.
Ruddock and others were quick to blame Lewis and his subcontractors for the
failure at Frank’s Island. Given some of Lewis’ other shady dealings with the Light-
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House Establishment, historians have been too eager to follow suit.73 While criticism of
Lewis’ workmanship is certainly warranted, pointing fingers and placing blame does not
address the more important question of why the government proceeded to carry out the
project over the concerns of qualified contractors. The fact the Treasury commissioned
two separate surveys eleven years apart before attempting to build the lighthouse at the
mouth of the Mississippi River demonstrates the extent to which government officials
learned from the experience constructing the Cape Henry light at the mouth of the
Chesapeake Bay. Building the light at Cape Henry informed government officials of the
environment’s impact on construction. From that point forward, surveys would be a
regular aspect of constructing aids to navigation. On the other hand, that the Treasury
proceeded to carry out Latrobe’s plan over the objections of the contractors shows the
government still had much to learn and that it was still somewhat unprepared for its role
in practical science. That no contractor was willing to undertake Latrobe’s project should
have raised concern with the Treasury Department, but it did not. Additionally, Lewis’
refusal to be held accountable if the foundation failed should have held sway with
government officials, but the government likewise passed on its obligation to consider the
knowledge presented.
Two important questions arise out of the failure at Frank’s Island. First, why did
the Treasury reject the plan by Barthelemy Lafon? Lafon was a former United States
Army Engineer, architect, cartographer, local city planner, and surveyor.74 Presumably,
Lafon knew the area much better than the federal government’s surveyors, engineers, and
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contractors. As Fazio notes, Lafon’s 1806 and 1813 maps of Louisiana and the
Mississippi delta were the primary sources of information on the area prior to the 1838
chart made by Andrew Tabott.75 Second, why did the government proceed with the
construction of the Frank’s Island light when no contractor, including Winslow Lewis,
was willing to stake their name on the project’s foundation? The first question can easily
be addressed. The second requires a deeper analysis.
ANALYZING THE GOVERNMENT’S DECISION
Lafon’s plan provided for a square wooden tower built on a truncated pyramid
base. Lafon recommended building the structure of local cypress timbers for their
strength and resistance to decay.76 Frank’s Island Lighthouse historian Jay Riedl implies
the government rejected Lafon’s plan because it was not monumental enough.77 This
implication is problematic. While Lafon’s plan may not have met requirements of being a
monument, neither did Latrobe’s first design.78 Rather it seems the Treasury rejected
Lafon’s plan for a variety of cultural reasons. First, Lafon was a Creole with a French
heritage.79 Given the prevailing attitudes about race in the early nineteenth century, it
seems likely Treasury officials dismissed Lafon’s plan as unsuitable because of Lafon’s
status as a Creole. Although there is no direct evidence that race played a factor in the
Treasury’s decision, Creoles were often considered inferior because of their nonEuropean heritage. Creoles were therefore believed to be less capable of producing tracts
of a knowledgeable character.
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The Treasury Department may also have rejected Lafon’s design because of his
French heritage and education. Fazio also implies the government wanted to announce
the elimination of the French from the Mississippi Valley. With the United States having
recently acquired the Louisiana Purchase from the French, constructing a monument
designed by a French Creole ran counter to the federal government’s vision for the area.80
Additionally, Lafon used French theoretical methods in engineering his cypress tower.81
In the early nineteenth century, engineering in the United States tended to follow the
British method of tried and true practical experience rather than using mathematical
theory.82
Lastly, and perhaps equally probable, the Treasury Department may not have
trusted Lafon’s design based on the engineer’s personal character. As early as 1802,
Lafon engaged in illicit privateering and was a close associate of the pirate Jean Lafitte.83
By late 1814, a grand jury indicted Lafon for his illicit acts of piracy against the Spanish.
While this indictment came almost a decade after Treasury officials dismissed Lafon’s
plan for the lighthouse, historian William C. Davis indicates the government was aware
of Lafon’s illegal activities much earlier.84 Compounding the issue of Lafon’s personal
character was the fact that Lafon’s son, Thomy Lafon, was a mulatto.85 If Barthelemy’s
status as a Creole was not enough to concern the government, his intimacy with a negro
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woman most certainly flew in the face of what was publicly acceptable in the early
decades of the nineteenth century.
Despite Lafon’s status as a Creole and his personal character, Lafon’s knowledge
and design for a lighthouse at the mouth of the Mississippi River should not be disputed.
As Jim Frasier notes, Lafon constructed several buildings in New Orleans including the
Pedesclaux-Le Monnier House. Originally designed as a one residence, later architects
have added three additional stories to the Pedesclaux-Le Monnier House attesting to the
quality of Lafon’s knowledge and original plan.86
This leads to the second question. Why did the government proceed with
executing Henry Latrobe’s plan for the Frank’s Island lighthouse against the objections of
qualified contractors? This question requires a deeper analysis of the government’s
values. Economics undoubtedly played a major factor in the decision to proceed with the
project. Since colonial times, the mouth of the Mississippi River had been known as an
important point of entry into the interior of the continent. The federal government
envisioned New Orleans as a major entrepôt that could aid in the nation’s westward
expansion and economic growth.87 The government wished to provide safety for vessels
sailing through the various passages of the Mississippi delta and the surrounding islands.
The interest in commerce appears to have trumped all other concerns. As Patterson,
Latrobe, and Duplessis noted, “vessels can stand close in with the land without any
danger, and the distance between that and the northeast pass being small, the light would
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be very perceptible, and enable them to run in with confidence to a good anchorage off
the bar.”88 Additionally, the mouth of the Mississippi frequently experienced heavy fogs,
which mandated the presence of a light for the safety of vessels. 89 Frank’s Island, thus
“unite[d] all the advantages that can be obtained here.”90
Aside from the commercial interests, however, it appears the Treasury
Department also highly valued the knowledge of professional engineers and men of
science. In the mid-1810s when the surveys were conducted, the federal government
remained in want of knowledge of the natural world. They turned to those who were well
respected for their knowledge in similar areas of natural philosophy and the mechanical
arts. Evidence extracted from the second state-sponsored survey seemed to confirm the
findings of the first survey completed 11 years earlier and validate Latrobe’s claims.
Furthermore, Latrobe’s track record with the Virginia State Penitentiary, Bank of
Philadelphia, and United States Capital Building undoubtedly held great sway with
Treasury officials in accepting Latrobe’s opinions being the best available. Thus, in the
eyes of the government, the opinions of Latrobe, De Mun and Patterson were more
informed than those of Lafon and Lewis. The Treasury Department had little reason to
doubt the opinions of their most trusted scientific minds.
THE DEBATE OVER NATURAL GAS LIGHTING
If Winslow Lewis’ opinion did not hold promise with the government in regards
to the Frank’s Island Light, the contractor held great sway with the Treasury Department
and the regional lighthouse superintendents in terms of lighting the coastal beacons. In
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1816, David Melville of Rhode Island, approached the Light-House Establishment about
using natural gas as a source for lighting the nation’s lighthouses. Melville spoke with
Lewis about introducing natural gas lighting into coastal beacons one evening and Lewis
promised to raise the issue with Pleasonton the next time he was in Washington. Lewis,
however, failed to follow through on his promise. Being the primary contractor for
supplying the Light-House Establishment with its annual supply of spermaceti oil, Lewis
was adamantly opposed to Melville’s assertion that natural gas provided a brighter light
because it was a direct financial threat to his own contracts with the government.91
Melville had to attend business in Washington as a designated representative of
the electorate for Rhode Island in that year’s presidential election. While in the District of
Columbia, Melville argued natural gas would eliminate many of the problems associated
the illumination in American lighthouses such as the condensation of humid air, the high
cost of oil, and the need to warm winter pressed oil to a liquid state for continuous
burning.92 Additionally, Melville claimed natural gas produced an “increased and more
certain light,” than the best spermaceti oil then in use by the Establishment.93 Melville
secured permission to conduct an experiment with natural gas for one year at the
Newport, Rhode Island Lighthouse.94 Lewis was forced to rescind his contract for
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supplying oil to the Newport Light, under the auspices that failure to do so would look
badly upon him.95
Despite giving up the Newport light for a year, Lewis continued his fight against
Melville’s experiment. Lewis suggested to Melville that he might profit more
handsomely if the Newport native produced a failure in the experiment. Lewis believed
the Nantucket oil manufacturers would compensate Melville to the tune of $10,000 if
Melville’s experiment failed.96 Melville, however, refused to be a part of Lewis’
underhanded scheme. Lewis then took a different route. Lewis wrote to Samuel H. Smith,
the Commissioner of Revenue and Henry A. S. Dearborn, the regional superintendent
who oversaw the Newport Light, that natural gas was unpredictable and dangerous. As
representatives of the state, Smith and Dearborn accepted Lewis’ opinion as more
knowledgeable than Melville’s and when the year on Melville’s experiment expired, the
government chose not to adopt natural gas for wider use throughout the Establishment.
WAXING AND WANING STATE INVOLVEMENT
Although navigation was one of the principle sciences in the early nineteenth
century United States, it was not the only area in which the government engaged in
scientific practice. The federal government also engaged in innovation and practical
science in the areas of communication, defense, infrastructure, and surveying. As the
government learned from its early trials and tribulations, its involvement in innovation
and scientific practice began to improve. By the late 1830s, Army Engineers such as
Colonel Joseph G. Totten, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel James Kearney, Major William
Turnbull, Lieutenant Robert E. Lee, and Lieutenant Joseph Mansfield had made a name
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for themselves constructing coastal defenses and canals and assisting with other national
public works projects.97 The Coast Survey produced its first chart of Bridgeport Harbor.98
The Light-House Establishment had experimented with numerous lamps, lenses, fuels,
and other apparatuses for use in coastal navigation.99 And Congress had established the
Bureau of Weights and Measures for regulating the nation’s standards of measurement.100
Historian Hugh Slotten argues with the establishment of the Bureau of Weights and
Measures, Congress recognized the scientific connection between the standardization of
weights and measures and the Coast Survey. This realization led Congress to reappoint
Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler as the Superintendent of the Coast Survey.101 In 1818,
Congress removed the Coast Survey from Hassler’s oversight arguing the work was “too
expensive and too slow” under civilian management. Congress felt the Navy could do the
work more efficiently, but this proved incorrect.102
Despite these advances, the federal government still failed to fully embrace
existing innovations that could benefit the public good. For instance, on March 10, 1837,
at the request of Congress, Levi Woodbury, Secretary of the United States Treasury
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Department, sent a “circular to certain Collectors of Customs, Commanders of Revenue
Cutters, and other persons” possessing knowledge of telegraphic science “with the view
of procuring from the most intelligent sources such information as would enable
Congress, as well as the Department, to decide on the propriety of establishing a system
of telegraphs for the United States.”103 The telegraph in which Woodbury inquired was a
visual telegraph that required a line of site between the signalers and receivers. Messages
were transmitted, or “telegraphed,” through a series of flags, banners, and colored balls.
Once the signal was received by a station, the message was then retransmitted to the next
station down the line. Some historians have called this the “pre-telegraph” to distinguish
it from Samuel F. B. Morse’s electromagnetic telegraph, but this designation is
ahistorical.104 In the nineteenth century, the telegraph simply referred to any system
relaying messages, with or without electricity. Although a few of the respondents to
Woodbury’s inquiry mentioned the electromagnetic telegraph being tested by Samuel F.
B. Morse, the predominant systems then in operation were those employing a semaphoric
code.
DEBATING THE TELEGRAPH
Captain David Porter, Sr. proved the utility of the semaphoric telegraph in
America several decades earlier when he erected a flagstaff on Baltimore’s Federal Hill
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in 1796 to communicate the arrival of ships into port.105 Local merchants subscribed to
Porter’s telegraph service for $2.50 per annum and in return received a private signal flag
assigned to their specific ship.106 As a ship approached the port, the ship’s crew raised the
merchant’s private colors for Porter’s observatory to see. Porter, or his observer, would
then fly the private flag from the observatory to communicate the ship’s arrival to the
docks. These private signals kept the system local. Unless the merchant purchased extra
flags and subscribed to the telegraph service in other ports, the private signal was only
relevant to the merchant’s home port.
In addition to the private signal flags, Porter’s system also utilized a series of
generic flags, banners and balls.107 Porter reported the arrival of foreign vessels, nonsubscribing ships, and news from the sea using these non-descript symbols. For example,
Porter raised a “pendant” when a brig approached and a burgee, a short wide swallowtailed triangle triangle, signal the arrival of a topsail schooner.108 Porter’s signals were
likely based on telegraphic systems he encountered in his 20-plus years at sea. After the
American Revolution Porter captained the United States Revenue Cutter Active, where he
frequently interacted with French and British naval officers.109 Additionally, Porter
frequently sailed as a private shipmaster to the Caribbean, where marine observatories
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had existed since at least the mid 1500s.110 A marine observatory was a land based station
that communicated with ships either passing at sea or arriving in port. The structure of the
marine observatory station could range from a single flagstaff from which the signals
were flown to lookout tower with many of the observatories sitting under a cupola atop a
port’s merchant exchange building.
Eleven years after Porter established his marine observatory, merchants and city
officials in Portland, Maine authorized Captain Lemuel Moody to erect a similar system
to benefit commerce and spurn economic growth of the local community. Moody used
Porter’s system as a basis for his own, but he added colored balls to the flags and banners
used to communicate non-subscribing ships and other news. This addition continued the
“Americanization” of the marine telegraph. Other ports followed. Savannah established a
signal line running from the Tybee Island lighthouse to the city docks by 1812.111 New
York adopted the optical telegraphic system of Captain Samuel C. Reid in 1821 and Key
West began announcing port arrivals in 1829.112 By the 1830s, marine telegraphs were
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present in nearly every major American seaport.113
Many of the respondents to Woodbury’s inquiry acknowledged the utility of the
telegraph with a “national point of view.”114 As Captain Andrew Mather, commander of
the United States Revenue Cutter Wolcott stated in his reply, “As to the utility of a
telegraph from the seat of Government to the principal seaports and commercial cities, I
believe there is but one opinion. There is no doubt of its great importance to the
commercial interests, and its importance in time of war is incalculable.”115 Moody
believed a concise message could be sent more than 100 miles between Portland and
Boston in less than 20 minutes.116 Mather opined the rate of conveyance would be even
faster at “six to eight miles per minute, and in urgent cases eight to ten miles per
minute.”117 Mather’s viewpoint was seconded by Signor Penistri, an Italian living in New
Orleans at the time. Penistri’s experience with the Italian telegraph during its war against
Austria in 1830 noted telegraphic messages ran “one hundred miles in about 11 minutes,
more or less, according to the communication.”118 In England, the Holyhead telegraph
was so efficient, it could transmit a message 128 miles to Liverpool in five minutes; a
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rate of almost 26 miles per minute.119 The Holyhead line was the most renowned among
mariners in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; however, despite its
remarkable efficiency, the Holyhead telegraph was not the fastest. On January 5, 1805,
the Providence Patriot (Rhode Island) reported M. Vloers, a Belgian physician, could
“transmit communications from Antwerp to Rome, in eighteen minutes;” by telegraph.120
If Vloers’ claims were correct, his message travelled more 940 miles in less than onethird an hour; a rate eclipsing 52 miles per minute and more than double that of
Holyhead.
Woodbury also sent the circular to the Franklin Institute, one of the leading
centers for the promotion of mechanical arts in the early nineteenth century. The Institute
recommended, “the propriety of causing two telegraphs to be erected, in which careful
experiments may be made on all the points that bear upon the general question submitted
to him by the House of Representatives.”121 One of these two telegraphs would be erected
along the coast connecting seaports with one another, such as the line contemplated by
John Rowe Parker, “from the [Boston] Observatory to Point-Judith” in Narragansett, RI
via Cape Cod, Nantucket, and the Vineyard.122 The other line proposed by the Institute
would be established for overland communication.
Some individuals responded negatively to Woodbury’s request. William W. Polk
of New Haven Connecticut, for instance, “doubt[ed] whether many advantages would be
derived from such an institution in a time of peace by either the public or the

119

“Telegraphic Signals,” The Eastern Argus (Portland, ME), December 18, 1827.
“Untitled,” Providence Phoenix (Providence, RI), January 5, 1805, 4.
121
R. M. Patterson to Woodbury, April 18, 1837 in H. Doc. 15.
122
“Marine Telegraph,” Providence Patriot and Columbian Phoenix (Providence, RI),
November 10, 1827, 2.
120

255

government,” and that if any benefit did exist, it would “by no means commensurate with
the expense.”123 Messrs. Servel and Gonon argued the system would be inexpedient
noting that in Russia it “often require[d] five or six hours to communicate thirty or forty
words” over “a distance of only seven leagues.”124
Despite the overwhelming support for the telegraph, the United States
government did not invest in the system. Woodbury laid the information before Congress,
but Congress failed to act upon the inquiry it had initially requested. Congress’ inaction
may have resulted from its recognition of the advances in telegraphic science. Morse
lobbied for his recently invented electromagnetic telegraph arguing, “telegraphs
constructed on the ordinary principles” were “useless the greater part of the time.”125
Morse noted, “in foggy weather, and ordinarily during the night, no intelligence can be
transmitted.”126 He also claimed, “even when they can transmit, much time is consumed
in communicating but little, and that little not always precise.”127 Morse then went on to
discuss the advantages of his “entirely new mode of telegraphic communication.”128
In a follow up letter of November 28, 1837, Morse wrote Woodbury relaying the
results of his experiment. Morse and his associates had sent a message over ten miles
with “perfect” results and Morse claimed, “our success has, thus far, been complete.”129
Morse had “no doubt of its effecting a similar result at any distance.”130 Consequently,
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Morse requested an audience with Congress to demonstrate his electromagnetic
telegraph, asking Woodbury, “How late in the session can I delay my visit, and yet still be
in season to meet the subject of telegraphs when it shall be presented by your report?”131
RENEWED INTEREST IN INNOVATION AND SCIENCE
If Congress did not follow through on the telegraph, it did show interest in other
areas of innovation and practical science. A year after Woodbury’s inquiry into the
telegraph, Congress passed two very important pieces of legislation regarding the state’s
involvement in science. The first was a resolution to purchase a French made lenticular
apparatuses for trial in American lighthouses. The Secretary of the Treasury
commissioned United States Navy Captain Matthew Calbraith Perry for the task. Due to
ongoing manufacturing problems in France’s glass industry, the lenses were not shipped
to the United States for another two years.132 The Treasury contracted with the French to
install the lenses, as they were more complicated than anything currently in use in the
United States Light-House Establishment. The installation was completed in the winter of
1840-1.
The second piece of legislation was the Army Reorganization Act of 1838. The
Act established the Corps of Topographical Engineers separate from the Army Corps of
Engineers and repealed the General Survey Act of 1824.133 The Topographical Engineers
had existed within the larger Corps of Engineers for decades surveying the nation’s
rivers, harbors, and other sites for public works. Until the passage of the Army
Reorganization Act, however, one-third of the Topographical Engineers were civilians.
131

Ibid.
Thomas A. Tag, “Fresnel Lens Makers Part II: The Sautter Lens Works Producers of
the Fresnel Lens,” The Keeper’s Log 21, no. 3 (Summer 2005), 26-9.
133
Schubert, 24.
132

257

The Act ended the Topographical Corps’ reliance on civilian engineers by prohibiting the
Corps’ hiring of civilians for surveys. The Act achieved this measure by increasing the
number of Topographical Engineers, all drawn from the officer ranks, within the
Corps.134
With the repeal of the General Survey Act of 1824, the Topographical Corps’
focused changed from surveying the nation’s rivers and harbors to surveying and
constructing sites of public works. This included proposed sites for lighthouses and other
navigational aids. The Topographical Engineers had previously interacted with the LightHouse Establishment conducting site surveys for potential lighthouses, the first of which
came in 1834 with survey of the Brandywine Shoals in Delaware under Captain Hartman
Bache.135
Additionally, in 1842, the Corps was given the responsibility of assessing the
Light-House Establishment and the condition of the nation’s aids to navigation. This task
was assigned to Lieutenant I.W.P. Lewis, the engineer who surveyed the Carysfort Reef
and later designed the lighthouse placed at the reef.136 The new duty of assessing the
Light-House Establishment increased the interaction between the Establishment and the
Corps of Engineers, but the relationship was contentious. At issue were concerns over the
management, or mismanagement, of the Establishment and how the state might improve
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coastal navigation. Lewis’ report was very critical of Pleasonton and the Fifth Auditor’s
management of the Light-House Establishment.
MORE WAXING AND WANING
As evidence of the state’s waxing and waning involvement in innovation and
practical science, Congress failed to act on either the Fresnel lens or Lewis’ report.
Stephen Pleasonton, the aforementioned Superintendent of the Light-House
Establishment, stood ready to purchase more Fresnel lenses after the initial installation
and experiments were conducted, “if it be thought proper by Congress to authorize any
more.”137 Pleasonton even suggested purchasing more lenses for additional experiments
on Long Island.138 Yet, as Pleasonton acknowledged years later, Congress “determined to
take no action upon it, and none as far as I can learn, has ever been taken on it since.”139
Lewis’ report met a similar fate from Congress. Lewis condemned Pleasonton’s
management of the Establishment, but Congress did little to rectify the situation.
Congress sent a commission, Lieutenants Thornton Alexander Jenkins and Richard
Meade Bache, to Europe to study how Britain and France managed their lighthouses, but
Pleasonton remained in his role as Superintendent of the Light-House Establishment and
Congress continued to underfund lighthouse appropriations. The previously mentioned
Carysfort Reef Lighthouse provides an excellent example. Congress originally
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appropriated only $20,000 for the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse. Pleasonton requested
further appropriations noting the lighthouse would cost four times the Congressional
authorizations.140 Congress appropriated an additional $40,000 the following year, but it
was still insufficient. In all the state spent over $105,000 on the lighthouse.141 Congress’
continual underfunding of the Light-House Establishment not only prevented Pleasonton
from purchasing additional Fresnel lenses on his own, it also maintained the status quo
management of the Establishment.
Congress’ response to the Lewis report, however, was not immediate. The process
of authorizing the commission fell victim to the bureaucracy of the government.
Congress appeared content with inaction, much as it had after it procured the two
experimental Fresnel lenses. Because of the federal government’s slow bureaucratic
process, three years lapsed between I.W.P. Lewis’ report and Congress’ reluctant
authorization of the commission. In the interim, mariners continued their complaints
against the Light-House Establishment. Edmund Blunt, an Assistant Superintendent of
the Coast Survey, and his brother George Blunt, publisher of The American Coast Pilot,
spearheaded the mariners’ efforts and became the face of the political opposition to
Pleasonton’s administration of the Establishment.142
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Lieutenants Jenkins and Bache were skilled surveyors and senior officers in the
Coast Survey. Jenkins graduated at the head of his class at West Point in 1834, and as a
result, was commissioned to the Coast Survey that same year.143 Bache joined the Coast
Survey four years later, while it was still under the superintendency of Ferdinand
Rudolph Hassler. Bache was the brother of Alexander Dallas Bache, who took charge of
the Coast Survey when Hassler passed away. Jenkins and Richard Bache spent a year
abroad conducting their investigation of the British and French lighthouses. In Great
Britain, Jenkins and Bache paid particular attention to the lighthouses in Ireland and
Scotland, where the climate and geography played a more significant role. Both men
recommended wide scale adoption of the Fresnel lens and the creation of a lighthouse
board made up of military officers and scientifically minded men to oversee the LightHouse Establishment.144 Additionally, Jenkins and Bache confirmed the opinions of Lt. I.
W. P. Lewis and the Blunt brothers; expressing the lighthouses in the United States were
“inferior to all they had seen in Europe.”145
Congress acted on Jenkins and Bache’s recommendations, but once again the
bureaucratic pace of change slowed the process. The state’s first action transferred the
responsibility for lighthouse construction to the Corps of Engineers.146 No longer would
the Treasury Department be responsible for soliciting, accepting, and overseeing the
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contracts for new lighthouses. That task was now in the hands of a group with expertise
in engineering and practical science. This transfer of responsibility limited the Treasury
Department’s role to the administration of Congressional appropriations.
The Corps of Engineers had been created for similar concerns in constructing
coastal defenses and surveying the nation’s waterways had proven its worth in these
areas, as well as in advising on privately built internal improvement projects. In the eyes
of learned men, the transfer of this responsibility represented new possibilities for
practical science and innovation as many of the agencies created by Congress and the
federal government created scientific agendas for resolving problems of commerce and
navigation.
While Congress removed the responsibility for lighthouse construction from
oversight by the Treasury Department, the rest of the Light-House Establishment
remained under the superintendency of the Fifth Auditor. Congress took another four
years before finally authorizing the establishment of a lighthouse board made up of
scientifically-minded men as originally recommended by Jenkins and Bache’s report. In
authorizing the Light-House Board, Congress specifically mentioned the scientific nature
of the enterprise and the qualifications expected of the board’s members in stating, “a
board…to be comprised of two officer of the Navy of high rank, two officers of
Engineers of the Army, and such civil officers of scientific attainments…” The LightHouse Board assembled the best scientific minds in the United States including,
Alexander Dallas Bache, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, and Joseph Henry,
Superintendent of the Smithsonian Institution. Other members, such as Commander
Samuel F. Du Pont of the United States Navy, Lieutenant Colonel James Kearney of the
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Topographical Engineers, and Lieutenant Thornton A. Jenkins of the Coast Survey all
had extensive education and practical training in mathematics, surveying, and other
sciences. The creation of the Light-House Board ended the Treasury Department’s tenure
as superintendent of the Light-House Establishment.
One of the first changes made by the newly established Light-House Board was
the importation of the French made Fresnel lighthouse lens. Jenkins and Bache had been
impressed with the lens’ performance in both England and France and testimony by
mariners in the United States indicated the experimental lens installed at Navesink
Highlands in New Jersey was the best light in the United States. Lieutenant David Dixon
Porter commented the twin lights at Navesink were the “only perfect lights on our coast,
not only as regards regularity in lighting, but in the brilliancy of the light.”147 Captain
George Barker of Boston considered the French lens at Navesink to be “among the best
lights on our sea-coast.”148 Packet ship captain William H. Russell noted, “with the
exception of the lights on the Highlands of Navesink, near the entrance to New York, I do
not know of any light along the entire line of our coast, which will bear any comparison
with those of England.”149 By 1860, the Light-House Board had installed Fresnel lenses
in all of the lighthouses in the United States including the lighthouse at Carysfort
completed in 1852.
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CONCLUSION
The Carysfort Reef was the recipient of the state’s innovation and knowledge
leading up to the American Civil War. The marking of the Carysfort Reef, both
physically and visually, represented the best the federal government had to offer. More
than one hundred and sixty years after its construction, the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse
remains as a testament to the government’s achievements in innovation and its
construction of scientific knowledge. Yet, while Carysfort is a testament to the
government’s accomplishments before 1860, the state’s involvement in innovation and
scientific practice went through many trials and tribulations. The federal government
followed an inconsistent, often waxing and waning path of engagement similar to their
involvement in building infrastructure, internal improvements, and public works.150
The trials and tribulations of the government’s venture into innovation and
science proved to be a great learning experience. Many of these trials resulted from the
government’s unpreparedness for entering scientific practice so soon after the nation
gained its freedom from Britain and established a strong centralized government. At other
times, defining expertise, identifying the experts, and constructing knowledge created
political situations that shaped the federal government’s involvement in science. By the
time Carysfort Reef was marked and the lighthouse at the reef built, the federal
government was fully immersed in innovation and scientific practice.
The state established government agencies, including the Army Corps of
Engineers, the Coast Survey, and the Light-House Establishment to deal with the
150
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commercial and navigational problems that plagued the nation. While the state only
specified the objectives of these institutions, those in charge of the agencies adopted
agendas that either engaged in or promoted the use of practical science and innovation to
resolve those problems. These individuals, however, represented the government and
their decisions often became policy, or at the very least were viewed by others as the
policies of the government.
The government’s involvement in innovation and the construction of knowledge
was also inconsistent; waxing and waning as the state’s priorities changed. Those
priorities were sometimes dictated by need, as was the case in constructing the Frank’s
Island Lighthouse. Other times, the priorities were determined by financial and political
concerns. The Treasury Department approved David Melville’s request to experiment
with natural gas lighting in coastal navigation because Melville argued natural gas was
cheaper and more efficient. Politics, however, prevented natural gas from being adopted,
despite its advantages. Still at other times, the government’s priorities reacted to public
outcry, such as the mariners complaints against the Light-House Establishment.
Regardless of what influenced the state’s priorities in innovation and science, men such
as Benjamin Henry Latrobe, Lewis De Mun, Winslow Lewis, David Melville, Levi
Woodbury, and Lieutenants Thornton A. Jenkins and I. W. P. Lewis made the federal
government a major factor in the construction of knowledge in the early American
nineteenth century. The longevity of the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse stands as evidence of
that fact.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The intersection of science, technology, commerce, and the state is an important
relationship in the history of the United States, especially in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries when the fledgling nation was still developing. The nation’s need for
a strong economy pushed the federal government into accepting responsibility for
preserving and protecting commerce. Despite the nation’s westward expansion to the
Pacific in the first half of the nineteenth century, maritime shipping remained the
principle means of commerce. Shipping acted as a gateway, providing access to the
global network of exchange. Protecting commerce, therefore, meant protecting maritime
shipping and the state assumed that responsibility with the advent of the Light-House
Establishment, the Coast Survey, and the Army Corps of Engineers. These agencies in
turn pursued scientific agendas to meet their obligations.
The path to scientific expertise, however, was not an easy one. The government’s
involvement with science and innovation was filled with many challenges. The
unexpected difficulties at Portland Head and Cape Henry and the failure at Frank’s Island
highlighted the government’s unpreparedness for its new responsibilities. The War of
1812 delayed the Coast Survey and temporarily interrupted the installation of Winslow
Lewis’ patented lamp and reflector system, but it illustrated the expertise of the Army
Corps of Engineers work in coastal defenses. These trials and tribulations proved to be a
great learning experience as witnessed by the longevity of the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse.
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Additionally, the government’s involvement often waxed or waned with the
nation’s immediate priorities. Congress authorized the agencies that undertook building
the nation’s infrastructure, but then often failed to appropriate enough funds for their
successful operation. Congress also left these agencies to determine their own agendas
until it became necessary for the legislative body to intervene. Hassler’s removal as
Superintendent of the Coast Survey in 1816 and his later reappointment in 1832 as well
as Congress’ dealing with the Army Corps of Engineers and Light-House Establishment
between 1837 and 1850 help illustrate the government’s waxing and waning involvement
in science and innovation.
The government’s involvement in innovation and practical science was also
shaped by the republican ideology of the early United States. Republican values
influenced how Superintendents managed their agencies. Most attempted to adhere to
principles of prudent management, honesty, civic duty, and promoted the idea of a selfreliant nation. Superintendents, such as the Light-House Establishment’s Stephen
Pleasonton, worked diligently to weed out corruption. They did their best to practice
prudence in their management through caution and thrift. The superintendents, and many
of the individuals who worked for them, also felt it was their civic duty to promote the
nation’s self-reliance in innovation and science. The Treasury, for instance, admonished
Hassler in the 1830s for continuing to use foreign equipment and suppliers for the Coast
Survey. This idea of self-reliance generated many new inventions including Captain
Stansbury’s diskpile foundation for offshore structures and improved methods for coastal
illumination. When Army Corps Engineers I. W. P. Lewis and George Gordon Meade
invented new apparatuses for illuminating the coast, they chose not to patent their
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inventions, but instead gave them to the government without profiting because their civic
duty was greater than their desire for fame or wealth.
The United States Light-House Establishment played an important role in the
creation of scientific knowledge, particularly in the areas of illumination and chemical
analysis of various fuels. These scientific endeavors produced new knowledge about the
natural world. Additionally, the engineering and surveying needs of the Establishment
resulting in the agency contributing to those fields through their interactions with the
Corps of Engineers and Coast Survey. The dual role of lighthouse keepers as telegraph
agents also put the Establishment in position to contribute to the advancement of
communications. The Establishment’s engagement in constructing knowledge and
performing science, thus placed the agency at the forefront of American science prior to
the outbreak of the Civil War. As such, the Light-House Establishment deserves to be
recognized as one of the leading scientific enterprises in the United States alongside the
Army Corps of Engineers and Coast Survey.
The Light-House Establishment employed a diverse lot of laborers. The men,
women and children who performed science for the Establishment included both the
formally educated and the everyday tinkerers. These individuals did more than make
observations and record their findings. They engaged in the construction of scientific
knowledge. The Light-House Establishment was responsible for dozens of innovations,
including clockwork mechanisms, new engineering methods, improved lamps and
reflectors, and many other devices designed to improve coastal navigation.
The Light-House Establishment provide the perfect opportunity for men and
women to engage in science. The coastal and harbor environments provided the perfect
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space to pursue experiments and learn about the natural world. These experiments turned
early American seaports in to scientific laboratories and workshops for the practical arts.
Ports were more than gateways of exchange or end nodes on a global trading network.
Early American ports were centers for creating, exploring and obtaining knowledge.
They were field schools for those who wished to learn about science, the arts, and the
natural world.
The environment also played a role in shaping both the government’s
involvement in innovation and practical science and science’s interaction with commerce.
Government officials, inventors, and other individuals interested in advancing science
and the arts viewed the environment as an adversary. These individuals sought to tame
the environment and thus approached the natural world with an antagonist attitude. The
landscape was sort of a manifest destiny; something that must be conquered to prove
Americans’ dominance in nature. The romantic literarists attempted to change society’s
perception of nature and, but those engaged in scientific practice remained steadfast in
their hostility towards the environment.
The natural world also provided American with the means for overcoming
environmental challenges. The extracted natural resources from the land to solve
everyday problems. In the process, these individuals gained valuable knowledge that not
only advanced their understanding of the natural world, but also of science and the arts.
The environment was an unrelenting challenge and often combating the
constantly changing natural world was beyond the capital ability of individuals. The
federal government necessarily had to intervene. The state possessed both the knowledge
and resources for taking on projects concerning the environment. This expertise was then
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passed on to individuals and local communities through the construction of infrastructure.
Internal improvements became a responsibility of the federal government as a result of its
expertise as much as it did for the government’s ability to commandeer the necessary
resources. Additionally, as the government expanded its role in dealing with the
environment, they sought to simplify nature. One landscape was treated the same as
another indicating the lessons learned at Cape Henry, Frank’s Island, and Portland Head
may not have been learned after all. The government chose Republican values over best
practices, which often led to complications and failures.
As the nation’s economic interests increased, so did he challenges that needed to
be addressed. Despite the westward expansion, eastern seaports remained the anchor of
American commerce. Commercial problems were shipping problems. These problems
included the British impressment of American sailors, reefs, shoals, and other underwater
hazards, and the loss of income from ships sitting idly in port with no place to sail and no
cargo to load. Those concerned with commerce and the economy used science and the
practical arts to solve everyday commercial problems. Many of these problems were
seen as matters “of serious importance.”1
Protecting the lives of mariners was one of the most important issues for
American commercial interests. The loss of life had a great impact of local communities
from the personal tragedy felt by those affected to the economic loss associated with a
reduced labor pool for working the ships, docks, and other commercial interests. The loss
of cargo was also important as the loss of goods had a more direct impact on the
economy. Cargoes lost as a result of shipwrecks correlated to losses in profits, customs
United States Congress, Breakwater – Crow Shoal – Pier and Light-House, 25th Cong.,
2nd sess., 1838, H. Doc. 433, June 18, 1838, 1.
1
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duties, and wages. These financial losses were necessary to keep the economy churning
and the loss of a single ship, such as The Union could bankrupt a local merchant or ship
owner.
Practical science and mechanical arts were necessary to protect commerce and
provide safe passage into and out of the nation’s harbors. Early on this task was taken up
by individuals who had an interest in commerce. Men, such as Lewis Brantz and Lemuel
Moody charted the coasts and local harbors. Others, including Winslow Lewis and David
Melville, innovated improvements to navigation through better illumination or invented
entirely new devices, all for the purposes of advancing the nation’s economy. The
government relied heavily on individual citizens to produce this kind of science,
however, by mid-century, the government began relying more heavily on its own
scientific enterprises. The Coast Survey began providing charts and maps for selecting
lighthouse sites and the Corps of Engineers were constructing breakwaters, lighthouses,
and public piers.
This shift required the government agencies to collaborate with each other. In
order to build the breakwaters, lighthouses, and public piers used to protect and facilitate
the nation’s commerce, the Corps of Engineers needed to understand the various
elements of the natural world. The Corps turned to the Coast survey for information on
tides, currents, winds, and the makeup of the ocean floor which the Survey had gained
through their scientific studies of the harbors and coastal inlets. The Corps of Engineers
also learned through their own work as they built the infrastructure of the ports.
Commerce served as the underlying and unifying principle.
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In the private sector, entrepreneurs sought to improve port efficiencies and they
turned to science and the arts to advance their goals. The advanced reporting of ship
arrivals through the marine telegraph, for instance, made it possible for merchants and
ship owners to pre-arrange unlading of cargoes, sell the incoming goods, and identify
cargos for the next voyage. The advanced notification reduced the amount of time ships
lay idle in port resulting in a faster return to the sea where ships and crews made their
money. An idle ship makes no money. The reduction in port idle time could average as
much as two weeks.
This study has provided just one way to examine the intersection of science,
technology, commerce, and the state in the early nineteenth century United States. I have
focused on the period between the ratification of the United States Constitution and the
American Civil War because science, technology, and commerce changed dramatically in
the face of railroad expansion after the war and because the federal government held little
power prior to the Constitution. Before the Constitution, each state pursued individual
economic and scientific agendas most likely resulting in an incoherent narrative.
Additionally, my examination centers around the Army Corps of Engineers, the
Coast Survey, and the Light-House Establishment. These were the first agencies
established by the federal government to work towards the betterment of commerce and
the economy. In an age when maritime commerce still dominated the economy, it should
not be a surprise that these agencies focused their energies on improving navigation.
Navigation in itself was a science, however, these agencies turned to the natural world,
the mechanical arts, and the practical sciences of engineering and surveying to

272

accomplish their objectives. Those objectives primarily consisted of providing safe
passage for ships sailing into and out of America’s commercial ports.
Lastly, I have focused almost exclusively on the Atlantic states. Gulf states and
the Midwest receive some attention, but the majority of the study is on the eastern
seaboard’s commercial centers. This is not intended to discount the contributions of the
Pacific west, but rather to recognize the West was just beginning its development in the
decade immediately preceding the American Civil War. The West therefore offered a
very different narrative.
There are other ways to examine the intersection of science, technology, and
commerce in the early United States. While this study has examined the intersection
through maritime interests because of the dominance of maritime trade on commerce and
the economy, one might also choose to look at the intersection of science, technology,
and commerce through agriculture as Joyce E. Chaplin does in An Anxious Pursuit.
Chaplin’s study looks at how agricultural innovations impacted commercial growth in
colonial America and the early United States republic.2 Similar to how maritime interests
dominated trade, agricultural products and food stuffs were the dominant products in
commercial markets.
In terms of the science and arts studied here, it might be more helpful to organize
the study based on the different sciences, such as engineering, illumination, surveying,
and chemical experimentation. This would allow a more detailed examination of the
fields that could be brought together in a final chapter at the end rather than the arching
narrative of the current study that begins and ends with a discussion of the various
2
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agencies, but narrows in the middle to almost solely focus on the Light-House
Establishment.
A second option is to re-frame the study as an examination of the science and
innovation in the Light-House Establishment prior to 1850. Framing the study as an
examination of science and innovation in the Light-House Establishment prior to 1850
would serve two purposes. First, it would fill the void in historiography of American
lighthouses which tends to privilege the politics of Stephen Pleasonton’s administration
and the romanticized stories of lighthouse keepers. Thomas A. Tag’s series of articles on
lighthouse illumination in The Keeper’s Log is not enough.3 More needs to be said about
the innovation and science in the Light-House Establishment. Second, such a study would
answer the critics of Pleasonton’s administration who claim the Light-House
Establishment was unscientific before the advent of the Light-House Board in 1852.
What these critics overlook is the question, “what was considered science?” during the
first half of nineteenth century. Chapter 3 of this study is a first step and could be used as
the foundation for revising the dissertation into a monograph. In contrast the the currently
held beliefs about the Light-House Establishment, answering the question “What was
considered science?” will demonstrate the Establishment was one of the most scientific
organizations in the early United States. The Establishment served as an outlet for
inventors and tinkerers to test their innovations and a place to promote science and the
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practical arts. Such a study might resemble Hugh Richard Slotten’s examination of the
Coast Survey or Todd Shallat’s narrative of the Army Corps of Engineers.4
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APPENDIX A – PERMISSION TO PRINT
The following is the Smithsonian National Museum of American History’s permission to
print figure 2.1 Winslow Lewis’ Lamp and Reflector Patent #1305.

James Risk <james.r.risk@gmail.com>

Publication Permission Request
Johnston, Paul F. <johnstonpf@si.edu>
To: James Risk <james.r.risk@gmail.com>

Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 2:09 PM

—VIA EMAIL—
Dear Mr. Risk,

Your request to publish pictorial material from the Smithsonian’s Transportation
History collections has been received (NMAH Photo of Winslow Lewis lighthouse
lamp patent).
The National Museum of American History (NMAH) will waive reproduction rights
fees for this non-commercial use of an image from its collections. You are hereby
provided with one-time, non-exclusive use, world rights, in one language only. Use
of the material with other conditions, in a later edition, another medium or other
publication is considered a new request. Use is granted only to the degree that the
NMAH has rights to do so, and it is the responsibility of the user to determine
copyright status.
The credit line for the published image should read: “Courtesy of the Smithsonian
Institution, NMAH/Maritime.” Thank you for your interest in the Smithsonian
Institution, and best wishes.

Sincerely,

PFJ
-Paul F. Johnston, Ph.D.
Curator of Maritime History
National Museum of American History
Smithsonian Institution
MRC 628
PO Box 37012
Washington, DC 20013-7012 USA
(202) 633-3909
americanhistory.si.edu

From: James Risk <james.r.risk@gmail.com>
Date: Monday, December 7, 2015 at 11:36 AM
To: "Paul F. Johnston" <johnstonpf@si.edu>
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